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ABSTRACT
The advertisements consumers are bombarded with every day normally occur in a
context. Editorial stories in print media, TV shows, and other advertisements or commercials
are examples of such contexts. The context in which advertisements are embedded can vary in
congruity with the content of the advertising messages. This dissertation first asked if
attitudes formed under different levels of congruence between content of advertising context
and the content of the advertisement arise from different levels of elaboration. If level of
congruence gave different levels of elaboration, the second question was: do attitudes formed
under different levels of congruence between content of advertising context and the content of
the advertisement differ in attitude strength? To guide the search in answers for these
theoretical questions, this dissertation focused on an integration of the literatures of on the
concept of priming and the theory and methods from research on attitude change.
The basic hypothesis derived from the multiple roles of persuasion variables postulate
of the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) was that congruence between editorial context and
advertisement content could lead to increased elaboration. In conditions with higher
congruence, primed memory content would be more applicable to advertising content, thus
increasing elaboration likelihood compared to conditions with lower congruence. The
following hypotheses were suggested: at different levels of congruence we expected: a) brand
attitude extremity should differ, qualified by sensitivity to argument quality, b) content of
cognitive responses would differ, qualified by sensitivity to argument quality, c) correlation
between cognitive responses and brand attitude would differ, and d) correlation between
brand attitude and purchase intention would differ. These hypotheses were tested in a 2 (prime
congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 (argument quality: strong vs. weak) between
subjects factorial design (n = 137). Congruence was manipulated by crossing a functionally
positioned advertisement with a prime story with either a functionally or experientially
content. Participants were undergraduate students of Ohio State University.
Results showed that congruently primed participants were significantly more sensitive
to the argument quality manipulation (F(1,133) = 9.8,p = .002), that correlations between the
cognitive response index and brand attitudes were higher for congruently primed participants
(Fisher z = 2.48, P < .01), and that correlations between brand attitudes and purchase
intentions were higher for congruently primed participants (Fisher z = 1.81, P < .04). The
predicted interaction between prime congruence and argument quality on the cognitive
response index failed to reach significance.
In response to the second question, the next assumption based on the ELM (Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, Haugtvedt, and Smith, 1995) was that if congruently primed
attitudinal responses resulted from higher message scrutiny than incongruently primed
attitudinal responses, congruently primed attitudes should be stronger. Consequently, it was
hypothesized that both brand attitude, and confidence in that brand attitude would resist
counter attack messages better in congruent compared to incongruent prime conditions.
The second study kept and crossed the strong argument quality version of the
advertisement with the same editorial stories as in study 1.Additionally, a counter argument
message in two versions: strong and weak was developed. Brand attitudes and brand attitude
confidence were measured pre and post attack, thus the design of study 2 was a 2 (counter
argument: strong vs. weak) x 2 (prime congruence: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (time of
attitude measurement: post advertisement, post counterattack) mixed factorial design with the
first two treatments as between subjects factors, and the last a repeated measurement factor
within subjects. Participants were 181 undergraduate students of Ohio State University. First,
the results showed that the hypothesized prime congruence x time of measurement interaction
on attitude resistance was significant (F(1,177) = 8.73, P < .OOS}.Attitudes of congruently
primed participants resisted counter attacks better than attitudes of incongruently primed
participants even though the brand attitudes in the two conditions were not significantly
different pre attack. Secondly, the hypothesized prime congruence x time of measurement
interaction on attitude confidence resistance was significant (F(1,177) = 9.26, P < .OOS}. The
confidence attached to the attitudinal response resisted counter attacks better for participants
in the congruent prime condition, compared with the incongruent prime condition.
In combination, the results form the two studies indicate that congruence between
advertising context and advertising content can increase elaboration likelihood, and
consequently also drive attitude resistance and attitude confidence. These questions have not
been addressed by previous priming research, or by previous persuasion research.
Particularly, priming researchers have normally not utilized manipulations necessary to assess
elaboration, and persuasion researchers have not investigated the elaborative capacity of
contextual priming. This dissertation contributes to both priming and persuasion research by
examining the elaborative capacity of contextual primes in the form of editorial context of
print advertisements. It also provides new knowledge about the strength of brand attitudes
formed or changed in the presence of different contextual primes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Picture yourself reading a business magazine, e.g., Forbes. You have just read an
interesting story regarding how successful companyexecutives organize themselves to
become more efficient. When you tum the page of the magazine, a full-page, color
advertisement for the new, enhanced PDAl from Casio catches your eye. It has infrared
communication with your laptop, color-screen, spreadsheet, word-processor, mail-
functionality, and a digital camera to name a few attributes. Do you think the attention you
give to that advertisement is influenced by the story you just read? Do you think the judgment
you reach about the PDA is influenced by the topic described in the story? Before saying yes
or no, consider the opposite, a situation where you saw the advertisement without having read
the story. What about a case where the story was about successful executives' culinary
interests? In such cases, would you be equally attentive to the advertisement then, would you
develop the same judgments about the product in the advertisement? Chances are no. Most
likely, what you read prior to the advertisement would have affected you in some way, or
more precisely, the context of the advertisement would have influenced how you process the
advertisement. The story would have made some concepts in your memory more salient or
accessible, and these concepts were still accessible in your mind when you saw the
advertisement. Chances are that you are aware of the story you read, but not especially aware
of how that story influenced the way you read the advertisement.
The relationship between advertising context and brand judgments may take several
forms, specifically; the processes mediating the effect of advertising context on attitude
towards the advertised brand may be different. Depending on the kinds of processes
underlying the formation or change of an attitude, the attitude can differ in strength (e.g.,
Haugtvedt, Schumann, Schneier, and Warren 1994; Petty, Haugtvedt, and Smith, 1995). One
can envision several different relationships:
• It could be that the advertising context fosters more positive brand attitudes because the
context leads consumers to think more carefully about the brand's claims in the
advertisement. This positive attitudinal response would be more likely if the nature of
these thoughts were primarily favorable responses to the brand's claims.
1 PDA = Personal Digital Assistant
1
• This increased level of thinking could also lead to less positive (or negative) brand
attitudes, a likely consequence if the nature of thoughts were predominantly negative to
the brand's claims.
• The context could lead to more positive attitudes due to less thinking about the brand's
claims.In other words, the consumer accepts the brand's claims more willingly due to the
content of the context.
• The opposite could also be the case here, the context could lead to less positive (or
negative) attitudes due to little elaboration about the brand's claimed attributes.
• Finally, the context might affect brand attitudes directly (positively or negatively), without
affecting the extent of thinking about the brand's merits to a noticeable extent.
Hence, the advertising context could affect brand attitudes differently based on the
extent to which the advertising context prompts different ways to elaborate (or not) on the
content of the advertisement.
Businesses prefer that consumers' favorable judgments result in favorable
consequences for their company's brand. For example if you were brand A, you would prefer
that attitudes toward your brand to resist attacks (e.g., advertisements) from the competing
brand B. In this perspective, one intriguing aspect of attitude formation is that two groups of
consumers might reach the same conclusion, i.e., judge brand A with the same degree of
favorability or unfavorability, regardless of the process leading up to this final judgment.
However, depending on the process they go through, the attitude toward brand A for these
consumers may be different in strength. Stronger brand attitudes should be more beneficial to
the company than weaker, but equally extreme favorable brand attitudes. Consequently, in
addition to investigating the effect of advertising context on elaboration of advertisement's
content, this dissertation also addresses whether brand advertisements in different contexts
give rise to brand attitudes of different strength.
1.1 Advertising context, priming and persuasion
Despite the fact that some studies have shown effects of immediate advertising context
on brand beliefs, research identifying how information processing is affected is scant. Even
more rare are studies that include measures of processes mediating the effect of context on
outcome measures. There are many possibilities for the influence of context on the processing
of embedded advertisements. For example, advertising context could hinder or foster
processing of embedded advertisements. likewise, context could affect the ways in which
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advertisements are elaborated upon. One of the important goals of this dissertation is to better
understand how advertising context might be used as a means to facilitate processing of
persuasive advertising messages.
Advertising context. Most advertisements occur in a context, simultaneously with other
material such as programs on TV, editorial articles in magazines or newspapers, ads for other
products, etc. Such material within which ads are embedded are usually referred to as
advertising context (Soldow and Principe 1981). Many advertisers would consider this
context as noise in the sense that the context may remove necessary attention from the
advertisement and/or distort processing. However, information in the immediate context also
may direct attention towards the advertisement, and its content. Advertising context can vary
to a great extent, and an important decision is selecting an appropriate context for
advertisements (e.g., Yi 1990a).
Advertising placement is typically a carefully considered strategy when it comes to the
choice of media (e.g., TV, print, internet), the type of program (e.g., late-night shows, reality-
TV, news-broadcasts, soaps), and the type of newspaper or magazine (e.g., New York Times,
USAToday, Reader's Digest). The major consideration is normally which type of reader or
viewer to reach. Such approaches can be characterized as a between-media focus. The
assumption is that readers of the same newspaper share communalities, e.g., occupation, age,
interests, lifestyle, etc. However, important context-effects may also arise within a medium.
Past research has shown that what someone reads or sees immediately prior to advertising
exposure affects how he/she attends to, thinks about, and evaluates the advertisement and the
brand (e.g., Broach, Page, and Wilson, 1997; De Pelsmacker, Geuens, and Anckaert, 2002;
Soldow and Principe, 1981; Yi, 1990a,b, 1993). There are theoretical and practical issues
associated with such research. On one hand, such research attempts to answer the practical
question of whether an advertisement for an Elizabeth Arden perfume will be processed
differently if the reader first has read a story about the pop-artist Madonna, or a story about
famine in the Sudan. Understanding these processes would aid in the decision as to which
article marketers would like to have precede their advertisement. On the other hand, greater
understanding of such processes may provide more insight into the fundamental processes of
persuasion and attitude change. To guide the search in answers for these theoretical and
practical questions, this dissertation focuses on an integration of the literatures on the concept
of priming and the theory and methods from research on attitude change.
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Contextual priming. Priming refers to "a procedure that increases the accessibility of some
category or construct in memory" (Sherman, Mackie, and Driscoll, 1990). A basic question in
this project is to what extent editorial material surrounding an advertisement may function as
a prime in the sense that the story makes some parts of knowledge more accessible (i,e., they
become primed). For example, reading a story about pop-star Madonna could prime 'success',
'fame' etc. On the other hand, a story about famine in the Sudan could prime 'unfair',
'charity', 'Red Cross', and perhaps even anger toward affluent consumption. Similarly, if a
student reads a story about other students' consumption patterns, motives or goals, he or she
might get the same patterns, motives or goals primed. Following priming logic, the alternative
stories, or primes could affect the way the subsequent advertisement for the new Elizabeth
Arden perfume would be perceived and evaluated. In essence, they might serve as
interpretation frames, or comparison standards (Stapel, Koomen, and Velthuijsen, 1998).
More specifically, Higgins (1996) defines (contextual) priming effects as the influences on
target impression formation that are the result of any non-target factor that makes particular
knowledge relatively accessible - be it primed attributes or traits, exemplars, of the target
category, moods, emotions or even personal goals and motivations (se also Bargh, 1997;
Bargh and Chartrand, 2000, Chaiken, Giner-Sorolla, and Chen, 1996; Sedikides and
Skowronski,1991).
Segal and Cofer (1960) were among the first to use the term "priming" to refer the
process or procedure where recent use of a concept in one task affects its probability of being
used in a subsequent unrelated task (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). Theoretically, the basic
assumption is that accessible information will affect the subsequent processing of a message,
or more precisely, that primes affect subsequent perceptions', As indicated by Bargh (2002),
priming is predominantly oriented towards the unconscious processes through which the
preceding stimulus exerts its influence. However, as also indicated by Bargh (1992; 2(02)
there are two ways to deliver unconscious primes: either subliminally in which case the
primes themselves are not accessible to the person's awareness, or supraliminally, in which
case the person is aware of the primes but not of their potential influence. Both forms have
been shown to successfully influence judgments, motivations, and behaviors in social
cognition research (Bargh, 1992). Editorial material or other advertisements in the print-
2 This assumption is mainly the same as the one set forth by Sedikides and Skowronski (1991) in their "Law of
Cognitive Structure Activation LCSA". However, as the priming tradition has matured more than the LCSA, and
consequently is more extensively researched, this manuscript will adhere to the priming tradition.
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advertisement context are not likely to be subliminal, as readers are aware of what they are
reading.
The priming logic has been applied in some research on advertising effectiveness. For
example, Yi (1990a) found that prior exposure to editorial material could prime certain
product attributes and subsequently increase the likelihood that consumers interpret product
information in terms of these activated attributes, thereby affecting the evaluation of the
advertised brand. Yi (1990b) also found that cognitive priming (Le., priming a certain product
attribute) determined the type of interpretation given to product information in a subsequent
advertisement, and thereby guided consumers' evaluation of the advertised brand (see also
Appel, 2000; Broach, et al. 1995; Coulter, 1998; De Pelsmacker, et al. 2002; Murry,
Lastovicka, and Singh, 1992; Moorman, Neijens, and Smit, 2002; Norris and Coleman, 1993;
1996; Soldow and Principe, 1981; Yi, 1991; 1993 for additional studies of advertising
context-effects). Thus, there is evidence that perceptions and interpretations of advertisements
(and brands within them) can be affected by priming manipulations prior to the advertisement.
However, previous research has not explicitly addressed the extent to which contextual primes
such as editorial context affect the nature of consumers' elaboration of advertising content.
Consequently, the number of possible relationships between advertising context and brand
attitude, and the role assumed by elaboration in these relationships remain ambiguous.
Appendix 1 presents a review of studies that have explicitly addressed effects of contextual
priming on advertisement and brand judgments.
Conditions may exist where there are varying degrees of match or congruence
between the content of an editorial story, and the content of a brand's advertisement. In
essence, congruence refers to an instance where the informational content of the context is
applicable to the informational content transmitted in the embedded advertisement'. In the
case of the Forbes reader described initially, he could have read about corporate executives
efficient self-organization, or their culinary interests. The efficient self-organizing story
would be somewhat congruent with the PDA advertisement, whereas the opposite would be
true with the culinary interest story. Most businesses would prefer that the attitudes
consumers hold toward their brands are strong enough to resist advertisements trying to sway
consumers to competing brands. No previous research has shown if brand attitudes primed
3 Of course, congruence is in the eye of the beholder. In experimental terms, pretests can be used to ensure that
the content of the editorial prime is congruent or incongruent with the brand concept of the subsequent
advertisement
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with editorial context are stronger (e.g., more resistant) than non-primed attitudes, neither
have they shown if the confidence attached to attitudinal judgments are more resistant for
congruently than incongruently primed customers. Because most advertisements do occur in a
context, the question if varying degrees of congruence between editorial content and
advertising content affect brand attitudes and attitude strength seems appropriate to ask.
An attitude's strength depends on the process through which it is formed (see e.g.,
Petty, et al. 1995). Previous research of contextual priming of advertisements has not
routinely included sufficient measures of such processes, nor have they utilized manipulations
necessary to detect differences in processing (cf. appendix 1). The subsequent paragraph
outlines some key issues in this regard.
Attitudes and persuasion. Consumers' attitudinal responses to brand advertisements can be
addressed through the attitude and persuasion theories, see e.g., Meyers-Levy and Malaviya
(1999), Petty, Cacioppo and Schumann (1983), Petty and Cacioppo (1986), and Vakratsas and
Ambler (1999). At the core of this research lays an interest in understanding the processes
(cognitive and/or affective) that mediate the effect of a stimulus on subsequent attitude
formation (Chaiken and Trope, 1999; Petty and Cacioppo, 1984; 1986; Petty and Wegener,
1998a). The assumption is essentially that effortful advertisement processing yields stronger
brand attitudes than less effortful processing. When you consider the information in the
advertisement carefully, you are more likely to establish a strong brand attitude, than when
you devote less effort to processing. The level and content of consideration given to a
persuasive message like an advertisement is called elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986),
and as elaboration increases, attitudes are assumed to become more positive (if the content of
elaboration is predominantly positive), and stronger.
In conditions with varying degrees of congruence between the content of the editorial
context and the content of the advertisement, it is necessary to ask if the amount and nature of
elaboration given to the content of the advertisement differs with varying congruence. This
question has not been addressed by previous priming research, or by previous persuasion
research. Particularly, priming researchers have normally not utilized manipulations necessary
to assess elaboration, and persuasion researchers have not investigated the elaborative
capacity of contextual priming. This dissertation contributes to both priming and persuasion
research by examining the elaborative capacity of contextual primes in the form of editorial
context of print advertisements. It also provides new knowledge about the strength of brand
attitudes formed or changed in the presence of different contextual primes.
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1.2 Research questions
The preceding discussion suggests that the context in which the advertisement appears
might distract, remove, or enhance processing. This dissertation seeks to merge the priming
and persuasion literature in order to understand potential processes mediating contextual
priming on persuasion. As most advertisements occur in a context, the assumption made here
is that the content of advertisements will vary in congruence with the content of the editorial
material preceding the message. It is likely that the extent of congruence has consequences for
the elaborative process leading up to a brand attitude. However, because contextual priming is
infrequently used in persuasion studies and because previous priming studies lack
experimental manipulations necessary to detect mediating processes (such as the type and
extent of elaboration), it is appropriate to phrase this as a general question, rather than a clear
prediction:
RQ 1: Do attitudes formed under different levels of congruence between
content of advertising context and the content of the advertisement arise
from different levels of elaboration?
If advertising context hinders or fosters elaboration, the next logical question relates to
the properties of attitudes primed by advertising context. Elaboration is assumed to affect
attitude strength (Haugtvedt, et al. 1994; Petty, et al. 1995). For example, attitudes formed
through more effortful processing could be more resistant to counter attacks from competing
brands or other sources. However, as the elaborative consequences of priming on elaboration
by means of advertising context are unknown, we set forth the second question:
RQ 2: Do attitudes formed under different levels of congruence between
content of advertising context and the content of the advertisement differ
in attitude strength?
These two research questions warrant some specification. First, the approach to these
questions is guided by an integration of the priming paradigm and theories and methods from
research on attitude change and persuasion. As part of the review it was pointed out that
previous priming studies lack some manipulations necessary to investigate elaboration
processes and attitude strength. It is therefore logical to build on the established tradition
7
when merging these two fields. To give the reader an introduction to the basic logic of the
studies, the next section provides a brief overview of the two experiments in this dissertation.
1.2.1 Overview of studies
Elaboration plays an important role in the first research question. The manipulations
needed to establish conditions that enabled detection of differences in elaboration as a
function of congruence between the advertising context and the advertisement. The first
manipulation in this project was a function of editorial material and an advertisement.
Different combinations of primes and advertisement produced different levels of congruence.
Specifically, two primes were utilized in conjunction with the advertisement to manipulate the
extent to which congruence occurs. The primes had the form of feature stories from a fictious
Internet newspaper - the goal was to manipulate congruence by developing an advertisement
with a brand concept profile that was either congruent or incongruent with the prime stories.
An advertisement for a new fictious brand of shampoo was developed. The message
arguments in this advertisement were functional (cf. Park, Jaworski, and MacInnis 1986)-
leaving one condition where the prime was congruent, and one condition where the prime was
incongruent. Additionally, as it was of crucial interest to be able to detect differences in
processing across different contextual primes, the content of the advertisement was
manipulated.
A method that has proven quite useful in gauging extent of elaboration is to vary the
strength of message arguments" (petty, Wells, and Brock, 1976).This manipulation involved
creating parallel versions of the shampoo advertisement that differed in terms of the cogency
of arguments, while keeping the brand concept profile of the advertisement essentially the
same. Strong arguments should lead to more persuasion than weak arguments under high
elaboration condition (congruent prime condition), whereas one would expect relatively less
sensitivity to the argument quality manipulation in the low elaboration condition (incongruent
prime condition). Cognitive responses were utilized as a second means of detecting
differences in elaboration (petty, Ostrom, and Brock, 1981).
Finally, a third manipulation was introduced in response to question 2 above. The
resistance of attitudes formed under different priming conditions was examined by exposing
consumers to messages containing counter-arguments to the product information in the
advertisement. Ifbrand attitudes and attitude confidence formed under different priming
4 Message arguments would here refer to the pieces of information presented in the brand's advertisement
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conditions differ in resistance, this should be identified through differences in attitude and
attitude confidence decay from pre- to post-attack attitude measurement.
The manipulations were administered in two experiments. The first study was a 2
(argument quality: strong vs. weak) x 2 (prime congruence: congruent, incongruent)
randomized between subjects factorial design. The second study was a 2 (counter argument:
strong vs. weak) x 2 (prime congruence: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (time of attitude
measurement: post attitude measurement, post counter attack) randomized mixed factorial
design with the first two treatments as between subjects factors, and the last a within subject
factor.
9
2. THE PRIMING CAPACITY OF ADVERTISING CONTEXT
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the principles of priming, and relate them to
advertising context. Priming can primarily be seen as a methodological tool, but it is also
important to understand the assumptions on which it is built, and potential explanatory
mechanisms for why and how priming might work. Accordingly, this section starts defining
priming, before turning to procedural issues, assumptions about prime-target, and comments
on the explanatory mechanism.
2.1 What is priming?
Priming studies are concerned with effects of current situational context and how these
environmental features cause the average individual to think, feel, and behave differently than
otherwise (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000:254). Advertising context might be conceived of as a
situational context in this perspective. More specifically, Higgins (1996) defines (contextual)
priming effects as the influences on target impression formation that are the result of any non-
target factor that makes particular knowledge relatively accessible - be it primed attributes or
traits, exemplars of the target category, moods, emotions or even personal goals and
motivations (se also Bargh, 1997; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Chaiken, et al. 1996; Sedikides
and Skowronski 1991). Sherman, et al. (1990) simply state, "priming may be thought of as a
procedure that increases the accessibility of some category or construct in memory" (p.40S).
This defmition points to what is happening when an individual is exposed to something that
makes some part(s) of memory more accessible. The 'some category or construct in memory'
part concerns what exactly is being primed, while the 'something' the individual is exposed
to, can be considered as a prime. Additionally, attention is given to how the primed content
affects judgments, perceptions, and responses to a subsequent target object. Accordingly, four
issues are of interest to understand priming: the process, the prime, the content being primed,
and the target object (Bargh, 2002; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Sherman, et al. 1990).
Principally, a prime triggers some content in memory. Memory content could be a
variety of different constructs, concepts, representations and the like. The primed content will
affect perceptions, interpretations, and/or judgments of a prime target. fu other words, the
effect of the prime on prime target is mediated through activated memory content. The key
assumption is that this activation-process (and effect) is unconscious, not guided by an act of
will. These issues will be delineated more thoroughly in the following sections. For now,
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think of the advertising context as the prime, triggering some mental content, which again
affects judgment of a target brand.
2.1.1 The priming process
The priming process basically refers to the procedure of making content accessible in
memory. The whole notion of priming rests on the assumption that this process is
unconscious, without an intervening act of will (Bruner, 1957; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000).
Because of unconsciousness, the recipient of the prime cannot actively counter the activation.
When you are unaware of the activating process, you cannot take any active steps to prevent
the activated concepts from affecting subsequent processing (Bargh 2002). The Higgins,
Rholes, and Jones (1977) study was among the first to reveal how an individual's recent
experiences could affect interpretation of another person's behavior. Consequently, priming
as a process pertains to unconsciousness, to the activation of some part(s) of memory.
Activation in priming terms relate predominantly to temporary activation (Higgins 1990).
More explicitly: "With respect to momentary increases in accessibility, activation of a
construct from recent or frequent "contextual priming" is capable of increasing the
accessibility of a construct" (Higgins 1990:304, quotation marks in original). According to
this definition only stored constructs can be activated, i.e., activation is dependent on
availability.
Although the process is unconscious, several studies have shown that priming can be
guided, i.e., that by controlling the stimuli that facilitate activation, one may guide
interpretations given to subsequent stimuli (e.g., Herr, 1989; Higgins, et al. 1977; Higgins and
King, 1981; Higgins, Bargh and Lombardi, 1985; Wyer and Srull, 1980). Thus, if a person is
primed with the term "adventurous" or synonyms thereof, he or she is more likely to use this
term in describing a person in a subsequent, seemingly unrelated, task (Higgins, et al. 1977).
It is memory content or concept (e.g., a perception of a personality trait), which is primed,
thereby increasing the likelihood that this particular memory content is applied when
describing an ambiguous target.
If an advertising context addresses concepts not previously stored in consumers'
memory, the context can be said to introduce, or make concepts temporarily available in short
term memory. The extent to which this newly introduced concept will influence perception of
subsequent stimuli more or less than already stored concepts is not known, and one might
expect that both old an new concepts become accessible or interact. Given the assumption that
the new concept might be equally accessible as older, stored concepts, the newly introduced
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concept could serve as an interpretation frame when processing a subsequent prime target.
Accordingly, one might expect congruence between advertising context and advertising
content of varying levels both in the case of old stored concepts, and concepts temporarily
introduced by the editorial context. In advertising contexts, the priming process incurs as the
subject is reading, or in other ways is exposed to the editorial material, other advertisements
or other stimuli. Following the priming logic, if one primes the word "sophisticated" by
reading about sophisticated people in a magazine, that word is likely to be used when
interpreting and describing a following advertisement.
As mentioned in chapter 1, the priming process can be triggered by delivering the
prime subliminally, or supraliminally (Bargh, 2002; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). In
supraliminal priming, the individual is fully aware of the priming stimuli, but is not aware of
some underlying pattern that serves to prime the construct (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000:259).
It is more likely than not that an individual is aware of the magazine article he or she is
reading prior to exposure to the advertisement, so the priming procedure could be classified as
supraliminal. However, it is less obvious that the customer carefully elaborates on how the
story he has read affects the way he processes the following advertisement. This lack of
consciousness is the critical part of the priming procedure. For that reason awareness of the
prime does not necessarily imply that you act against the prime, but it can be the case that if
the influence attempt from the prime becomes too obvious, contrast-effect may occur (Herr,
Sherman and Fazio, 1983; Lombardi, Higgins and Bargh, 1987; Stapel and Koomen, 1998).
On the other hand, as suggested by Bargh and Chartrand (2000:264), " ... in the usual case, in
which one is not aware of the potential influence, bias in the direction of the primed
representation occurs". When advertisement placement is not carefully considered, it is rather
evident that advertising context due to its priming capability, may be perceived as noise,
leading to wrongful conclusions and perceptions of the advertisement. Even worse for the
advertiser, the customer would not know that potential wrongful conclusions drawn from the
advertisement could be caused by the context.
It should be noted that even in one of the most recent reviews of priming procedures,
Bargh and Chartrand (2000:266) notes that it is not clear as to how different priming
procedures (and processes) should be classified. Bargh and Chartrand (2000) propose a
distinction based on what one aims to prime: conceptual priming and mindset priming.
Conceptual priming involves the activation of mental representations in one context, so that they exert
a passive, unintended, and nonaware influence in subsequent unrelated context until their activation
dissipates (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000:258).
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In conceptual priming, the prime could be delivered both subliminally, and
supraliminally. The crucial issue is that the priming manipulation should be done in such a
way that the participant does not realize the relation between the content activation event and
the later influence or use of that content in an unrelated situation. A frequently used procedure
to ensure this is framing the whole experiment as two unrelated tasks (or experiments), where
the recipient is primed in the first session, then asked to voluntarily participate in another
experiment. As a result, the two tasks are made up to appear as different as possible, and the
concern is whether the primed representation is used subsequently. It could be the case that
advertising context could generate its effect through conceptual priming, it depends on what
one wants to prime. It is less certain that the two tasks (reading the context and reading the
advertisement) are sufficiently different to constitute conceptual priming, as the unrelated-
tasks procedure is crucial to this category. In other words, the context is almost per definition
something that occurs immediately prior to the advertisement; hence an unrelated task
procedure would appear quite unrealistic in many advertising settings.
The second, and more recently conceptualized priming procedure is labeled "mindset
priming" (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000:258, 265-267).
Mindset manipulations have the individual actively engage (or read about someone else so engaged)
in a goal-directed type of thought in one context, to show that this mindset (Gollwitzer, 1990) - what
goal to pursue in the situation - is more likely to operate in an unrelated context (Bargh and Chartrand
2000:258).
This represents the "counter-part" of passive conceptual priming, as the unrelated-
tasks requirement is relaxed. Reading about other people in feature stories in print media
represents something in between conceptual and mindset priming (c.f., Bargh and Chartrand,
2000:266; Chaiken, et al. 1996). The reader is not explicitly engaging in the relevant intention
(of the featured person) or in this person's act of will. In the Forbes reader example from
chapter 1, the reader was exposed to executives who used high-tech tools to become more
efficient. In other words, the goal of being efficient was vicariously stimulated. This goal
could then be active when the Forbes reader was exposed to the subsequent PDA
advertisement. As another example, consider editorial material telling a story about college
students' consumption goals or motives. This could activate the reader's consumption goals
and motives, which might operate during processing of a subsequent advertisement. The same
editorial stories could also prime networks of associations that are not necessarily
motivational, e.g., stereotypical images about college students or managers, own experiences
as a college student, own experiences of trying to become more efficient, or particular product
attributes in the case of the Forbes reader in the first example.
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The lack of actively or intentionally following a primed goal in these two examples
indicates that advertising context as a prime does not fit completely with mindset priming.
Apparently, priming by reading about other people in e.g., newspapers or magazines falls
somewhere in between conceptual and mindset priming, especially when reading functions as
vicarious activation. As Bargh and Chartrand (2000:266) conclude at this very early stage of
motivational priming research, we are not aware of all mechanisms in operation.
2.1.2 The prime
So, what is the prime? Itwould seem that close to every stimuli in the immediate
context could represent a prime. The predominant practice has been to prime particular
memory representations like "hostile" through sentence-scrambling tasks, word rehearsal, etc.
(see e.g., Higgins, et al. 1977; Higgins, et al. 1985; Lombardi, et al. 1987; Bargh and
Chartrand, 2000). To prime 'hostile', a sentence-scrambling task would typically have
participants make up sentences of three out of four words, where synonyms of "hostile"
would be more frequently represented than other traits. The crucial test would be if the term
"hostile" were more likely to be associated with a subsequent ambiguous person than non-
primed descriptors of that person (see e.g., Srull and Wyer, 1979).
Initially, priming procedures have been very precise in the sense that only particular
.traits (hostile) have been made accessible. The advertising context can hardly satisfy that level
of accuracy. In the present research, advertising context is delineated to be the immediate
editorial material surrounding a target advertisement in question in the print medium. It is
therefore hard to see how advertising context in the form of a feature story in a magazine or
newspaper could resemble a sentence-scrambling task, as the repetition of words would be
less controlled", However, Higgins (1990:306) argues, " ... contextual priming can be
conceptualized as a situational factor that creates momentary individual differences in
construct accessibility". This implies that any factor in the situational context may prime
construct accessibility", Consequently, the context surrounding an advertisement can indeed
be conceptualized as a prime. Accordingly, compared to the sharply controlled studies where
words are rehearsed, a feature story in a print medium is likely to be a less precise prime, and
5 Reading a feature story where the words are randomly arranged as in a scrambling task is rather unlikely to
happen. Nevertheless, particular words could be primed through repeated use in headlines and boxes.
6 It also indicates that the distinction between 'priming' as a process, and 'prime' as the facilitator ofthis process
is less emphasized in Higgins (1990).
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more than one type of memory content could be primed - and new concepts could be
introduced and made temporarily active. Itmight be more precise to assume that advertising
context represents a crowd of different primes, and that this is why context is perceived as
noise - it opens up for (too) many interpretations and the result could be ambiguous (Empson,
1930; Hoch, 2002). Consequently, what we employ as a prime should logically be considered
with respect to what it is that we aim to prime when attempting to manipulate congruence
through priming.
Past research examining the contextual priming potential of advertising context has
utilized different means as contextual primes (see also appendix 1). Yi (1990a) utilized
advertisements to prime two particular product attributes: ease of use or versatility.
Interestingly, the prime advertisements belonged to the same category as the prime target
advertisement: PC's. Yi (1990b; 1993) used a magazine article in two versions, one priming
fuel economy (called a cognitive prime), and the other priming safety (an affective prime). In
Yi (1990b; 1993), the editorial stories were unrelated to the product category of t~e
subsequent prime target advertisement. Coulter and Sewall (1995) utilized one magazine
article as a prime, to obtain different levels of congruence with subsequent advertisements.
Moorman, et al. (2002) used three different magazines, specifically they used ELLE focusing
on lifestyle, EUE Wonen7 focusing on interior decoration, and Sante focusing on health. This
represents a quite different approach than the Yi studies in the sense that their basic
assumption was that content profile of the magazines, not particular content within the
magazine serves as primes. Finally, De Pelsmacker, et al. (2002) utilized three mock
magazines, each 10 pages being warm, humorous, or rational. A few other studies have
utilized magazines as context in order to induce involvement (e.g., Coulter and Sewall, 1995;
Norris and Coleman, 1992), and mood (Howard and Barry 1994). Several additional
approaches can be identified in TV-program - commercial applications, but as the focus of
the current research is on the print media, they will not be discussed further (see e.g.,
Aylesworth and MacKenzie, 1998; Broach, et al. 1995; Coulter, 1998, Goldberg and Gom,
1987; Hom and McEwen, 1977; Lord and Bumkrant, 1993; Kamins, Marks, and Skinner,
1991; Mundorf, Zillmann, and Drew, 1991; Murry, et al. 1992; Shrum 1999). The vividness
of commercials, and the combination of both audio and visual impressions in both TV
programs and commercials might imply too many different mechanisms than the one(s)
appropriate for the current research.
7 ELLE Wonen is a Dutch name for the interior magazine version of ELLE
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Consequently, past research shows varied practice when it comes to selecting the
particular editorial context to use as primes. So even if the context of advertisements has been
shown to function as primes, which particular memory content they have been priming is
more diverse.
2.1.3 The content being primed
We basically prime constructs, concepts, or representations in memory, but they may
have rather different content (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Higgins, 1990; 1996). The
acknowledgment of this fact is essential. It illustrates that instead of one chain or links from
prime, via mental content, to prime target, there could be as many chains between the prime
and the prime target as there are types of primed content. As a logical extension, it is not
likely that all types of primed contents affect the prime target in question through the same
mechanisms.
Segal and Cofer (1960) showed that exposing participants to lists ofwords increased
the probability that those particular words were used in a subsequent free-association task.
These early sentence-scrambling tasks primed semantic representations by using words as
primes (see also Higgins, et al. 1977; Srull and Wyer, 1979). Subsequent research focused on
perception and impression formation even more (e.g., Srull and Wyer, 1980). This tradition is
more passive activation oriented where the recipient does not actively pursue the relevant
representation in question, and refers to conceptual priming. Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and
Steller (1990) primed mindsets, and Chaiken, et al. (1996) primed impression vs. accuracy
motives, showing that motivational memory concepts can be primed in addition to perceptual
representations. Bargh and Chartrand (2000:265) conclude:
It is noteworthy that the same priming methods - such as the scrambled sentence task and subliminal
prime presentation - produce motivational and behavioral effects, as well as perceptual effects. The
inescapable conclusion from this fact is that in a given experiment, a priming manipulation
simultaneously produces all of these various effects.
In an advertising setting then, one might very well prime needs, motives, product
categories, and behavior. Still, one should not mix the primed content, and the prime target. A
primed goal might affect how a customer attends to an advertisement (the prime target). In
other words, when priming consumption goals, subsequent ads could be interpreted with these
goals in mind. Goal primes could be delivered in third person, meaning that the participants
are primed with other people's goals by reading stories or about these people (vicarious
experience of motives and goals). In that sense, the goals of experimental participants are not
necessarily triggered in their motivational sense or capacity, rather they are made temporarily
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more accessible. As an illustrative example, consider Chaiken et al. (1996) who primed
impression-management and accuracy goals by having participants read different scenarios.
This would resemble having participants read a feature story in a magazine or newspaper that
primes either functional or experiential needs, or goals of consumption (Park, et al. 1986;
Woods, 1960).
The focus for primes in past studies utilizing the editorial context of print
advertisements has varied, and it is not always clearly defined what has been primed: memory
concepts or attributes in advertisements. Yi (1990a) attempted to prime two different product
category concepts: PC ease of use, and PC versatility. The question was whether these
concepts would be used in open-ended descriptions of a product (PC) that followed the prime
manipulation. Yi (1990b; 1993) primed the concepts of product safety and fuel economy
(what he labeled cognitive priming), and affective state (positive or negative). Coulter and
Sewall (1995) adopted the approach of Yi (1990a, 1993) using a similar story:
The cognitive priming article utilized in experiment 1 involved a discussion of the importance of
energy conservation amid dwindling global natural and environmental resources. Itwas assumed that
this topic would be positivelyassociated with fuel efficiency (the focal attribute of Ad 1), negatively
associated with the comfort/roominess attribute of ad 2 (i.e., due to the increased gas consumption
inherent in operating a large luxury automobile), and unassociated with driving pleasure (Coulter and
SewallI995:179)
This quote shows that the aim was to prime one particular attribute, which should be
differentially associated with the focal attributes of different subsequent advertisements. In
their second experiment, they utilized a warm, humorous article regarding child rearing to
manipulate affective consistency between prime and advertisement, i.e., they tried to prime
warm emotions (e.g., happiness). Moorman, et al. (2002) did not state explicitly what memory
content they were priming, but as they sought to manipulate thematic congruence, it seems
logical that they tried to prime the concepts related to lifestyle, interior decoration, and health.
De Pelsmacker, et al. (2002) could be assumed to prime warmth, humor, and what they
labeled "rational" although they did not state if this is the explicit memory content aimed for,
as their goal was to manipulate context type - ad type similarity. Finally, Iversen (2003)
manipulated country stereotypes studying the effects of these primed stereotypes on brand
personality associations.
These few studies show that the foci of primes have been diverse, ranging from
product category attributes, via affect, to country stereotypes. Their specificity, i.e., the
precision of the primes varies substantially, from "versatility" (Yi, 1990a) to more abstract
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notions of positive and negative affect, and warm emotions (Coulter and Sewall, 1995; Yi
1990b; 1993).
In the current research, the editorial context consisted of stories of students'
consumption behavior, seeking to trigger either functional consumption concepts, or
experiential consumption concepts (Keller, 1993; Park, et al. 1986; Woods, 1960). These
would be logical counterparts for different brand concepts suggested by e.g., Aaker (1996),
Keller (1993; 2003), Park, et al. (1986), and Woods (1960), thereby enabling manipulation of
contextual prime - target advertisement content congruence.
2.1.4 Prime target: the stimulus following the prime
Primes serve to affect perceptions and judgments of subsequent stimuli (or objects) as
shown in the brief presentation above. It could be easy to confuse the prime and the
subsequent object. The advertisement embedded in an editorial context would represent the
prime target in the current research, similar to Yi (1990a,b; 1993), Moorman, et al. (2002), De
Pelsmacker, et al. (2002), Norris and Colman (1992), Coulter and Sewall (1995), and Howard
and Barry (1994).
Following the traditional priming literature, prime-driven perceptions are most likely
to appear when the target stimulus is ambiguous (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). However,
exactly how ambiguous a target stimulus would have to be is not clear. The impression left
from Yi's (1990a,b; 1993) studies of contextual priming in advertising, is that the
advertisement following a prime need to be ambiguous for priming effects to occur. With an
ambiguous prime target, different primes would have equal activation potential, and should
facilitate priming equally well - given that congruence of some kind between prime and
prime target is irrelevant for the studies. On the other hand, when the purpose of the study is
to examine effects of congruence between context and advertisement content, there should be
less reason to require ambiguous prime targets. On the contrary, it should be logical to
manipulate the prime target in order to obtain varying degrees of congruence or match.
Consequently, other aspects of the prime target might be more interesting depending on the
purpose of study, as evident from previous studies.
De Pelsmacker, et al. (2002) investigated context/ad similarity", and manipulated this
by crossing warm, humorous, and/or rational stories with warm, humorous, and/or rational
advertisements. Moorman, et al. (2002) followed a similar strategy, and chose advertisements
8 Similarity in their terms has the same meaning as congruence in the present studies.
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as prime targets to be vary in congruence with the profile of the magazines in which they were
embedded (not congruence between specific content and advertisements). Different from
other studies, Moorman, et al. (2002) used real advertisements for known brands (Alessi,
Guhl, and Cartoon). In Yi's (1990a,b, 1993) work, only one advertisement was utilized, and
although not explicitly addressed, his manipulations entailed conditions with varying degrees
of congruence. Coulter and Sewall (1995) used four different advertisements as prime targets
to vary congruence. These advertisements varied in focus, text-picture combinations etc.
The primary concern in the current research is ability to detect processing differences,
so manipulation of the prime target in the current research followed the tradition in the
persuasion literature, i.e., the manipulation of the quality of the arguments presented in the
message representing the prime target (see e.g., Petty, et al. 1976; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
Specifically, the focus of the advertisement is held constant, but the cogency or quality of the
arguments presented in the advertisement is varied. The basic assumption is that the more
recipients of advertisements elaborate on the content of the advertisement, the stronger the
sensitivity to the cogency of the brand's claims should become (petty and Cacioppo 1986,
Petty and Wegener 1999). This is purelya methodological tool utilized to reveal the process
that gives rise to the attitude.
None of the studies examining the effect of editorial contextual primes on judgments
of advertisements and/or advertised brands have included manipulations of the quality of the
arguments in advertisements used as prime targets. Consequently, we cannot be sure what
kind of elaborative process that might have been triggered by previous studies varying the
congruence between the prime and the prime target. A supplement to the contextual priming
studies cited, can be found in mood-induction studies. Mood-induction is somewhat different
when it comes to explanations for effects of context-induced mood - advertisement
congruence, yet the studies by Howard and Barry (1994) and Batra and Stayman (1990)
provide some evidence that varying the argument quality of target advertisements do increase
understanding of elaborative processes facilitated by different degrees of congruence.
Accordingly, the current research departs from the traditional priming literature in the sense
that less emphasis is given to prime-target ambiguity, and the argument quality manipulation
of the prime target is introduced to better detect elaborative differences that might arise from
different degrees of contextual prime - prime target congruence.
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2.1.5 How does priming work?
A prime can be administered either subliminally, or supraliminally (Bargh and
Chartrand, 2000). With subliminal primes, the individual has no chance of controlling the
influence. With supraliminal primes, like say advertising context, the consumer is aware of
the prime, but most probably not of its influence. Most external, environmental influences
involve stimuli that are in plain view, but somehow we frequently don't realize that the
influence is taking place (e.g., Wilson and Brekke, 1994), and we might also be overconfident
in our ability to control the way we are influenced (Bargh, 1999). If consumers should judge
all incoming stimuli while consciously assessing how those judgments are affected by
preceding stimuli, they would have little else to do - or rather: it would be practically
impossible. As a result, the default could very well be that consumers are aware of primes, but
not how they influence their judgments (Bargh, 2002:283).
However, the fact that there is an effect does not necessarily imply knowledge about
why this effect occurs. At least two factors play critical roles in the priming process. The first
is accessibility (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Higgins et al. 1977; Higgins and King,
1981; Higgins, 1996; Srull and Wyer, 1980). Accessibility should be distinguished from
availability, which refers to whether or not a construct is stored in memory (Higgins and
King, 1981:71). Hence, a construct might be available, but not accessible. When priming
some aspect or construct, accessibility can be defined in terms of" ... the readiness with which
a stored construct is utilized in information processing" (Higgins and King 1981:71).
However, this definition mixes availability and use, and a more precise definition of
accessibility proposed by Higgins (1996) serves to illustrate this point: "Accessibility can be
defined as activation potential of available knowledge" (p. 134, italics in original). Highly
accessible content has a high potential for activation. Hence, priming can activate memory
content, but does not guarantee utilization of accessible content.
InSedikides and Skowronski's (1991) "Law of Cognitive Structure Activation" one
will fmd predominantly the same assumptions as the ones presented above. Sedikides and
Skowronski do however extend the theory's applicability to domains beyond those discussed
in most of priming literature. Specifically, they argue:
When a stimulus is ambiguous enough to be encodable as an instance of multiple cognitive structures,
the stimulus wiU be most likely encoded as an instance of that cognitive structure that is the most
activated in memory, and most semantically similar to the stimulus. This encoding will, in tum, affect
structure-relevant judgmental and behavioral processes (Sedikides and Skowronski 1991:170)
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This definition explicates the central role of semantic similarity, which can be thought
of as an instance where the advertising context and the advertisement share similar (although
not necessarily identical) content. It also points to the possibility that not only a particular
attribute might be activated by a prime, but also that the network of knowledge (i.e., cognitive
structure) associated with that attribute will become more accessible. The semantic similarity
notion of the law of cognitive structure activation, and the notion of applicability in the
priming literature are consistent.
It should be evident from both the priming literature, and the law of cognitive
structure activation, that different types of memory content might be made accessible through
priming. However, as pointed out by Higgins (1996), accessibility does not explain or account
for all priming effects. Ifmemory content is supposed to affect subsequent processes, it
cannot merely be accessible; it should also be applicable. Higgins and Chaires (1980), and
Higgins (1996) describe a primed construct as being applicable to a stimulus if there is
sufficient match between the features of the (mental) construct, and the features of the
stimulus. Ostensibly, this would be true for both the prime-stimulus, and the target-stimulus.
Prime-stimulus applicability would indicate that only one (or a few) construct(s) is (are)
applicable to the prime. A prime description is vague if no construct has more than weak
applicability to it (Higgins 1996). Of course, this puts strong demands on the advertising
context if it is supposed to work effectively as a prime, or if congruence is assumed to occur.
Consequently, the most straightforward answer to 'how does priming work' is that
priming works through two critical components. First, it makes memory content accessible.
Second, for accessible content to exert any effect, it has to be applicable to the prime target.
Bargh and Chartrand (2000) argue that a prime might produce behavioral,
motivational, and perceptual effects. Inother words, a prime might facilitate choice (a
behavior, e.g., Sherman, et al. 1990), trigger a motive (Chaiken, et al. 1996), prompt different
mindsets (e.g., Gollwitzer, et al. 1990), or perceptions and stereotypes (e.g., Higgins, el al.
1977; Higgins and King, 1981; Iversen, 2003). The explanation ofwhy priming works would
then have to be related to what is being primed. Priming has by itself no particular
explanatory mechanism for priming effects besides the assumption that what is made
accessible and is applicable is then more likely used in subsequent processing. As reviewed
earlier in this manuscript in section 2.1.3, editorial context has been utilized to prime a variety
of memory concepts, or chunks of memory networks (see e.g., Howard and Barry, 1994).
The link from prime to content needs little explanation in addition to that offered by
the accessibility - applicability discussion. It is however evident that a host of different types
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of memory representations can be primed based on different primes and priming procedures
(i.e., conceptual vs. mindset priming). Thus, the challenge in predicting outcomes of priming
becomes one of disentangling the effects of different types of primed content on the properties
of the prime target in question. Rather than asking the question "how does a contextual prime
affect target perceptions?" one might ask, "How does a primed stereotype affect target
perceptions?" (c.f., Iversen, 2003) or "how does a primed product attribute affect target
perceptions?" (e.g., Yi, 1990a,b; 1993).
The main interest in the current research is the extent to which contextual priming
affects elaboration of the prime target. Specifically, the question is how different levels of
congruence between the content of the advertising context and content of embedded
advertisements affect elaboration and brand attitudes. In this respect, attention is directed
towards the nature and content of elaboration, and the resulting judgments of the target (i.e.,
attitudinal response to the target). The key facilitators (to be discussed more extensively later)
of elaboration are the recipient's level of motivation and ability to elaborate on a .
communicative message, in this research the target advertisement. Interestingly, of the studies
reviewed on the effect of editorial context on judgments of embedded advertisements, brand
attitudes have not been the dependent variable of interest in most studies. Notable exceptions
are studies by Yi (1990b; 1993). These studies show that cognitive priming (i.e., priming
product attributes) affected brand attitudes. Moorman, et al. (2002) studied effects of
congruence on attitudes toward the advertisements, not the brands, the same was the case for
De Pelsmacker, et al. (2002). Coulter and Sewall (1995) results are mixed, and equivocal
when it comes to effects of congruence on brand attitudes. None of the studies attempted to
test the extent to which contextual primes affected elaborative processes leading to these
attitudes.
2.2 Summing up: advertising context in priming terms
The preceding discussion has shown that the effects of advertising context can be
addressed through the notion of priming, or more precisely, that the effect of congruence
between advertising context and advertising content can be addressed through priming.
First, priming as a procedure and process is concerned with "the mind in the middle",
i.e., how cognitive concepts and processes mediate between environmental events and
psychological reactions to them. In particular, the assumption under priming is that recipients
of the primes mayor may not be aware of the prime, but not aware of the way the prime
affects subsequent processing. It appears logical that the printed material (e.g., editorial
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content, other advertisements) can be analyzed in priming terms. Consumers are practically
unable or unwilling to consciously assess how all other stimuli preceding a target
advertisement affect their processing of that particular advertisement.
Second, any stimuli might in principle serve as a prime. The advertising context may
indeed entail words, stories, pictures etc. fully capable of making mental representations
relatively more accessible. The issue is not if consumers are primed, but rather how they are
primed, and what the advertising context primes - both old previously stored concepts, and
new concepts temporarily introduced by the prime. Depending on the extent to which the
context serves as conceptual priming or mindset priming, we might observe different effects.
Apparently, particular perceptions, motives, goals and behaviors can all be primed - the
importance resides in the recipient's level of awareness of the prime's influence. The
challenge then becomes one of proactively using the advertising context to obtain wanted
effects. Otherwise, context will continue to be noise.
Third, advertising context might entail a host of different contents, so the question
''what is primed" becomes rather indefinite. It seems crucial to be cautious with the level of
ambiguity in both prime and target advertisement to obtain predictable effects. Otherwise the
prime may render so many possible interpretations open (or more specifically: so many
representations activated), and consequences for advertisement processing becomes less
predictable. It might also be the case that inseparability of target advertisement and prime
becomes more problematic than separability. The review also showed that previous studies of
contextual priming of print advertisements have had diverse foci for their primes.
Fourth, the targets following the prime can also be ambiguous at varying levels. The
priming literature seems to suggest that main effects of primes are more likely when the target
is ambiguous. However, in advertising terms, the question is more oriented to the other part of
the equation because advertisers normally would like their advertisement to be perceived,
processed, and judged in only one or a few of the potential ways possible. Some of the
previous studies have assessed the effects of contextual prime - advertisement content
congruence, but utilized attitude toward the advertisement, not attitude toward the brand as
their dependent variable, leaving the door open for congruence effects on brand attitudes. The
review also revealed that no attempts have been made to vary the quality of brand claims in
the advertisements, leaving the elaborative capacity of congruence between advertising
context and advertising content unknown in these studies.
Fifth, explanatory mechanisms in the priming literature are primarily oriented towards
the notions accessibility, and applicability. Specifically, the assumption is that activated
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content will drive perceptions and judgments of subsequent stimuli as far as the activated
memory content is applicable to the prime target. Memory concepts might vary in the extent
to which they are more chronically accessible, or temporarily accessible. It is likely that
editorial context primarily can serve as a means to prime memory concepts to become
temporarily accessible. Explanations of elaborative effects of the accessibility and
applicability notions have not been addressed in the priming literature.
Having reviewed the priming literature with specific emphasis on how editorial
context may serve as contextual primes of print-advertisement judgments, it is clear that the
elaborative consequences of this type of priming need to be addressed from perspective of
attitude and persuasion research. The next chapter focuses on principles of persuasion, and
how advertising context as contextual primes might affect elaboration and attitudinal
responses.
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3. ELABORATION AND PERSUASION
The previous chapter identified editorial context as potentially significant for
perceptions and judgments given to subsequent (embedded) advertisements. The judgment of
primary interest in the current research is the attitudinal response given to the advertised
brand (brand attitude), and the strength of this attitude. To illustrate: recall the Forbes reader
from the example in chapter 1. The primary interest is the attitudinal response given to the
advertised PDA, and the extent to which this brand attitude would be different depending on
the stories he read prior to ad-exposure. The term "attitudinal response" implies more than the
attitude per se, it also includes properties of the process leading up to the attitude, and
attitude-strength related consequences. More precisely, the current research is concerned with
the following: first, the nature and extent of advertisement elaboration, second, the facilitators
of elaboration, third, how variables in the persuasion context affect elaboration, and finally,
strength-properties of the brand attitude. The roles advertising context in these different issues
are also essential.
Contemporary theories of persuasion have helped to organize, categorize and
understand processes underlying attitude changes in a variety of settings (see e.g., Chaiken
and Trope, 1999; Eaglyand Chaiken, 1993; Petty and Wegener, 1998a; 1999). Most
prominent among the persuasion theories are the dual process models HSM (the Heuristic
Systematic Model: Chaiken, 1980) and the ELM (the Elaboration Likelihood Model: Petty
and Cacioppo, 1984; 1986). In the last decade(s), these models have guided research in the
area of attitude change, and within marketing: how advertising works (Vakratsas and Ambler,
1999; Meyers-Levy and Malaviya, 1999).
3.1 Message processing: The dual processes principle
A core assumption in the persuasion literature is that attitudes might arise from
different processes, and based on the nature of these processes, attitudes might vary in
strength (Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt and Wegener, 1994; Haugtvedt, et al. 1994;
Haugtvedt and Priester, 1997; Petty, et al. 1995). As discussed in the previous chapter, some
of priming research has shown that congruence between prime and advertisement might
facilitate positive attitudinal responses. However, the extent to which varying levels of
congruence prompt more or less message elaboration or processing is unknown. The past
priming studies have not used manipulations necessary to detect potential processing
differences associated with different contextual primes. The current research sought to
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investigate the capacity prime-target congruence has to trigger different levels of elaboration
in the persuasion process.
Both the ELM and the HSM suggest that the same brand attitude can result from very
different processes, as implied by the label "dual process theories". Consider an advertisement
for a PDA with the typical "picture and bullet-point information" format. Typically, the ad
lists features like size of working memory, storage space, speed of the processor, screen
resolution, colors, compatibility with other hard- or software etc. We would have one picture,
and a number of sales arguments or product attributes presented. First, in some situations, or
for some kinds of individuals, attitudes may be established and/or changed in a positive
direction as the consumer reflects on the content and quality of message arguments. A
consumer, who is knowledgeable about PDAs, would be more likely to carefully consider all
available information before reaching a conclusion (Le. establishing a brand attitude). The
consumer might infer that based on size of working memory, storage space, compatibility,
and connectivity, this is a state of the art product, suitable for his needs. This conclusion is
inferred, not explicitly stated in the advertisement. When this type of inference occurs, the
consumer has elaborated on available information. The preponderance of positive thoughts in
this thoughtful process would serve as a basis for a positive attitude. In other words, the
consumer is elaborating on the available brand specific information.
Second, in other situations, or for other kinds of consumers, an attitude may arise or
change due to simple inferences or positive associations. Consider the PDA novice" looking at
the PDA advertisement described earlier. He might just think about one or two of the pieces
of information, the picture, the design of the ad itself, and might not be able to infer
implications from the presented information to the same extent as the expert. He is likely to
generate fewer thoughts about the advertised brand than the expert. In this case his brand
attitude is the result of a less elaborative process, it might be a simple inference like "it has
five complicated things speaking for it, it must be good". Hence, two consumers might reach
the same conclusion in terms of attitude extremity, but if they follow different elaborative
processes, the strength of their respective attitudes may be different.
The thoughtful process described above is considered as a central route process (ELM)
or a systematic process (HSM), and the latter as a peripheral route process (ELM) or a
9 In this example, level of expertise is used as a variable affecting the elaboration likelihood. That is, the expert is
more likely than the novice to have motivation and/or ability to elaborate. In the current research, we ask if the
contextual prime could affect elaboration likelihood in similar ways.
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heuristic process (HSM). Although these labels give the impression that these two processes
are uniquely separated, elaboration can vary along a continuum from minimal to extensive
(Petty and Wegener, 1999). The important issue is that the nature of elaboration along the
continuum can be both qualitatively and quantitatively different. The term "elaboration" is
used to suggest that people add something of their own to the specific information provided.
That is, when elaborating on an advertisement, they go beyond the mere verbatim encoding
(or learning) of the information provided (Petty and Wegener, 1999:46). Thus, there is a
quantitative difference implying that the type of thoughts given to object relevant information
can be the same along the elaboration continuum, but that the amount of cognitive activity
varies. The high-elaboration consumer might consider all pieces of information, and make
several implications from each piece of information, whereas the low-elaboration consumer
considers all pieces, but generates few thoughts (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The effect is
a relative one, where the amount of thoughts is relatively higher in high-elaboration than the
low-elaboration condition.
In addition, there could be a qualitative difference in elaborative processes referring to
the assumption that low-elaboration attitude change can be based on processes that are
substantially different from high-elaboration processes (Petty and Wegener 1998a: 331-342;
Petty and Wegener, 1999:46). Importantly, it is not only the number of thoughts, but also the
nature of the processes yielding these thoughts that matter. Message learning/reception
processes (e.g., Hovland, 1953; McGuire, 1964; 1968), cognitive responses (e.g., Brock,
1967; Greenwald, 1968), expectancy-value models (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), and to
some extent, cognitive dissonance (e.g., Festinger, 1957) are classified as high-elaboration
processes. Common to all of these are relatively high levels of elaboration leading toward a
judgment. On the other hand, classical conditioning (e.g., Staas and Staas, 1958; Gresham and
Shimp, 1985), attribution theory/self-perception theory (e.g., Bern, 1972), and mere-exposure
effects (Bomstein 1989; Zajonc 1968) are classified as low-elaboration processes. So,
whereas the quantitative distinction relates to amount of elaboration leading to the judgment,
the qualitative distinction relates to differences in processes leading toward the judgment.
Persuasive messages presented in the form of advertisements can be subject to varying
degrees of elaboration. There could be two polar situations, a lower-elaboration situation,
where attitudes are based on peripheral processing, and a higher-elaboration situation where
attitudes are based on more thorough processing. However, as elaboration is a matter of
amount and type, the distinction is relative rather than absolute. In the current research, it was
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crucial to investigate the extent to which varying levels of congruity between the
advertisement and the advertising-context decreases or increases elaboration.
Continuing with the Forbes reader example from chapter 1, two different situations
can be envisioned. First, he might read the story describing companyexecutives' use of
information technology to be more efficient, and then be exposed to the PDA advertisement
stressing functional, efficiency oriented product attributes. This could represent a situation
with high congruity between editorial context and advertisement content. Second, he might
read about the same executives, but now the story could cover their culinary interests. In this
case, the congruence between editorial context and advertisement content could be said to be
lower due to fewer shared or overlapping properties.
It is not sufficient to say that due to the overlapping properties of the prime and
advertisement in the first, congruent situation, the attitudinal response should be more positive
than in the less-overlapping, incongruent second situation'", It could be the case that in the
congruent situation, the increased accessibility and applicability of memory content renders
the reader more skeptical or critical to (or able to assess) the merits of the arguments in the
advertisement, thereby producing a less favorable brand attitude (if the arguments are
perceived to be weak). In the absence ofthis prime-ad congruence (situation two), the same
level of skepticism or processing ability might not be evoked, and the attitude could be more
favorable than in situation one (he might not elaborate on the merits of the presented
arguments to the same extent). Thus, incongruence might in fact be superior to congruence.
Yet in another scenario, one could imagine the reader in the congruent situation being able to
elaborate more simply due to the perceived applicability of primed memory content, and thus
reach a favorable attitudinal response based on the amount of elaboration. The reader in
situation two could experience less applicability of primed memory content, and therefore
produce a lower number of brand-related thoughts - resulting in a less favorable attitude. In
this latter scenario, congruence-driven amount of elaboration, not necessarily merits of
presented arguments, could account for the attitudinal response. Stated differently, the extent
to which congruence yields positive or negative attitudinal response depends on the
elaborative process, and the merits of the advertised brand. Additionally, one might
experience that effects of congruence on brand attitude could be mediated through cognitive
responses in a high elaboration condition, but no mediation in the low-elaboration likelihood
condition.
10 That would represent a main effect of congruence.
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This exemplification directs attention to the next essential part of the persuasion
theories, the facilitators and inhibitors of elaboration.
3.2 Facilitators of elaboration
The ELM hypothesis of an elaboration continuum comes from recognizing that it is
impossible for people to elaborate extensively on all the messages (e.g., advertisements), and
attitude objects (e.g., brands) they encounter daily. In order to function in life, people must
sometimes act as "cognitive misers" (Taylor, 1981). Given these cognitive limitations, it is
even less likely that consumers have additional capacity to consider how the advertising
context affects how they elaborate. Thus, it is necessary to address under which circumstances
different levels of elaboration is more or less likely to occur. According to the ELM (e.g.,
Petty and Cacioppo, 1986), elaboration likelihood increases as people are motivated to think,
and are able to think (i.e., have the necessary skills and opportunity to engage in thought). In
their review of how advertising works, Vakratsas and Ambler (1999) conclude that
consumers' motivation and ability serve as the primary filters for the amount of elaboration
given to advertisements (see also Macinnis, Moorman, and Jaworski, 1991). This review did
however not address if or how advertising context might affect these filters.
There are many variables capable of affecting elaboration likelihood and thereby
influencing whether attitude change is likely to occur by the high- or low-elaboration process.
Some of these motivational and ability variables are part of the persuasion situation (e.g., the
advertising context), whereas others are part of the consumer (e.g., need for cognition;
Haugtvedt, et al. 1992, category expertise as in the PDA example, etc). Some variables affect
mostly the amount of information processing activity, whereas others tend to influence the
direction or valence of thinking (Petty and Wegener, 1998a). One of the best-documented
variables influencing a person's motivation to elaborate is the perceived personal relevance of
the message (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1979; 1990; Petty, et al. 1983; Johnson and Eagly,
1989). When people perceive the personal relevance or importance of the advertisement to be
high, they are more influenced by their processing of the substantive arguments in the
advertisement, and less influenced by peripheral cues (see e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, and
Goldman, 1981; Petty et al. 1983).
In the current research, the question is the extent to which contextual prime - target
advertisement content congruence affects elaboration. Other studies have previously
addressed the elaborative potency of matching messages to properties of the individual and/or
the attitude object itself, its category etc. When it comes to attitudinal effects, congruence
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between message content and factors like attitude functions (e.g., Lavine and Snyder, 1996;
DeBono, 1987; DeBono and Packer, 1991; Snyder and DeBono, 1985; 198911), attitude object
functions (e.g., Shavitt, 1990), cognitive and affective bases of attitudes (e.g., Edwards, 1990;
Edwards and von Hippel, 1995, Fabrigar and Petty, 1999), mood-profile of television
programs (e.g., Aylesworth and MacKenzie, 1998), mood-profile ofpreceding stories
(Howard and Barry, 1994), product types (Johar and Sirgy, 1991) have primarily shown that
matching or congruent messages tend to produce more positive attitudes than mismatching
(incongruent) messages. In the functional attitude domain the attitude function -
advertisement content congruence has established itself to such extent that it has obtained the
label "the functional matching hypothesis of persuasion" (see e.g., Lavine and Snyder 1996;
Petty, Wheeler and Bizer, 2000). However, the explanations and results are mixed, as
illustrated by Millar and Millar (1990) who found mismatching to be more effective. In an
effort to resolve some inconsistencies, Petty and Wegener (1998b) suggested that matching
effects on persuasion could be explained through at least three different mechanisms (see also
Fabrigar and Petty, 1999; Petty, et al. 2000) based on the multiple roles of persuasion
variables postulate (pettyand Cacioppo, 1986). Petty and his colleagues (petty and Wegener,
1998b; Petty, et al. 2000) obtained congruence by matching message content, and personality
traits or schemas self-monitoring and need for cognition. Wheeler (2001) also found that self-
schema matching could serve to increase elaboration likelihood, so the assumption that
congruence might facilitate elaboration is documented. However, the strategy to manipulate
congruence in the current research is different from these previous studies.
The current research addresses an additional way of obtaining congruence to facilitate
elaboration. Instead of relying on personality traits, self-schemas, or attitude object (class)
characteristics (their functions, or their classes of supporting beliefs) to obtain varying degrees
of congruence, the goal was to situationally manipulate congruence by means of the
advertising context. Hence, the strategy reported here parallels that of situationally inducing
temporal accessibility of memory concepts (old or newly introduced), and consequently
temporal congruence, through priming (Higgins, 1996).
11 The personality trait self-monitoring has been used extensivelyas an operationalization of the value expressive
attitude function. Consequently, the result is a person x target ad interaction. See e.g., Shavitt (1989,1990),
Shavitt, Lowrey, and Han (1992) for a critique ofthis procedure.
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The notion that congruence between contextual prime and target advertisement
content might affect elaboration fits into the multiple roles of persuasion variables postulate,
subject for discussion in the next section.
3.3 Multiple roles for persuasion variables
The multiple roles of persuasion variables postulate in the ELM states that
... variables can influence judgments (1) by serving as arguments relevant to determining the merits of
an object or position, (2) by biasing the processing of attitude-relevant information (both of which are
most likely when motivation and ability to scrutinize attitude-relevant information are high), (3) by
serving as peripheral cue (when motivation and ability is low), and (4) by itself affecting the level of
scrutiny given to attitude-relevant information (when elaboration is not constrained by other factors to
be particularly high or low) (pettyand Wegener, 1998:344; see also Petty and Cacioppo, 1986:16;
Petty and Wegener, 1999:48).
Continuing from the previous section, this postulate outlines four different ways in
which variables in the persuasion setting might affect elaboration likelihood. At different
positions along the elaboration continuum, variables are postulated to assume different roles.
Several variables in the current research fit into this postulate, the prime itself, the target
advertisement, and the contextual prime - target advertisement content congruence. As
congruence is the main concern of this research, this will be the main focus of discussion, and
be addressed first. Then, a brief discussion will be presented with respect to the roles played
by the prime and the advertisement respectively. Keeping in mind that congruence is a
function of context - advertisement interaction, the main effects of the context and ffie
advertisement are of secondary interest in the current research. Also, the crucial question for
the current research was one of how a variable (the congruence) by itself could affect the level
of message scrutiny given to the advertisement. Hence, attention is given to role (4) in the
postulate above at the present stage of research.
3.3.1 Prime - target congruence as a persuasion variable
The enhanced scrutiny explanation for effects of persuasion variables may come into
play when elaboration likelihood is not constrained to be either high or low. In the setting of
the current research, it was unlikely that motivation and ability to elaborate were particularly
high, or constrained to be low while evaluating embedded advertisements. In moderate
elaboration likelihood conditions, one might expect some elaboration to take place as a
baseline (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). The question then becomes one of whether conditions
with increasing congruence between contextual prime and advertisement content facilitate
elaboration in such circumstances.
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According to network theory (Anderson, 1983; Bower, 1981; Bower and Cohen,
1982), memories of stimulus events can be represented as a configured web of associative
ideas. The memory network that becomes available at the time of advertisement context
exposure facilitates connection between previously stored knowledge (in the network) and the
cognitive responses to the content of the contextual prime. Inother words, the network
linkages between previous mental concepts and the information present in the contextual
prime are likely to be rehearsed. The likelihood of material being cued from memory is a
function not only of associative linkages, but also other variables such as the recency of
processing information, as hypothesized by the priming literature (e.g., Higgins and King,
1981; Higgins, 1996). Ifwe assume that memory operates on a last-in-first-out basis principle
as suggested in early priming research (e.g., Higgins, et al. 1977), it is likely that the most
recently primed associations (i.e., those primed by the advertising context), should be more
available and become more readily retrieved. By implication this should imply that the
cognitions generated in connection with the editorial contextual prime are those ideas,
thoughts, and memories that most likelyare available at time of advertising exposure.
The interconnections between primed mental concept(s), and the information in the
prime itself could place quite heavy burdens on the cognitive capacity of the consumer at the
onset of advertising exposure. The current research suggests that this represents a condition
where it is more likely than not that the advertising content with higher degree of congruence
with the prime (and primed memory content) will be more readily elaborated upon. Logically
then, the elaborative capacity of the prime-target ad congruence would depend on not only
accessibility of mental concepts, but even more so, the applicability of the primed mental
concepts. As argued by e.g., Tybout, Stemthal, and Calder (1983), elaboration is facilitated by
the ease with which one can integrate or relate new and existing information, or specifically,
elaboration is likely to occur when new information is related to a concept for which people
have many associations stored in memory. Hence, the more applicable the primed memory
content is to the advertisement, the more elaboration should be facilitated. For example, when
the Forbes reader in the initial example reads about efficient organization of work-time, there
is a condition where the primed information in memory interacts with the information in the
prime and the content of the advertisement. As the subsequent advertisement presents an
object that easily fits into this primed content, it seems logical to assume that that particular
advertisement is more likely to be scrutinized. This is consistent with chunking processes in
memory (e.g., Crowder, 1976), that demonstrate how categorically similar information tends
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to be processed more efficiently, thus avoiding cognitive capacity limitations. If this is the
case, congruence should facilitate elaboration.
This explanation predicts an interaction between congruence and e.g., the cogency of
the information in the advertisement. Inother words, in congruent conditions, the recipient
should hold sufficient capacity to elaborate. As the advertisement content is congruent with
prime content, it seems more likely than not that the arguments for the advertised brand
should be more critically, or extensively elaborated upon.1f congruence facilitates
elaboration, sensitivity to argument cogency should increase with higher congruence between
prime and target. The pattern would then be such that if arguments in the advertisement are
deemed as insubstantial or specious, this should be more penalized when congruence is high,
rather than low following the enhanced scrutiny explanation. In the incongruent situation, one
would expect less or no sensitivity to argument strength. As argued by Petty and Cacioppo
(1984:70):
According to this view, if under scrutiny the message arguments are found to be cogent and
compelling, favorable thoughts will be elicited that will result in change in direction of the advocacy.
If the arguments are found to be weak and specious, they will be counterargued and the message will
be resisted - or boomerang (change in the opposite to that intended) may even occur.
3.3.2 Prime target: the advertisement as a persuasion variable
This is the persuasive message itself, and would represent the target advertisement in
the current study. Message relevance is usually considered as one message property, with the
dominant assumption being that how much a person cares about an issue is dependent on the
extent to which the issue is relevant to some aspect of oneself (i.e., ones beliefs, possessions,
values, groups, etc. cf. Bonninger, Krosnick, Berent, and Fabrigar, 1995; Petty, Cacioppo, and
Haugtvedt, 1992). The baseline assumption is that the more relevant, the higher elaboration
likelihood. In the current research, this property of the message is not manipulated, but its
motivational property is held constant across conditions. There are, however, some other
properties of the message in need of clarification.
First, in marketing applications of the ELM, one might get the impression that some
pieces of information are by "always" cues, like e.g., the brand name itself, packaging, user
image, country of origin, or other "non-product related attributes". Information about product-
related, or intrinsic attributes (quality, durability, weight, color, etc.) is regarded as arguments.
Consequently, some marketers would assume that only information about product related
attributes is processed in high-elaboration conditions, whereas information about non-product
related attributes only is processed in low-elaboration conditions. This is a rather fruitless
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approach, which clearly misses out on important assumptions in the ELM (petty and
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999). Any piece of information may serve as a cue at
the low end of the elaboration continuum, whereas they may serve as arguments or bias
processing at the high end of the elaboration continuum. No piece of information is therefore
by definition a cue or an argument. Hence, if the processor is motivated and able to process
information, he will examine all available information to evaluate its importance for assessing
the true merits of the issue. In this case, information about brand X's country of origin could
very well be an argument (e.g., "Norwegian Salmon is the best there is due to low sea-water
pollution"). On the other hand, with low motivation and/or ability to process information,
information is more likely to be considered as cues giving direction to the evaluation in a
peripheral processing manner ("Norwegian Salmon is good because I like Norway").
Consequently, the primary concern for a marketer aiming to establish strong brand attitudes in
favor of his brand would be to what extent the processor is able to find information of such
nature that when scrutinized, the information is perceived as sound arguments.
Another property of the advertising message is the cogency or quality of the
information in the message. The argument quality manipulation is a central methodological
tool in the ELM tradition, meaning that it serves the purpose of detecting the extent to which
the recipient of the message is elaborating or not. Argument quality concerns the strength,
compellingness, or cogency the recipient perceives the information to have when scrutinizing
or elaborating on the information (Petty and Cacioppo, 1979; 1984; 1986; Petty, et al. 1976).
The quality might therefore be more adequately addressed depending on the recipient's level
of motivation and/or ability to process the information. In low-elaboration conditions, one
would not expect the recipient to show the same level of sensitivity to argument quality as in
a high-elaboration condition (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1979). Therefore, in order to detect the
extent of elaboration, a potential strategy is to vary the quality of arguments in the message,
and analyze in which condition(s) recipients exhibit sensitivity to argument strength. The
prime target (in this case the advertisement) has not been subject to this manipulation in
previous contextual priming studies. In some mood-induction studies, (e.g., Batra and
Stayman 1990; Howard and Barry, 1994), argument quality manipulations have been made in
print advertising settings. However, as mood is not the prime focus of the current research,
their results cannot be transferred directly.
In sum, one important question addressed by the current research was the extent to
which the sensitivity to argument quality manipulations differed across contextual primes, or
more precisely, differed as a function of prime-target congruence.
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3.3.3 Prime: the editorial context as a persuasion variable
Inpersuasion terms, context refers to any factors related to the setting in which the
communication is presented (pettyand Wegener, 1998a). Although not discussed as a context
variable in the Petty and Wegener (1998a) review, the editorial context of advertisements
would logically adhere to this category of persuasion variables. If the editorial context is
supposed to exert an effect through a priming mechanism, it presupposes that the recipient is
unaware of how exactly he or she is influenced by the prime in subsequent judgments (cf.
Bargh and Chartrand, 2000).
From a priming perspective, it is not straightforward to determine which role under the
multiple roles postulate the contextual prime might serve. In the current research, the primary
interest in the contextual prime is derived from its potential to establish conditions with
varying degrees of congruence with the advertisement - and as such, no particular predictions
will be made about the elaborative efficiency (or inefficiency) of the prime per se.
However, some comments could be made that address key features of the prime in a
persuasion setting. Chapter 2 suggested accessibility and applicability as key drivers of
priming effects. Applicability of memory content on prime target seems logically tied to
ability to elaborate in the sense that if a prime triggers some memory content that is easily
applicable to the prime target, ability to elaborate on the prime target might be facilitated even
though motivation to elaborate could be unaffected. In other words, editorial material could
make memory content accessible, but if this memory content is less applicable, no effects on
elaboration would be likely to occur following an ability to elaborate logic. Likewise, it could
also be the case that the advertising context could cause e.g., product category associations to
become more accessible, and without necessarily affecting motivation, it may nevertheless
facilitate more elaborate message processing simply because elaboration then could be carried
out with less effort than in the case of a non-applicable alternative editorial. Furthermore, it
could be the case that advertising context (the particular prime) could trigger personal goals,
which in tum might be addressed by the advertisement. In such case, prime could be said to
increase the relevance of the persuasive message, and accordingly increase elaboration.
In chapter 2, a distinction was drawn between conceptual vs. mindset priming. The
mindset priming procedure shares some similarity with manipulation of personal relevance by
Petty et al. (1983). As mindset priming is more motivational in nature (Bargh and Chartrand,
2000; Chen, et al. 1996), motivation to elaborate could be more affected with this priming
technique. On the other hand, conceptual priming involves the activation of mental
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representations in one context, so that they exert a passive, unintended, and nonaware
influence in subsequent unrelated context until their activation dissipates (Bargh and
Chartrand, 2000:258). As also noted by Bargh and Chartrand (2000), the current state of
knowledge about primes' roles as mindset primes and/or motivational primes is still
rudimentary, and it is accordingly premature to categorize contextual primes (defined here as
the editorial material) into either conceptual or mindset priming techniques. It is likely that
depending on the content of the editorial material, different mental representations will
become accessible - and conclusively, the interaction between accessible and applicable
mental representations and the content of the prime target remains most crucial.
3.4 Summing up
The preceding review of the persuasion literature has attempted to intertwine issues
learned from the review of priming into the persuasion issues relevant to the questions in the
current research.
A key assumption in the process theories of persuasion reviewed here is that equally
positive (or extreme) attitudes can arise from different cognitive processes. Importantly,
depending on the quality and quantity of elaboration given to a persuasive message (the
advertisement), attitudes can be held with different strength.
Since an advertisement can be elaborated upon differently, this directs attention to
what fosters or hinders elaboration. Two main facilitators were mentioned: the recipient's
level of motivation, and ability to elaborate. A wide range of variables has been shown in
previous research to affect motivation and/or ability to elaborate. Some studies have
investigated the extent to which persuasive messages matching or mismatching properties of
the individual and/or the attitude object affect elaboration likelihood.
The current research extends on this knowledge by examining how situationally
induced congruence between advertisement content and advertising context in print media
might affect elaboration (in study 1). Potential attitude strength consequences in relation to
the second research question of this dissertation will be theorized and tested in the subsequent
study 2. The multiple roles of variables postulate of the ELM offers a framework for the
assumption that degree of congruence between the advertising context and the content of the
advertisement could serve to enhance scrutiny (or elaboration likelihood). The rationale for
this assumption is derived from the priming literature's notion of accessibility and
applicability. Specifically, the contextual prime will make some memory content accessible,
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and dependent on the applicability of this memory content to the prime target, elaboration
likelihood can increase.
The prime target is represented by the advertisement, or more precisely the content of
the advertisement. In the ELM, the quality of this content is subject to manipulation as a
methodological tool, the assumption being that sensitivity to the quality of message
arguments should increase with increasing elaboration likelihood. The prime in the form of
editorial material has to enable the occurrence of conditions with varying degrees of
congruence between editorial story and advertising content. In other words, different primes
will make the respective primed memory content equally accessible, but only one condition
entails the occurrence of accessible memory content applicable to the content of the
advertisement (i.e., high congruence). Study 1 is devoted to testing these first assumptions.
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4. STUDY 1: CONTEXTUAL PRIMING AND ELABORATION
The first research question in this dissertation asked to what extent different levels of
congruence between advertising context and the content of the advertisement had implications
for the level of elaboration exhibited by consumers. This somewhat exploratory question was
the focus of study 1, seeking to lay foundations for studying the phenomenon.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we specify the hypotheses for study 1
based on the previous literature review. Second, we describe the methodology of study 1,
finally, we present results from the empirical tests of the hypotheses.
4.1. Hypotheses
The purpose of study 1 is to provide initial evidence that contextual prime - target
advertisement congruence might affect the nature of elaboration given to claims in the
advertisement, as identified through different empirical patterns. Specifically, if congruence
does affect message elaboration, we might expect that at different levels of congruence:
a) brand attitude extremity differ, qualified by sensitivity to argument quality,
b) content of cognitive responses will differ, qualified by sensitivity to argument quality,
c) correlation between cognitive responses and brand attitude will differ, and
d) correlation between brand attitude and purchase intention will differ.
4.1.1. Congruence and brand attitude
Congruence can be conceived of as an instance where the content of the editorial
material primes memory concepts applicable to the content of claims in the persuasive
message. Network theory (Anderson, 1983; Bower, 1981; Bower and Cohen, 1982), suggests
that memories of stimulus events can be represented as a configured web of associative ideas.
Exposure to editorial material prior to advertising exposure represents such a stimulus event.
In this case, the network linkages between previous memory concepts and the information
present in the editorial material are likely to be rehearsed. This should imply that a
predominant part of the recipient's information handling capacity is occupied with concepts
primed by the editorial material. Early priming research would suggest that memory operates
on a last-in-first-out basis principle as suggested in early priming research (e.g., Higgins, et al.
1977). This should imply that the cognitions generated in connection with the editorial
contextual prime are those ideas, thoughts, and memories that most likelyare available at time
of advertising exposure.
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Now, does this increase or decrease elaboration likelihood of the subsequent claims in
a brand's advertisement? Potential increase or decrease depends on the extent to which
congruence will ease the information processing. In conditions with higher congruence, the
primed memory concepts are more readily applicable to the prime target (Higgins, 1996). In
conditions with lower congruence, primed memory concepts are equally accessible, but not as
applicable to information from the prime target. In conditions with lower congruence, one
could therefore assume that the lack of congruence might confuse the recipient, or otherwise
place burdens on his capacity to elaborate on prime target information. One potential result
could be that the recipient simply disregards the information from the prime target, or in fact
draw wrongful implications from the presented information because his interpretive frame
provides skewed directions for processing.
In conditions with higher degrees of congruence, it is more likely than not that the
advertising content will be more readily elaborated upon. The interpretive frame provided by
high congruence provides direction to information processing, or more precisely, it is more
likely that the claims in will be accepted as arguments when congruence is high rather than
low. This follows from the elaboration likelihood assumption that a recipient will scrutinize
information in order to learn the true merits whenever he has the motivation and/or ability to
elaborate (petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999). The argument here is not that
the recipient necessarily feels more strongly motivated in the high vs. the low congruence
condition, but rather that the readily applicable memory concepts eases the processing of
subsequent information.
Tybout, et al. (1983) argue that elaboration is facilitated by the ease with which one
can integrate or relate new and existing information, or specifically, elaboration is likely to
occur when new information is related to a concept for which people have many associations
stored in memory. In the case of contextual priming, it could also be the case that there were
no memory concepts stored prior to the priming event, but the prime could nevertheless leave
newly introduced concepts prominent in short-term memory, thereby providing a foundation
for congruence. Additionally, memory can work through so-called "chunking processes" (e.g.,
Crowder, 1976), meaning that categorically similar information tends to be processed more
efficiently, thus avoiding cognitive capacity limitations. In other words, with higher levels of
congruence, prime target information should be processed more efficiently.
If congruence facilitates elaboration, it is likely that the recipient should be more
attentive to the quality of the arguments presented in the prime target (Pettyand Cacioppo,
1986). Returning to the Forbes reader in the introduction, if congruence facilitates elaboration,
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he should be more attentive to the quality of the arguments presented for the PDA if he first
read the story about executives becoming more efficient when using electronic aids, than if he
read a story about the same executives' culinary interests. This prediction results from the
assumption that with increasing levels of elaboration likelihood, message arguments become
subject to more extensive scrutiny (petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999). In
higher congruence conditions, the overlap between primed concepts and advertisement claims
provides a condition where this scrutiny could be less demanding, or in other words, he holds
more sufficient capacity to elaborate than in the low congruence condition.
This explanation predicts an interaction between congruence and the cogency of the
information in the advertisement. It seems more likely than not that the subsequent arguments
presented for the advertised brand should be more critically, or extensively elaborated upon in
congruent compared to incongruent conditions. If congruence facilitates elaboration,
sensitivity to argument cogency should increase with higher congruence between prime and
target. If this prediction holds, attitudes of congruently primed participants would be more
positive the stronger the message arguments and vice versa for weaker arguments. If
incongruence is a weaker facilitator (or inhibitor) of elaboration, one should expect the
attitudes of incongruently primed participants to be significantly less sensitive to the quality
of message arguments.
Previous research within priming or persuasion has not combined congruence and
argument quality manipulations, at least not with the temporary congruence manipulation
pursued in the current research. Studies by Petty and Wegener (1998b), also reported by Petty,
et al. (2000), utilized self-monitoring (e.g., Snyder, 1979; Snyder and DeBono 1985) and need
for cognition in combination with value-oriented vs. utilitarian advertisements to manipulate
congruence, and found congruence to increase elaboration likelihood. Such a manipulation
cannot be said to entail the same properties of temporal activation as the one obtained through
contextual priming, but some of the basic logic transfers to the current studies, and is
supportive of the basic prediction offered here. Specifically, the first hypothesis of the current
research is:
Hl: There will be an interaction between advertising context and advertising content
so that brand attitude will be more positive in the high congruence strong
argument quality condition than in the high congruence weak argument quality
condition. Smaller differences will be observed in incongruent strong argument
quality condition compared to the incongruent weak argument quality condition.
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The hypothesized interaction translates into the expected pattern shown in figure 1, in
line with predictions from Petty and Cacioppo (1986:34):
Figure 1
Example of prime congruence x argument strength interaction
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This figure shows that sensitivity to argument strength in the congruent prime
condition yields a situation where weak arguments are penalized compared to the incongruent
prime condition, and strong arguments are rewarded compared to the incongruent prime
condition. Thus, if obtained, this pattern would indicate that higher levels of elaboration have
been taking place in the congruent prime condition compared to the incongruent prime
condition. There is no apparent reason to expect the attitudinal responses in the incongruent
prime condition to be reversed compared to the congruent prime condition, hence we do not
expect a crossover interaction. Instead, the incongruently primed participants should show
insensitivity to the argument quality manipulation, and score close to equal if prime
congruence facilitates elaboration.
4.1.2 Congruence and cognitive responses to the brand
Hypothesis 1 suggested that the attitudinal response would differ as a result of
interaction between prime congruence and argument quality. Additional evidence that
contextual prime content - ad content congruence affects elaboration likelihood should be
found in the content of the cognitive responses to the advertisements (Cacioppo and Petty,
1981; Petty, et al. 1981; Petty and Cacioppo 1986).
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Brock (1967) and Greenwald (1968) suggested that one way of assessing extent and
content of elaboration in persuasion situations was to have experimental participants listing
their thoughts either during or after exposure of the persuasive message. The basic assumption
is that if a variable increases elaboration likelihood (e.g., need for cognition, personal
relevance, or in the current research, prime-target congruence), this might lead to an increase
in total number of thoughts about the issue or message and vice versa. The cognitive
responses need not only be recollection of message arguments, but also (preferably)
inferences made based on message arguments, meaning that the respondents might add
something on their own based on the arguments (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and
Wegener, 1999). These thoughts could then be coded into categories like high-issue relevance
or low-issue relevance. Another option is that enhanced message scrutiny could increase
cognitive responses consistent with the quality of message arguments, but decrease cognitive
responses that are inconsistent with their quality (Petty, et al. 1995). Accordingly, not only the
total number, but also the profile of cognitive responses might provide information about the
elaborative process taking place. Consider a message with strong arguments, then favorable
cognitive responses should increase, and unfavorable responses should decrease as message
scrutiny increased (e.g., higher levels of prime-target congruence). The ratio will change, but
the total amount of thoughts might remain the same. Specifically, the relative profile of
favorable and unfavorable issue-relevant thoughts listed might be used as to index of
elaboration even though there are no differences in the absolute number of thoughts listed
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986:39). Itmight also be the case that the total number of thoughts will
be equal across different conditions of elaboration likelihood. However, in the low-processing
conditions, the profile of thoughts should be unaffected by manipulations of argument quality,
whereas in the high-processing conditions, the opposite would be true. The more the profile of
thoughts reflects the quality of the arguments presented, the more likely it is that the
arguments have been processed (petty and Cacioppo, 1986:40).
An advertiser will frequently aim to build certain brand associations in order to occupy
a specific brand position (e.g., Keller, 1993; 2003). Hence, it would be in their interest not
only for customers to respond with any thoughts, but hopefully generate a positive cognitive
response index. Additional precision could be gained by a more detailed classification
scheme. Specifically, when building a brand, the advertiser cannot rely exclusively on total
thoughts, or a favorability - unfavorability index of those thoughts. The advertiser should also
consider if the cognitive responses are related to the advertisement itself (i.e., layout), or the
merits of the brand arguments presented (i.e., brand related cognitive responses). The focus of
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the current research is brand attitudes, not attitude toward the advertisement, consequently, a
brand cognition index represent the appropriate test of brand elaboration in the current
research.
Prime content - advertising claim congruence represents the suggested driver of
elaboration likelihood in the current research, and as such, one should expect processing
differences across congruence conditions. Conditions with higher congruence imply that the
claims in the advertisement match the content of the editorial material to a higher extent.
During ad processing, this congruence will manifest itself - not before. As the recipients read,
they experience congruence. In this case, it is likely that the recipients can elaborate more
easily on the claims in the advertisement as they match already salient memory concepts.
Compared to the less congruently primed recipients, they should also experience relatively
higher applicability of the primed memory content on the arguments in the advertisements. In
sum, they should be more likely to process the message argument, and consequently be more
sensitive to the quality of the arguments in the message. The incongruently primed recipients
have primed memory content accessible, but this content is not equally applicable to the
arguments in the advertisement. They might still generate the same total of cognitive
responses, but they are less likely to score equally on the brand cognition index. In fact, the
simple accessibility of memory concepts might lead them to elaborate in directions other than
what the advertising claims aim for, or simply regard the advertisement as irrelevant.
The basic ELM logic would also imply that if the congruently primed participants
scrutinize the advertisement more extensively due to applicable memory content, they should
also show more sensitivity to the quality of message arguments. If this assumption holds, one
should expect congruently primed participants receiving weak arguments to respond with
more negative than positive brand cognitions, and congruently primed participants receiving
strong arguments should generate more positive than negative brand related cognitions. If the
incongruently primed participants elaborate less extensively, one would not expect the same
level of argument quality sensitivity to be reflected in their brand cognition index.
Some previous priming studies have gathered cognitive responses, however their
manipulations of congruence are not directly comparable with that of the current research. Yi
(1990a) had the participants provide lists of attributes they would consider when buying a
computer after having been primed with computer advertisements. They gave their cognitive
responses prior to rating their attitudes toward the computer in the target advertisement;
hence, they might as well be seen as elaborating on the prime as the target advertisement. Yi's
(1990a) study utilized an ambiguous target advertisement for a computer with no argument
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quality manipulation. Accordingly both primes in the form of PC advertisements could be
said to represent congruent conditions. The cognitive responses were not coded according to
the procedure suggested by Petty, et al. (1981). Yi's main conclusion was that the key
message elements of the two different prime advertisements resulted in them being mentioned
first and more frequently in the cognitive responses. Based on the presented results, one
cannot conclude if prime congruence increased elaboration. Yi (1990b) utilized a parallel
procedure, however, this time the primes were in the format of four different magazine
articles. The target advertisement had no argument quality manipulation. Cognitive responses
were elicited after exposure of the target advertisement, asking them to provide product
attributes they would consider if they were to buy a car (same category as the target ad).
Cognitive responses were not coded into brand cognition indexes, rather the frequency of
mentioning and order of mentioning analysis were the same as in Yi (1990a), showing that the
editorials increase accessibility of attributes. Howard and Barry (1994) utilized stories to
induce positive or neutral mood, and subsequently exposed participants to advertisements for
shoes either congruent or incongruent with the priming stories. Argument quality was
manipulated in the target advertisements, and cognitive message related responses were coded
as suggested by e.g., Petty and Cacioppo (1986). The net thought ratio was only utilized as
dependent variable in an interaction between argument quality and mood. Another question
was to what extent induced mood lead participants to scrutinize congruent or -incongruent
advertisements differently. In the results for the congruence hypotheses they did however
established a total message topic thought index disabling a conclusion about sensitivity to
argument quality manipulation in congruent vs. incongruent conditions, also illustrated by the
lack of test for the particular interaction of argument strength and congruence on total
message topic thoughts.
Goldberg and Gom (1987) collected cognitive responses to commercials embedded in
happy or sad TV-programs; the commercials were not manipulated on the argument strength
dimension. Their results showed that the happy (sad) TV-programs elicited more happy (sad)
cognitive responses to the embedded advertisements.
Also within the TV-commercial domain, Aylesworth and MacKenzie (1998) found
that program-induced mood influenced attitude toward the advertisement by affecting the
number of cognitive responses to the advertisements, with more positive ad cognitions for
participants in the positive mood condition.
The cited studies are not directly comparable to the current studies, but they still
provide some empirical evidence that the advertising context does affect the content and
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amount of cognitive responses given to embedded advertisements. Drawing on the previous
discussion, and previous studies, it is hypothesized that the congruence between content of
advertising context and claims in the advertisement facilitates elaboration of the advertising
message. Specifically, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H2: There will be more positive than negative brand related thoughts in response to
strong arguments in the congruent prime conditions; more negative than
positive brand related thoughts in response to the weak arguments in the
congruent prime conditions. Such differences will be minimal in the incongruent
prime conditions.
The third hypothesis addresses the influence of congruence on the correlation between
cognitive brand responses, and brand attitudes. Stronger correlation between attitudes and
cognitive responses indicates that the attitude reflects greater message-relevant thi~ng (e.g.,
Chaiken, 1980; Petty and Cacioppo 1979; Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, and Petty, 1995).
The issue under hypothesis three is not necessarily one of amount of processing, but
the extent to which the thoughts of higher elaborating participants are more influential on
subsequent brand attitude than the thoughts of lower elaborating participants. If one assumes
that the high elaborators scrutinize the message more extensively, they might be more likely
to base their attitude on the thoughts they generate. Low elaborators may still think, but the
link between their thoughts and the brand in the advertisement may appear weaker, one might
say that the thoughts are less directing or decisive for the conclusion drawn, i.e., the attitude.
Additionally, if the low elaborators have generated the same total amount of thoughts,
these thoughts might still be cue-based, shallow, and not interconnected. Inother words, for
high elaborators, one might say that a brand attitude might be characterized by higher belief
strength between brand cognitions (beliefs) and brand attitude in a multi-attribute attitude
model as for example suggested by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975; see also Lutz, 1975; 1991). In
contrast, the belief strength of lower elaborators will be weaker, or less systematic: by
implication the correlation between thoughts and attitudes should be lower12• Basically, both
12 It could be the case that even if the subject generates six cognitive responses, his attitude might only be based
on one or two of these. For example, I (think) I know a lot about Apple computers, but my attitude towards
Apple is defined by my liking of their æo Steve Jobs. Apple enthusiasts on the other hand, will probably know
a lot, and base their attitude on a more complex set of beliefs.
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high and low elaborators may reach the same attitude judgment on a scale, but the basis for
their score should be different.
Inhigher congruence conditions, the cognitive responses to advertising claims will fit
more readily into already accessible memory content, in other words the accessible memory
content is more likely to apply to the cognitive responses. The activated memory network has
given directions to cognitive responses, and consequently, they should be easily
accommodated into the existing schema of knowledge. In this situation, it is likely that the
thoughts generated about the advertisement will be intertwined in current knowledge, and
possibly gain belief strength as a function of fit. For participants in the incongruent condition,
several results might surface. First, if they do elaborate somewhat on the brand claims, they
won't have the same opportunity to easily accommodate these cognitive responses into the
accessible memory content. This should reduce chances of brand information becoming
coherently connected to accessible memory concepts thereby reducing accommodation.
Second, if they demonstrate lower elaboration, the link between the few thoughts generated,
and their brand attitude judgment may suffer.
As argued under hypothesis two, the nature of elaboration might be more effectively
revealed through the favorable - unfavorable brand cognitions difference, than the total sum
of thoughts. This applies just as much for hypothesis three, as the correlation between brand
cognitions and brand attitude is assumed to be stronger at increasing levels of elaboration. The
difference index captures this element of elaboration, hence the following hypothesis is
proposed:
H3: The correlation between brand attitude and the difference between positive and
negative brand cognitions will be higher in the congruent prime conditions than
the incongruent prime conditions.
4.1.3 Congruity and consequences of brand attitude
A basic assumption in the persuasion theories, and the main argument for studying
elaboration, is that different levels of elaboration might yield attitudes with different strength
related properties (Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt and Wegener, 1994; Haugtvedt, et
al. 1994; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, et al. 1995). One of the suggested strength related
properties of attitudes are that stronger attitudes should have more impact on behavior than
weaker attitudes (see e.g., Petty and Krosnick, 1995). Attitudes based on more extensive
elaboration are as previously argued, rooted in a more elaborate cognitive structure, therefore
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they may simply have more attributes supporting them than would be the case for attitudes
based on less elaboration. In other words, the intra-attitudinal structure might be more
developed for stronger than weaker attitudes (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1995; Chaiken,
Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla, 1995). If the inter-attitudinal structure were more developed
for strong attitudes, one would expect less variability in purchase intentions of attitude objects
for individuals with stronger attitudes than weaker attitudes. Participants with attitudes based
on lower elaboration might still be positively inclined to purchase the attitude object, but as
the attitude is rooted in shallower processing, one would expect greater variability in their
purchase intentions. Put differently, the correspondence between their brand attitudes and
purchase intentions might be lower. In their classical study of the moderating role of
involvement in ad-processing, Petty, et al. (1983) found that the correlation between attitudes
and purchase intention was significantly higher in the high-involvement group than the low-
involvement group. This empirically supports the assumption that elaborated attitudes are
more predictive of behavior.
The discussions of the previous hypotheses have provided the arguments for the
assumption in the current research that congruence facilitates elaboration. By extension, the
correlation between brand attitude and purchase intentions should be stronger in the congruent
prime condition than the incongruent prime condition. In the congruent prime condition,
given increased elaboration, the participants have had better opportunity to intertwine and also
test the advertising claims against primed memory concepts. Incongruently primed
participants have not had the same opportunity, and might be less certain about their
attitudinal response - even though they might have developed the same total number of
cognitive responses as the congruently primed partlcipants'". Hence, the following hypothesis
is proposed:
H4: The correlation between brand attitude and purchase intention will be higher in
the congruent prime conditions than the incongruent prime conditions.
13 It could also be the case that the correlation is of equal size in the two prime conditions, but that the level of
significance (and the expression of standard error of the correlation coefficient) is higher in the congruent than
the incongruent prime condition.
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4.2. Methodology
In this section we first discuss the design chosen for study 1. Then we outline the
experimental procedure, before detailing the measurement and manipulations of independent
and dependent variables, including pretests. We then turn to tests of the hypotheses, and ends
this chapter with a discussion of the results.
4.2.1 Overview of design
To be able to test the hypotheses the design applied had to possess some important
features. First, there was a need to control the level of congruence between the editorial
context and the subsequent advertisement. Second, the design should enable control with
prime-exposure, and preferably avoid too obvious links between the prime and the
advertisement (cf. Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). Third, in order to ensure that the prime was
read prior to the advertisement, the prime had to administered before the advertisement, in
other words, the prime and the advertisement could not appear on the same page. Otherwise,
there would be no control of what was processed first, the editorial context, or the
advertisement. As the focal interest was the extent to which prime prompts elaboration, this
sequence of administration was crucial. In addition to qualifying the temporality aspect of
causality, this also strengthened the ability to control for confounding variables (i.e., the
context serves as prime for the advertisement, not the opposite), a threat to the isolation aspect
of causality (cf. Hunt, 1991:89-91; Bollen, 1989:41-45). Fourth, argument quality was
employed as one means to assess differences in elaboration. Therefore, the hypotheses
warranted tight control of administration of advertisements with varying levels of argument
quality, while at the same time permitting different levels of prime-advertisement congruence.
Fifth, the effect of contextual priming on elaboration and persuasion was not previously
tested, thus demanding a sensitive design to facilitate at test of clear cases of congruence vs.
incongruence, and strong vs. weak arguments. The current research prioritized internal
validity. Sixth, the design should enable collection of cognitive responses to gauge the nature
of processing. Finally, both the priming and the persuasion tradition brought together in this
dissertation share an experimental design tradition. In order to assess the contribution of this
dissertation to existing knowledge, it appeared logical to build on this experimental tradition -
to obtain the same levels of control, to use the same means of exposure to treatment variables,
and to gauge elaboration and attitude judgments in similar ways. The previous studies of
effects of contextual priming have predominantly applied an experimental procedure (e.g.,
Coulter and Sewall, 1995; De Pelsmacker, et al. 2002; Iversen, 2003; Yi, 1990a;b; 1993). It
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would be easier to assess the contribution of the current research if it followed the tradition of
the previous studies. Accordingly, it was our contention that a randomized between-subjects
factorial design was the best response to these requirements.
Research question 1 and the respective hypotheses 1 and 2 demanded two treatment
factors: prime-advertisement congruence, and argument quality. Two levels on each factor,
gave four conditions in the form of a 2 (prime congruence: congruent vs. incongruent) x 2
(argument quality: strong vs. weak) design. Experiment participants were only exposed to one
prime congruence level, and one version of the advertisement, either strong or weak. Thus, a
between-subjects administration was chosen. Additionally, to reduce impact of potential
confounding variables, experimental participants were randomly assigned to the four
conditions. The design for studyone is visualized in table 1.
Table 1:
Design for study 1
Prime congruence
Argument Strong
strength Weak
ConditionA ConditionB
Congruent Incongruent
ConditionC ConditionD
4.2.2 Participants and procedure
Participants were 144 undergraduate marketing students at Ohio State University, who
participated for extra course credit. Participants entered the experimentallab in groups
ranging from 4 to 12, and were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions.
Each was seated in front a computer, and the experimenter entered the condition in the
MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2002) used in the experiment.
In reply to question 1, the logical priming manipulation for these studies was the
editorial material preceding the advertisements. The participants were explicitly told to use
whatever time they felt necessary to read instructions, and answer questions. Participants
should first read a cover story to disguise the purpose of the prime. Via the cover story
preceding the priming manipulation participants were told that they were to assess readability
of editorials in an online (internet) context. Then they read one of two versions of an editorial
story representing the primes. The stories were related to young consumers' consumption
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behavior. No references to any advertisements or brands were made in the editorial stories.
Mer reading the story, they answered questions about the format, readability, and layout of
the story, and their preferences for ways of presenting advertisements and editorial material in
internett-based newspapers. Next, a new cover story appeared prior to advertising exposure, to
diminish demand artifacts or carryover effects from the prime. The purpose was to reduce
chances that participants guessed the link between prime and advertisement. However, this
task could not be so strong that it removed or otherwise reduced the salience of the primed
concepts. In other words, awareness of the prime was not the main problem, but the concern
was to reduce participants' awareness of its influence. Furthermore, because the prime had to
precede the advertisements, advertisements and editorial material could not occur on the same
page(s).
Then the participants entered the part of the experiment where they should evaluate
the target advertisement. The cover story told them that they should evaluate different
advertising formats on the Internet. This should lead them to expect more than one exposure.
Mer being exposed to one of the two versions of advertisements for a fictional brand of
shampoo", they evaluated the advertised brand and the advertisement it self. Then the
thought-listing procedure commenced, with screens popping up enabling them to enter one
thought for each screen. When they felt that they had nothing more to say, they hit the escape
key and completed a number of individual differences scales. Then they were asked to recall
as many attributes of the advertised brand as possible, and to recall the name of the brand.
Finally, as manipulation checks, they were asked to rate the quality of the arguments
presented in the ads, and rate the extent to which the person featured in the priming story was
either predominantly concerned with pleasure and fun, or functionality with the product she
bought. At the end, a debriefing description was the final screen, telling them about the
purpose of the experiment. Then the participants were thanked and dismissed. The whole
session took approximately 15 minutes for each subject to conclude, with differences
primarily resulting from the number of thoughts listed and attributes recalled. One participant
used the scrolling wheel on the mouse, and missed the advertisement. He was excluded from
further analysis.
The MediaLab software (Jarvis 2002) used in the experiment allowed us to measure in
milliseconds how much time the participants used to read the primes and the advertisements
respectively. The average prime exposure time was 66968.1 ms, with a standard deviation of
14 The advertisements were identical in their focus on functional benefits, but varied in argument quality.
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23239.74 ms. Six participants had less than 1000 ms exposure to the prime. Itwould be
impossible to read the prime material in less than a second, and as the prime would have to be
read to make any sense, these participants were excluded from further analysis, reducing the
total number of participants to 137.
4.2.3 Manipulations of independent variables
Study 1 entailed two manipulations: prime-target advertisement congruence, and
argument quality.
4.2.3.1 Prime congruence
It would be somewhat inaccurate to describe the prime (editorial story) as a
manipulation by itself related to this study. Prime-advertisement congruence is the actual
manipulation, or treatment, and occurs as a level of match between the prime and the brand
concept position in the advertisement (cf. Park, et al. 1986). Thus, this first manipulation was
a function of the editorial story, and the advertisement.
A functional brand concept as one out of three potential brand concepts as defined by
Park et al. (1986) was chosen. Petty and Wegener (1998b) applied a similar brand concept in
studies of congruence. A functional brand concept is defmed as "one designed to solve
externally generated consumption needs" (park, et al. 1986:136). This kind ofbrand concept
would normally emphasize the functional benefits of concrete product related attributes (as
different from experiential or symbolic benefits derived from more abstract attributes).
Shampoo was chosen as the product category in which to create a new, fictive brand. The
experiment required a product most consumers would be experienced with, with varying
levels of involvement, few economic barriers to switch, and trial purchasing should not
require too large expenditures to hinder us from measuring purchase intention (in reply to
H4). Additionally, the category is frequently supported by print advertisements, and it should
be a category where new brands are launched so often that it allowed a credible launch of a
new brand. Finally, the experiment required a manipulation of argument quality. This was
feasible in the shampoo category based on the fact that reallife advertisements tend to
describe brand attributes open for this kind of manipulation. Most consumers have
experiences with shampoo, and there are numerous brands available, from cheap private
brands, to expensive designer brands sold exclusively at hairdressers. Additionally, brands
with functional, experiential, and/or symbolic brand concepts can be found in this category. It
is also a category where one would expect low to moderate baseline levels of elaboration
likelihood. The shampoo advertisement was developed in strong and weak versions with a
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functional profile based on a similar version (a quality oriented advertisement in their terms)
developed and tested by Petty and Wegener (1998b) in their study of the elaborative capacity
of matching message to personality traits (see also Petty, et al. 2000).
To obtain different levels of congruence between the editorial story and the
advertisement, two stories were created. In the congruent condition, the story had to be
functionally oriented (to match the functional concept of the brand in the advertisement). The
incongruent condition called for a story of similar type as the congruent one, but it should
mismatch the functional orientation of the advertised brand. To be able to prime memory
concepts, we also needed to develop stories about issues familiar to the subject pool. Hence,
the two stories described young students' consumption behavior. In the congruent prime
condition, the story had a functional profile, whereas in the incongruent prime condition, the
story had a hedonic or experiential profile. This strategy resembled the one adopted by
Howard and Barry (1994). Following Bargh and Chartrand (2000), and Chaiken et al. (1995),
this priming procedure fell in between mindset priming and motivational priming techniques.
The two prime stories can be found in appendix 2.
The two stories were pretested to assess the extent to which they were perceived to be
functionally oriented, or experientially oriented. 90 undergraduate students of Ohio State
University (different from the students participating in the main experiment in study 1), rated
one of the two stories on different items. As the participants in the main experiment only
would receive one prime story, the pretest participants also rated one story each. The results
of independent sample t-tests on these items are presented in table 2 below.
Table 2: Pretest results of editorial stories' profile
Functional Experiential
story story
Item (n=48) (n=42) t-value
1. Article has a focus on functional benefits 4.21 3.33 2.76
2. Article has a practical orientation 4.50 3.69 2.78
3. Article has a benefit orientation 4.58 3.67 2.99
4. Article has a pleasure orientation 2.40 4.81 7.74
5. Article has an emotional orientation 2.77 5.10 7.91
6. Article has a desire-orientation 3.00 5.04 7.80
7. Article says consumption is experience 2.63 4.95 8.35
8. Article says consumption is enjoyment 2.52 5.00 9.30
9. Article says consumption is a reward 2.67 4.12 5.02
10. Article says consumption is fun 2.48 4.52 7.04
All items measured on 7-point scales: strongly disagree - strongly agree
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The functional story was rated as significantly more functionally oriented, and less
experientially oriented than the experiential story, and vice versa. Thus the conclusion was
drawn that the stories had the profiles aimed for.
In addition, the stories were tested for readability and the extent to which they
conveyed a clear story. Independent sample t-test showed that on readability, the stories
scored equally well (Mtunctional = 5.42, Mexperiential = 5.57, n.s.) on a 7-point scale, and on
conveying a clear story, they also scored equally (MIunctional = 4.96, Mexperiential = 4.69, n.s.) on
a 7-point scale.
Referring to the congruent vs. incongruent condition, the assumption in the current
study was such that combining the functionally oriented story with the shampoo
advertisement should create high degree of congruence. Combining the shampoo
advertisement with the experientially oriented story, should create a lower degree of
congruence.
4.2.3.2 Argument quality
A central concern in the current study was to enable detection of differences in
elaboration across different contextual primes. Recall that the editorial stories prime either
functional or experiential aspects of consumption, consequently the advertisements had to be
either similar or dissimilar to the two primes. Hence, an advertisement for a new fictious
brand of shampoo was made. This entailed reviewing a host of different advertisements for
shampoos to obtain ideas for functional arguments. Petty and Wegener's (1998b)
manipulation of argument quality in advertisements for shampoos provided additional
guidelines. As already mentioned, the message arguments in this advertisement should
emphasize a functional brand concept (cf. Park, et al. 1986). A method that has proven quite
useful in gauging extent of elaboration is to vary the strength of message arguments'" (Petty,
et al. 1976). This manipulation involved creating parallel versions of the shampoo
advertisement that differed in terms of the cogency of arguments, while keeping the subject of
the advertisement essentially the same (i.e., the functional brand concept orientation). The
strong version of the shampoo advertisement contained arguments about vitamins, SUD-
protection, dandruff-prevention, etc. The other version contained much of the same type of
information, but in significantly weaker versions (e.g., will reduce dandruff if used less than
three times a week, will keep your hair healthy as long as you stay out of wind and rain). The
advertisements contained the same picture, background, and number of arguments. The
15 Message arguments would here refer to the pieces of information presented in the brand's advertisement
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advertisements were programmed in the HTML editor of Netscape 4.0 in order to make the
advertisements look like a full-screen web-page pop-up consistent with the cover story of the
advertisement exposure part of the experiment. Appendix 2 presents the advertisements.
The quality of the different arguments in the advertisements was pretested one by one
(see e.g., Wheeler 2001).90 undergraduate students of Ohio State University rated either the
strong or the weak arguments one by one where the scales were anchored bad - god, and
weak - strong on (in this case) 7-point scales. Read in isolation, one particular argument
might be perceived as stronger or weaker than it would appear in a real advertisement, but we
nevertheless wanted to have an initial test to provide some idea of the extent to which the two
versions of the advertisements where relatively different in argument strength. Even though
the advertisements contained the same number of arguments, and they where sometimes close
to identical for some statements, the strength of each argument could only be evaluated based
on whether or not they were significantly different from a scale midpoint. Put differently, it
did not make sense to compare argument number 1 from the strong condition directly with
argument number 1 from the weak condition, to assess if they were significally different.
Accordingly, the tables 3 and 4 show the means of these two items, compared with the scale
mid-point of 4.
Table 3:
Strength ofweak arguments (n = 44)
Weak-strong Bad-good
(t-values) (t-values)
1. A new brand of shampoo has just been developed. In tests, half of the 1.98" 2.00
people who tried Vital Essence thought it cleaned their hair as good as the (1l.46)b (12.64)shampoo they used at home, as long as they stayed out of wind and rain
2. This is due to the new scientific formula with synthetic silicone. It will 2.55 2.41
reduce some types of dandruff, and will not harm your scalp if you don't (7.97) (9.04)use it more than three times a week
3. The synthetic silicone formula provides a shell around each hair, making 4.09 4.07
the hair easily manageable (.42) (.29)
4. This shampoo is clearly a good substitute for all the shampoos you have 3.52 3.43
previously used (2.28) (2.49)
5. It comes in three different sizes, and the formula works for most types of 3.75 3.93
hair (1.26) (.33)
6. Vital Essence will soon arrive at a supermarket near you 3.61 3.63(1.90) (1.77)
Note: a: Means on 7 point scale, values lower than 4 mean weaker and more bad
b: t-values
The results show that when judged one-by-one, some of the weak arguments are not
significantly lower than the scale mid-point of 4. However, when collapsed to an index, the
two scales on the six arguments yielded M = 3.25, which is significantly lower than 4, t(1,43)
= 6.49, P < .001. The conclusion was drawn that the arguments intended to be weak and
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specious, taken together were perceived that way, even though some individual arguments
failed to be significantly different from the scale mid-point of 4. The same tests were run for
the strong arguments. Table 4 shows the results.
Table 4:
Strength of strong arguments (n = 46)
1. A new brand of hair shampoo has just been developed. In tests, over half
the people who tried Vital Essence thought it cleaned their hair better than
the shampoo they used at home
Weak-strong Bad-good
(t-values) (t-values)
4.72" 4.80
(4.24)b (4.68)
5.13 5.11
(8.01) (6.84)
4.89 5.00
(4.90) (5.78)
4.91 4.98
(4.66) (5.07)
5.24 5.37
(7.79) (8.93)
4.74 4.78
(3.53) (3.56)
Arguments in the advertisement
2. Vital Essence's all-natural ingredients provide your hair with optimal
protection against sun and pollution damage, while preventing dandruff
and hair-loss
3. Provides essential vitamins for healthy hair and skin
4. The Vital Essence Shampoo is available in a variety of sizes, and unique
formulas for different types of hair
5. With containers made of environmental-friendly and recyclable material
and natural ingredients, you will not harm the environment
6. Vital Essence will be available at your hairdresser, to make sure you get
the right one for your hair
Note: ': Means on 7 point scale, values lower than 4 mean weaker and more bad
b: t-values
This table shows that all the strong arguments were judged to be significantly stronger
than the scale mid-point of 4. Collapsing the items into and index yielded the same results,
with M = 4.97, which is significantly higher than 4, t(1,45) = 6.49,p < .001. This average
strength index offered a scale comparable to the average strength index of the weak argument
test, and the two indexes were therefore collapsed into one. One-way ANOV A on this index
with argument strength condition as between-subjects factor suggested that the strong
arguments on average (Mstrong = 4.97) were stronger than the weak arguments on average
(Mweak = 3.25), F(1,89) = l22.l,p < .001. Based on these pretests, the conclusion was drawn
that the strong argument version of the advertisement was significantly stronger than the weak
argument version.
4.2.4 Measurement of dependent variables
After being exposed to both the prime, and the advertisement, the participants
indicated their attitudinal responses on a number of attitude measures, listed thoughts
generated in response to the advertisement, and indicated the likelihood that they would
purchase the new shampoo when it entered the market.
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4.2.4.1 Brand and advertisement attitudes, purchase intentions
Brand attitude was measured after advertisement exposure with three seven point
semantic differential scales with instructions and scale anchors: "To what extent did you fmd
the brand ... bad - good, negative - positive, unfavorable - favorable" (see e.g., Haugtvedt
and Petty, 1992; Russel, 2002; Yi, 1990). A single item measured purchase intentions, "what
is the likelihood that you would purchase the advertised shampoo when it becomes available
in the market?" with scale anchors "not very likely - very likely" on a 7-point scale. Attitude
toward the advertisement was assessed with three items. The participants were instructed to
judge the advertisement itself, not the brand. The scales had the same introduction: "To what
extent did you find the advertisement", and the scale anchors were bad - good, dislike -like,
unfavorable - favorable, all 7-point scales (cf. Aylesworth and MacKenzie 1998, MacKenzie
and Spreng 1992).
4.2.4.2 Thought listings
In addition to the argument quality manipulation, a second means of detecting
differences in elaboration was cognitive responses, or collection of thoughts listed in response
to the advertisement (Cacioppo, Petty, and Harkins, 1981; Petty, et al. 1981). In the few
priming studies in which cognitive responses have been collected (e.g., Aylesworth and
MacKenzie, 1988; Goldberg and Gom, 1987; Lord and Bumkrant, 1993; Schmitt, 1994; Yi,
1990a;b; 1993), the role they might have played in the effect of priming on persuasion is still
not clear. In this dissertation, coding of advertisement or brand related positive and negative
responses (favorability of advertisement vs. brand related elaboration), and counting of
number (amount of elaboration) will provide useful information about extent and direction of
processing. In the first experiment, participants entered their cognitive responses directly into
the experiment software, as in figure 2 below:
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Figure 2:
Example of thought listing interface and instructions
Please type aUthoughts you.recall goingthroughyour mind whileviewing the
brand-advertisement. Do not bother with grammar, or spellinq, just type one
thought in each oUhe fieldsthat will pop up underneath! IT ISVERY
IMPORTANT THAT YOU HIT ENTERAFTER EACH THOUGHT. THEN A
NEW THOUGHT IN THENEXT BLANK FIELDTHATAPPEARS.
You have two minutes. but if you are finished .early.:you can continue by hitting
the <esc> key
1.
Press ENTER after each response ...
Two independent judges coded the responses given into the following categories:
positive brand responses, negative brand responses, neutral brand responses, positive
advertisement responses, negative advertisement responses, neutral advertisement responses,
and neutral responses (like e.g., "my head is aching, I am hungry"). The primary interest was
the difference between positive brand cognitions minus negative brand cognitions. Analysis
showed that the correlation among the two judges' codings were rpositivejudgeA,judgeB = .821,p
< .0001, and rnegativejudgeA,judgeB = .847,p < .0001 respectively. Then, indexes were
established for the two judges respectively (positive brand cognitions - negative brand
cognitions). The indexes of the two judges were highly correlated, rindexjudgeA, indexjudge B =
.791,p < .0001.
4.2.4.3 Ancillary measures
In addition to the focal variables of the study, several other measures were also
gathered. After completion of the different attitude measures, participants completed the need
for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao, 1984), need for evaluation (Jarvis and Petty,
1996), propensity to self-reference (Haugtvedt, 1994; Shakarchi and Haugtvedt, 2004), and
the reduced 13-item self-monitoring scale (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984). These variables do not
concern hypotheses in the current research, and won't be discussed further.
Last, the students completed measures of age, sex, and student id, before a new screen
appeared that debriefed them on the purpose of the experiment they had been participating in.
A complete list of all measured items can be found in appendix 3.
57
4.3 Results
This section first reports results of manipulation checks, before testing the hypotheses
1 through 4.
4.3.1 Manipulation checks
At the end of the experimental session, participants were asked to indicate their
agreement with three statements designed to assess the extent to which the experimental
manipulations were successful. These questions were placed late in the experiment to avoid
them confounding or biasing attitudinal responses and thought listings. To assess argument
quality, they were asked to rate the quality of the arguments presented in the advertisement.
For the argument quality manipulation to be judged as successful, a main effect of argument
quality should be obtained, that is, the strong version of the advertisement should be
perceived as stronger regardless of priming condition. A 2(argument quality) x 2(prime
congruence) ANOVA produced only a significant main effect of the argument quality
manipulation as expected (F(I,133) = 16.42,p < .001). Participants in the strong argument
condition rated argument significantly higher (Mstroog arguments = 4.35), than participants in the
low argument quality condition (Mweak arguments = 3.43), lending support to the assumption that
the manipulation was successful.
For assessment of priming manipulation, two questions were asked. The first asked the
extent to which the featured girl in the priming story was primarily concerned with quality
and functionality when she bought products. A 2(argument quality) x 2(prime congruence)
ANOV A on this item gave only the expected significant main effect of priming manipulation.
Participants who received a functional prime (congruent with the advertisement) agreed
significantly more (Mcongruent = 5.35,), than those who received the incongruent prime
(Mjncongruent = 4.51, F(1,133) = 11.4l,p =.001). Another question asked for agreement with the
statement that the featured person in the prime was primarily concerned with fun and stuff
that pleases her. A 2(argument quality) x 2(prime congruence) ANOVA on this item gave
only a significant main effect of the prime, this time with participants in the incongruent
prime condition agreeing more (Mjncongruent = 5.54), than those who received the congruent
prime (Mcoogruent = 3.04, F(1,133) = 1l0.37,p < .001). Combined, these results suggested that
the manipulations were successful.
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4.3.2 Test of hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis predicted an interaction between prime congruence and argument
quality on brand attitudes. Specifically, it predicted that brand attitudes would be more
positive in the congruent prime strong argument condition than the congruent prime weak
argument condition, and that smaller differences should be observed between the incongruent
prime strong argument condition and incongruent prime weak argument condition. Basically,
the assumption was that sensitivity to the argument quality manipulation should be more
prominent in the congruent than the incongruent prime condition. This would provide initial
evidence that priming might facilitate elaboration (enhance scrutiny) of persuasive messages.
The three brand-attitude measures were highly interrelated (a = .953), and a factor
analysis with maximum likelihood rotation and varimax extraction yielded a one-factor
solution accounting for 87.4% of the variance. Hence, a brand attitude index was established
by adding the three items, and dividing the sum by three, thus establishing an averaged
summated rating scale (Hair, et al. 1998:129). Table 5 shows cell-, and marginal means of
brand attitudes in study 1.
Table 5: ANOVA results
Effects of prime congruence and argument quality
on brand attitude Study 1
Prime congruence
Congruent
(n = 35)
Incongruent
(n = 35)
Argument
quality
Strong
(n = 32)
Weak
(n =35)
5.04
(1.10)
3.56
(1.44)
4.96
(.99)
4.77
(1.22)
5.02b
Marginal 4.87"4.30"
means
': Main effect of prime sig. p = .025
b: Main effect of argument quality sig. p < .001
Std.deviation in parentheses.
A 2(argument quality) x 2(prime congruence) between subjects ANOV A on the brand
attitude index gave the following results. A significant main effect of argument strength
(F(1,133) = 16.46,p < .001) showed that participants rated the brand more favorably in the
strong condition (Mstrongarguments= 5.02) than in the weak condition (Mweakarguments= 4.17). A
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main effect of priming was also significant (F(1,133) = 7.53, p = .007). Inspection of means
showed that a congruent prime resulted in lower brand attitude (Mcongruent = 4.3) than the
irrelevant prime (Mjncongruent = 4.87). Importantly, both these main effects were qualified by a
significant interaction between prime congruence and argument strength. The interaction
between prime congruence and argument quality was the primary prediction in HI. Overall,
the interaction was significant (F(1,133) = 9.8, p = .002), supporting the predicted increased
sensitivity to the argument quality manipulation in the congruent prime condition. The
incongruently primed participants showed no such sensitivity. Simple effect tests within the
congruent prime condition showed that the strong argument version yielded significantly
more positive attitudes (.Mcongruent, strong = 5.04), than the weak argument version of the
advertisement (.Mcongruent, weak = 3.56), F(1,66) = 21.96, p <.001. In the incongruent prime
condition, similar analysis showed no differentiation in brand attitude as responses to strong
(Mjncongruent, strong = 4.96), vs. the weak argument version of the advertisement (Mjnongruent, weak =
4.77), F(1,69) = .51.
Figure 3:
Prime congruence x argument quality interaction study 1
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The pattern in figure 3 clearly shows that participants were more sensitive to the
manipulation of argument quality in the congruent prime condition, and that this sensitivity
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disappeared in the incongruent prime condition. It could be the case that the amount of time
spent on reading the prime and the advertisement could confound some of the presented
results. Specifically, could it be that the congruent condition participants spent significantly
more or less time on reading either the prime or the advertisement? One option could be that
participants in congruent prime conditions felt more motivated to process the advertisement,
and consequently spend more time scrutinizing the advertisement. If this was the case, one
could expect a main effect of prime on time spent on advertising exposure, and furthermore,
advertising exposure time could serve as a significant covariate on brand attitudes.
As measures of both prime and advertisement exposure time were collected, analyses
were conducted to assess this option. First, did participants in the four conditions spend
unequal time reading the prime? A 2(argument quality) x 2(prime congruence) ANOVA on
prime exposure time gave no significant main effects, nor interaction effects (Mcongruent prime
strongargument = 67858.1 ms, Mcongruent prime weakargument = 67687.9 ms, Mjncongruent primestrong argument =
69517.3 ms, Mjncongruent primeweakargument = 62885 .2 ms). Similar analysis with advertising
exposure time as the dependent variable gave no significant main effects, nor interaction
effects (Mcongruent primestrong argument= 41012.4 ms, Mcongruent primeweak argument = 42115.3 ms,
Mjncongruentprime strong argument = 36479.5 ms, Mjncongruentprimeweakargument = 38310.3 ms). The main
effect of prime approached significance, (F (1,133) = 2.45,p = .12), meaning that participants
in the congruent prime condition spent on average 4168.94 ms more on the advertisement
than the participants in the incongruent condition, however without any significant effect on
brand attitudes. Second, to further check if exposure times affected brand attitude, a
2(argument quality) x 2(prime congruence) ANCOV A was run on brand attitude with prime
and advertisement exposure time as covariates. The covariates did not approach significance
(Fprime exposure time (1,131) = .738,p > 1), (Fadvertisment exposure time (1,131) = .953,p > 1). None of
the effects of the treatment factors changed substantially from the ANOV A to the ANCOV A.
The results confirm hypothesis 1, and lend initial confirmation to the basic assumption
forwarded in this study that priming affects elaboration. However, in addition to the argument
quality sensitivity identified to support this basic notion, the nature of the cognitive processes
should also be different between priming conditions in order to provide further evidence. This
was the focus of the second hypothesis.
4.3.2 Test of hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis concerned the nature of the elaborative processes occurring
under different conditions of high vs. low contextual prime - advertising context congruence.
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The basic assumption was that contextual prime - advertisement content congruence would
prompt greater elaboration of message content than would incongruence. Specifically, there
should be more positive than negative brand related cognitive responses to strong arguments
in the congruent prime conditions; more negative than positive thoughts in response to the
weak arguments in the congruent prime conditions. Such differences should be minimal in the
incongruent prime conditions (H2). In order to test this hypothesis, a dependent variable was
coded as the mean difference between positive and negative brand responses (see
measurement section). This index served as a dependent variable in a 2(argument quality) x
2(prime congruence) ANOV A.
Table 6. ANOVA results
Effects of prime congruence and argument quality on
Positive - negative brand responses study 1
Argument
quality
Strong
(n = 30)
Weak
(n = 35)
.13 .47
(1.96) (1.44)
-.94 .06
(1.95) (1.78)
Prime congruence
--------------1 Marginal
Congruent Incongruent means
(n = 34) (n = 35)
Marginal
means
a: Main effect of prime sig. p < .05
b: Main effect of argument quality sig. p < .025
Std.deviation in parentheses.
As the table above shows, significant main effects were obtained for both the prime
congruence factor (F(1,130) = 4.64, P < .05), and the argument quality factor (F(1,130) =
S.76,p < .025). Specifically, participants in the strong argument condition had a more positive
brand cognition difference (Mstrong= .30) than participants in the weak argument condition
(Mweak= -.44). Participants in the congruent prime condition had a less positive brand
cognition difference (Mcongruent= -.40) than participants in the incongruent prime condition
(Mjncongruent= .26).
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Figure 4:
Effect of prime congruence and argument quality
on cognitive response profile
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The hypothesized interaction between prime congruence and argument strength did
not reach significance, as shown in the figure above. However, the pattern of results was in
the hypothesized direction, and the participants in the congruent prime condition showed
more sensitivity to weak arguments (more negative than positive responses) than the
incongruently primed participants. Simple effects tests within the congruent prime condition
show that the brand response index is significantly less positive in the weak argument quality
condition compared to the strong argument quality condition (F(I,63) = 4.88, p = .03). The
incongruently primed participants did not show this sensitivity in brand responses in the
strong vs. weak argument quality condition (F(I,67) = 1.12, n.s.). Despite this difference, it
cannot be concluded that H2 obtained support.
When adding the number of positive and negative brand related cognitions, the mean
number of thoughts was equal across priming conditions: Mcongruent = 1.97, and Mjncongruent =
1.9, F(I,133) = .049, n.s. Hence, congruently primed participants did not elaborate more than
the incongruently primed participants when it comes to amount, but the content of the
responses still differed between the priming conditions. The extent to which this might have
consequences for brand attitudes and purchase intentions was the focus for H3 and H4.
63
4.3.3 Test of hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted higher correlations between the positive - negative brand
cognitions index and brand attitude in contextual prime - advertisement content congruence
conditions, than in the incongruence conditions. Basically, this hypothesis suggested that
degree and nature of elaboration would be more closely related to the brand attitude in
congruent conditions, than incongruent conditions. If this assumption holds, it lends support
to the notion that attitudes in the congruent prime condition rely more on elaboration than
attitudes in the incongruent prime conditions. In other words, even though the interaction
between prime and argument strength on the brand cognition index was insignificant (H2), it
could still be the case that participants in the congruent prime condition relied more on their
elaboration (even though they don't necessarily elaborate more positively) when forming
brand attitudes. In order to test this, separate analyses of correlation between the brand
cognition index and brand attitudes in the congruent vs. incongruent conditions were run. The
analyses showed that the correlation in the congruent prime condition was r = .623, P < .0001
(n = 65), and r = .284,p < .01 (n = 69) in the incongruent prime condition. Correlations in
both conditions were significant, but the important test would be if there were significant
differences in strength. The Fisher z-test showed that this difference was significant (z = 2.48,
P < .01), thereby supporting H3.
Interestingly, these results showed that even though the difference between positive
and negative brand related cognitive responses was in favor of the incongruent prime
condition, the relationship between cognitive responses and brand attitudes were stronger and
more systematic for the congruently primed participants. As already shown, the mean number
of thoughts was equal across priming conditions. Hence, the nature of the elaborative process,
and particularly its content, appears to be different between the congruent and incongruent
priming conditions. In this study, this difference resulted in more favorable consequences for
the attitudes of congruently primed participants. So even though the total amount of brand
related cognitions was equal across priming conditions, it could be that the congruently
primed participants were able to tie closer links between the primed memory content and their
cognitive responses to the advertisement, than the incongruently primed participants. In other
words, in congruent conditions, it could be the case that the beliefs (cognitive responses)
become more strongly related to the brand attitude. In priming terms, even though the total
amount of elaboration might have been equal across priming conditions, the primed memory
content was more applicable to the content of the elaborative responses to the advertisement
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in congruent prime conditions. The next question then becomes one of whether these
differences in elaborative processes translate into different behavioral consequences, as
hypothesized in H4.
4.3.4.Test of hypothesis 4
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the correlation between brand attitude and purchase
intention would be higher in the congruent prime conditions than the incongruent prime
conditions. Specifically, if the cognitive responses of the congruently primed participants are
more closely intertwined with existing knowledge structures due to increased applicability,
and hence are held more strongly, brand attitudes should be more systematically related with
purchase intentions for the congruently primed participants than the incongruently primed
participants. To test H4, correlations between brand attitude and purchase intention was run
for the congruently and incongruently primed participants separately. The analyses showed
that the correlation in the congruent prime condition was r = .785, P < .0001 (n = 67), and r =
.63l,p < .0001 (n = 70) in the incongruent prime condition. The Fisher z-test showed that this
difference was significant (z = 1.81, P < .04). So even though the correlation was strong and
significant in both groups, it was significantly stronger in the congruent prime condition. This
corroborated the finding from H3 that the nature of primed elaboration differed between
congruently and incongruently primed participants. So even though the congruently primed
participants didn't necessarily elaborate more extensively, the fact that they had primed
memory content available into which they could more readily fit their cognitive responses to
the prime target, lead their attitudes to be more closely related to purchase intentions. The
correlation between brand attitudes and purchase intentions can be seen as one indicator of
attitude strength (Haugtvedt, et al. 1994; Petty, et al. 1983; 1995), and as such, the preceding
results indicate that contextual priming also might have consequences for attitude strength.
4.4. Summary and discussion of study 1 findings
The purpose of study 1 was to provide initial evidence that contextual prime - target
advertisement congruence affects the nature of elaboration given to claims in the
advertisement, as identified through different empirical patterns. Specifically, if congruence
did affect message elaboration and brand attitudes, a set of different results were expected at
different levels of congruence:
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a) brand attitude extremity would be different, qualified by sensitivity to argument
quality (Hl),
b) content of cognitive responses would be different, qualified by sensitivity to argument
quality (H2),
c) correlation between the cognitive brand response index and brand attitude would be
different (H3),
d) correlation between brand attitude and purchase intention would be different (H4).
All four hypotheses were in some way related to elaboration likelihood assumptions.
First, if congruence facilitated elaboration, that would predict an interaction between
congruence and argument quality on brand attitude as suggested by HI. Hence, an interaction
between prime congruence and argument quality was the primary prediction in HI. Overall,
the interaction was significant (F(I,133) = 9.8, p = .002), supporting the predicted increased
sensitivity to the argument quality manipulation in the congruent prime condition. In the
congruent condition, participants noticed the argument quality manipulation, whereas this
sensitivity disappeared for the incongruently primed participants. This lends initial support to
the basic hypothesis forwarded in this dissertation: that contextual priming prompts
elaboration, and consequently, that congruence between advertising context and advertising
content need not be beneficial to the advertiser. On the contrary, if in congruent conditions,
the brand's claims are perceived as weak and specious, congruence could penalize the
attitudinal response due to enhanced elaboration.
Second, elaboration should also be evident through differences in cognitive responses
to advertising claims in the different priming conditions. H2 predicted an interaction so that
there should be more positive than negative brand cognitions in the congruent prime, strong
argument condition than in the congruent prime, weak argument condition, whereas this
difference should be insignificant in incongruent prime conditions. This interaction failed to
obtain empirical support. Simple effects test within the congruent prime condition showed
that congruently primed participants did report more negative than positive brand cognitions
as response to weak arguments. Accordingly, traces of argument quality sensitivity were
translated into cognitive responses, however not in the magnitude necessary for the interaction
to become significant. Further analysis also showed no difference in the total amount of brand
related cognitions between the congruently and incongruently primed participants. Taken
together, this might imply that the contextual priming manipulation did not affect the amount
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of elaboration as expected, but rather that it could indicate how elaborated cognitive responses
were subsequently utilized in establishing judgments. This latter option was the focus of H3.
Third, both accessibility and applicability are important prerequisites for priming
effects to occur (Higgins, 1996). Hence, in congruent prime conditions it was suggested that
the claims in the target advertisements would fit more easily into both accessible and
applicable memory content. Due to this match, it was further suggested that the cognitive
responses of congruently primed participants would be more closely related to attitude
towards the brand in the advertisement. In other words, the cognitive responses in the
congruent prime condition could become more easily accommodated into primed memory
content, and consequently become more directly linked to the attitudinal response. H3
predicted that this should be evident through higher correlation between cognitive brand
responses and brand attitude in the congruent than incongruent prime condition. The results
supported this prediction: the correlation in the congruent prime condition was r = .623, P <
.0001 (n = 65), and r = .284,p < .01 (n = 69) in the incongruent prime condition. Correlations
in both conditions were significant, but importantly, the correlation was stronger in the
congruent prime condition (z = 2.48,p < .01), thereby supporting H3. The closer
correspondence between cognitive brand responses and brand attitude for congruently primed
participants indicates that they rely more on their elaboration when establishing brand
attitudes, despite the fact that they did not show more extensive elaboration in terms of total
amount (Mrongruent = 1.97, and Mjncongruent = 1.9, F(1,133) = .049, n.s.) and had less favorable
thought index than the incongruently primed participants (Moongruent = -.40, and Mmcongruent =
.26, F(1,130) = 4.64,p < .05). However, as the cognitive responses they did make, found a
memory content accessible that also was applicable; they appeared to utilize their cognitive
responses more than the incongruently primed participants. Put the other way, the cognitive
responses of incongruently primed participants did not find memory content that could easily
accommodate them, therefore they where less utilized in forming the brand attitude. This
could be a signal of more peripheral processing in the incongruent prime condition.
Finally, H4 started addressing the question if brand attitudes formed in the congruent
prime condition were stronger than brand attitudes formed in incongruent prime condition. If
the former brand attitudes were relatively more rooted in cognitive brand responses (H3), this
should translate into a higher correlation between brand attitudes and purchase intentions for
the congruently primed participants compared to the correlation for incongruently primed
participants (H4). Petty, et al. (1983) showed that this correlation was higher for participants
devoting more effort to message scrutiny, when motivation to elaborate was manipulated. The
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findings in the present research corroborate their findings with another elaboration likelihood
manipulation, as the current hypothesis obtained empirical support. Specifically, the
correlations were significantly higher in the congruent prime condition compared to the
incongruent prime condition.
Considering the results of the hypotheses in conjunction, they lend the first initial
support to the basic prediction of this dissertation: that contextual priming of print
advertisement can enhance elaboration, or message scrutiny. In such respect, study 1 findings
support the contention that contextual prime content - target advertisement content
congruence can affect elaboration as suggested by the multiple roles of variables postulate of
the ELM (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Congruently primed participants are more sensitive to
argument strength in the persuasive message, the argument quality manipulation gives
somewhat more effect in the net favorability of cognitive brand responses, and their responses
are more closely related to their brand attitudes. So, even though congruently primed
participants don't necessarily elaborate more, the fact that the content of their cognitive
responses are more easily accommodated by accessible memory content (Higgins, 1996)
seems to imply that the advertising message has been more efficiently scrutinized, and applied
to establish a brand attitude. Interestingly, these results are obtained even though there were
no differences in amount of time spent on reading the prime and the advertisement in the
different conditions.
One key assumption of priming is that participants might be aware of the prime
(evidently, all participants read the prime to the same extent), but they are unaware of the
prime's influence on subsequent perceptions and judgments (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000;
Higgins, 1996). Translated to the results of study 1, it can be the case that elaboration has
been triggered without participants' awareness.
Study 1 has also shown that congruence can be situationally induced, or in other
words, that accessibility and applicability can be temporarily primed (Higgins, 1996). In that
respect, this study extends on the previous studies of matching in persuasion, where
congruence or matching frequently has been obtained by matching the message content to
personality traits, attitude functions, or attitude object functions (e.g., Edwards, 1990;
Edwards and von Hippel, 1995; Lavine and Snyder, 1996; Shavitt, 1990; Snyder and DeBono,
1985; 1989).
However, a key assumption of the ELM is that attitudes can be characterized by
different strength properties depending on the elaborative process leading up to the attitude
(e.g., Petty, et al. 1995). Study 1 found that the correlations between brand attitudes and
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purchase intentions were significantly higher for the congruently primed participants, thus
lending some support to the notion that contextual prime induced elaboration can cause
stronger brand attitudes. However, the instance of congruence is temporal in nature, and the
advertisement content is not matched to other more stable traits or characteristics of the
individual. This might indicate that the strength results obtained are ephemeral, and won't
stand in the face of an attack. Normally, other advertisers constantly try to steal your
customers away, through attacking messages. The consumer will have access to other sources
of information (i.e., consumer reports tests etc.) that can be held against the target brand.
A logical extension of the findings from study 1 would be to assess the strength of
brand attitudes established in high vs. low congruence conditions more directly.
Consequently, this was the purpose of study 2.
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5. STUDY 2: CONTEXTUAL PRIMING AND ATTITUDE
STRENGTH
This studyexamines the extent to which attitudes formed or changed under different
levels of contextual prime - advertising content congruence differ in strength. As such, this
study extends the results of study 1. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section
presents the theoretical background on attitude strength as related to persuasion. Hypotheses
regarding the effects of prime congruence on attitude strength are then presented. Next, the
design and methodology for study 2 are presented. The final sections include a report of the
hypotheses tests and a discussion of the results.
5.1 Background: Attitude strength principles
A central assumption in of the ELM is that attitudes established under different levels
of elaboration may have equal extremity, yet differ in strength properties (e.g., Haugtvedt and
Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt, et al. 1992; 1994; Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Krosnick,
1995; Petty, et al. 1995). Reviews of these ideas in the marketing literature also suggest that
marketers should not only aim to obtain positive or favorable attitudinal responses to their
advertisements; they should also strive for strong attitudes (e.g., Haugtvedt, Leavitt, &
Schneier, 1993; Haugtvedt & Priester, 1997; Keller, 1993; 2001; 2003). These suggestions are
based on the assumption that stronger attitudes are more persistent (they decay slower); are
more resistant to counter arguments (from competing brands); and they should be more
predictive of behavior (e.g., Petty and Krosnick, 1995). The primary purpose of study 2 was
to examine whether attitudes established in congruent prime conditions are more resistant to
counter attacks than attitudes established in incongruent prime conditions.
The findings from Study 1 provide a good basis from which to study the issue of
attitude strength. Results of Study 1 show that the attitudes for participants in the congruent
prime condition and the incongruent prime condition did not differ significantly in response to
the argument quality manipulation. That is, the brand attitudes of the two groups of
participants exposed to very different contexts were equal in extremity. The underlying bases
of the equally extreme attitudes were quite different as identified through the cognitive
responses - brand attitude correlations, and the brand attitude - purchase intentions
correlations. Such results are consistent with the pattern of data one would expect for strong
attitudes (Petty, et al. 1983).
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Study 1 has already suggested that contextual priming affects the nature of
elaboration, but the question as to whether or not contextual prime induced elaboration might
affect attitude strength remains unanswered. In the ELM, the attitude strength postulate says:
Attitude changes that result mostly from processing issue relevant arguments (central route) will show
greater temporal persistence, greater prediction of behavior, and greater resistance to
counterpersuasion than attitude changes that result mostly from peripheral cues (pettyand Cacioppo,
1986:21; Petty and Wegener, 1999:61)
This postulate argues that attitudes based on relatively higher levels of elaboration are
considerably stronger than attitudes based on lower elaboration. There are several reasons
why attitudes based on higher elaboration might be stronger.
Attitudes are resistant if they have the ability to withstand attack'", The ELM predicts
that individuals whose attitudes are changed or initially established based on extensive
elaboration (e.g., high prime - target ad congruence), would naturally resist the influence of
an attack better because they would be able to use their own initial cognitive responses to
defend their attitudes (Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992). More specifically, the elaboration
assumption is that more brand-related thinking will increase the likelihood that the brand-
relevant information associated with the attitude will be more salient, or in other words, that
the belief-attitude link is stronger. Hence, higher levels of elaboration may render the attitude
more defendable at a later point in time. So, when encountering an advertisement from a
competing brand, the customer will be more able to benchmark the belief-oriented brand
claims from the attacking brand against the beliefs supporting the attitude of the incumbent
brand. Additionally, salience due to elaboration might imply that the beliefs supporting the
initial attitude are more easily retrieved. Once retrieved, previous levels of elaboration will
determine if these beliefs offer sufficient reason to resist the attack, and help maintain current
brand attitude (e.g., Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992; Haugtvedt and Wegener, 1994; Haugtvedt, et
al. 1994).
It could also be that elaboration enhances the consistency between attitudes and
underlying beliefs, thus making it easier to resist counter messages from competing brands
(e.g., Chaiken, et al. 1995; Petty and Wegener, 1999:61). Chaiken and her colleagues use the
term 'evaluative-cognitive consistency' to refer to the consistency that exists between a
16 Attitudes can persist over a longer period of time simply because they seldom or never become challenged.
This refers to attitude persistence, and is related to inoculation theory (McGuire, 1964). In marketing
applications, brand attitudes will frequently be subject to attacks or challenged with claims from competing
brands. Consequently, attitudes' resistance is a natural focus in the present study.
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person's overall, abstract evaluation of an attitude object and the evaluative meaning of his or
her beliefs about the object (Chaiken, et al. 1995:388). Additionally, one might expect that
high-consistency persons' beliefs are more internally consistent in their implied evaluation of
the attitude object than those of low consistency persons. In relation to attitude resistance,
Chaiken, et al. (1995) state that they have observed that high consistency persons are more
prone than low consistency persons to counterargue information that challenges their attitudes
(Chaiken and Yates, 1985).
Finally, higher elaboration might enhance confidence (Petty, et al. 1995). This means
that with increasing levels of elaboration, and thereby increasing amount of thought, it is more
likely that the consumer places confidence in both beliefs and resulting attitudes. This effect
could also arise as a qualitative elaborative effect, i.e., that the process as such is qualitatively
different in high elaboration conditions (cf. the second postulate of the ELM: Petty and
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999). Both the amount and nature of elaboration should
favor confidence at higher levels of elaboration.
There are relatively few studies where attitudes are measured at two points in time.
Studies where attitudes have been created or changed under experimental control, and then
experimentally challenged and measured again are even more rare. Some studies have applied
different sets of manipulations to assess attitude strength consequences. However, none of the
persuasion studies have manipulated advertising context to examine attitude strength effects.
They have primarily dealt with manipulations of the advertisement itself (e.g., repetition and
variation) and/or aspects of the recipient (e.g., distractions, motivation etc.). Haugtvedt and
Petty (1992, study 2) showed that the initial experimentally created beliefs of high need for
cognition individuals were more resistant to counter messages than the experimentally created
beliefs of individuals low in need for cognition. High in need for cognition individuals tend to
elaborate more on the initial message, and were therefore more able to resist.
Haugtvedt and Wegener (1994) manipulated the order of messages, that is either pro-
con or con-pro a position, and participants' level of motivation to elaborate. They found that
situations that foster high levels of message elaboration lead to greater influence on an initial
message on final attitudes, whereas situations that foster low levels of message relevant
elaboration lead to greater influence of a second message on final judgments. Haugtvedt, et al.
(1994) manipulated advertising repetition and variation strategies, and found in study 2 that
despite the appearance of equal effectiveness with respect to attitude extremity, persistence,
and confidence, the type of advertising repetition strategy differentially influenced the extent
to which individuals resisted change in the face of a counter persuasive attack. Hence, the
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Haugtvedt, et al. (1994) study demonstrated that attitude persistence and attitude resistance
are two separate dimensions of attitude strength (see also Petty and Krosnick, 1995).
Specifically, repetition strategies were more effective in producing persistent attitudes
regardless of variation strategy, but attitudes based on substantively varied advertisements
were more resistant in face of attack than were attitudes based on other repetition strategies.
5.2 Hypotheses
Advertising context has previously not been introduced into the persuasion situation as
a variable potential to affect attitude strength. Nor have the priming studies to date assessed
attitude strength. Under what conditions would one expect advertising context (as a prime) to
influence attitude strength, and in particular, attitude resistance? The underlying explanation
of the elaboration-attitude strength hypothesis is that if a variable increases the likelihood that
an attitude is based on careful thinking rather than a simple cue process, this variable would
also increase the likelihood that the resulting attitude is strong rather than weak (Petty, et al.
1995:94). In the present research, this variable is the contextual prime, or more precisely, the
congruence between the contextual prime and the target advertisement.
Petty and Wegener (1999) specify salience as a variable explaining some of the effect
of elaboration on attitude resistance. The assumption is that increased object-relevant thinking
will increase the likelihood that object relevant information linked to the attitude object will
be more strongly linked to the attitude, i.e., that the set of beliefs supporting the attitude is
highly attitude-object specific. With increasing prime - target ad congruence it is likely that
the primed memory content will provide direction to the elaboration that takes place, thus
increasing the likelihood that the object relevant thinking becomes even more saliently tied to
the attitude object. In the case of incongruence, the primed content could direct elaboration
away from the presented attitude-object arguments, reducing the link between attitude-object
and supporting belief-structure. Hence, with increasing congruence, it is likely that the
supporting belief-structure will be more closely related to the attitude object than in the
incongruent case, yielding an attitude more resistant in the face of a counter-message.
Additionally, congruence also rests on the applicability assumption from the priming
literature (e.g., Higgins, 1996) - that is, for a prime to be congruent, it should not only
facilitate access to an attitude and supporting belief structure, but the accessed memory
content should also be applicable to the subject in question. With increasing congruence, we
would have a situation that facilitates salience, and applicability, a situation that in sum
73
should make the attitude become more strongly embedded in a set of beliefs supporting that
particular attitude.
Higher elaboration could facilitate evaluative-cognitive consistency as earlier argued.
With increasing consistency, it is more likely that the resulting attitude will be strong, as it
contains no conflicting 'evidence' on which to base the attitude. In this situation, the
consumer has no reason to question the validity of his or her attitude, which should make it
more resistant to attack. Again, with increasing congruence between prime and advertisement,
the directional capacity of the prime should make it more likely that evaluative-cognitive
consistency arise. In case of low congruence, there is less reason to assume such consistency.
Consequently, with incongruence, chances are lower that the belief structure should support
the attitude, resulting in a weaker attitude.
Finally, prime congruence might enhance attitude confidence (Petty, et al. 1995). In
this situation, a contextual prime serves first and foremost the purpose of providing direction
to the amount and content of elaboration. In high congruence situations, attitude confidence
could be enhanced as the merits of the advertised brand is processed in lieu of the already
primed memory content. In other words, the increased ease of processing in line with primed
content yields no particular reason for the consumer to question his or her elaboration of the
arguments in the advertisement. On the other hand, in a situation with low congruence
between prime and advertisement, the primed memory content could be (in varying degrees)
in opposition or orthogonal to the advertised arguments, thus leaving room to question the
validity of the arguments. The consumer could then become less confident in both the
arguments, and the elaborative interpretation of those arguments. Consequently, less attitude
confidence would be expected in the incongruent compared to the congruent prime condition.
The previous studies of contextual priming effects on print advertisement judgments
have not challenged primed attitudes with counter-messages. Hence, there are no specific
empirical studies from which to obtain support for the assumption that attitudes formed in
congruent prime conditions are more resistant to attack than attitudes formed in incongruent
prime conditions. However, the preceding theoretical discussion leads to the following
hypotheses:
H5: Brand attitudes formed in conditions with higher congruence between contextual
prime and advertisement will be more resistant to attacks from counter-messages
than attitudes formed in conditions with lower congruence between contextual
prime and advertisement.
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H6: Brand attitude confidence formed in conditions with higher congruence between
contextual prime and advertisement will be more resistant to attacks from
counter-messages than brand attitude confidence formed in conditions with lower
congruence between contextual prime and advertisement.
5.3 Methodology
In this section we first discuss the design chosen for study 2. Then we outline the
experimental procedure, before detailing the measurement and manipulations of independent
and dependent variables. We then tum to tests of the hypotheses, and end this chapter with a
discussion of the results.
5.3.1 Overview of design
An important assumption in the ELM is that attitudes formed under different levels of
elaboration may be equally positive (or negative), but still they might differ in strength. In
study 1, this might be the case for the attitudes of participants in the congruent vs. incongruent
prime strong argument condition (Mstrong arguments congruent prime = 5.04 and Mstrong arguments incongruent
prime = 4.96, F (1,66) < 1, n.s.). However, the participants' attitudes were not challenged in
study 1, hence, attitude strength implications may only be assumed based on the results from
tests of H3 and H4. In study 2, the purpose was to challenge the attitudes formed in the strong
argument condition because of this apparent similarity in extremity across priming
conditions'",
Therefore, the second study was an extension of studyone in two respects. First, it
introduced a counter message, or more precisely a message containing arguments questioning
the validity of the claims in the advertisement. Second, attitude toward the advertised brand
and attitude confidence were measured after the initial advertising exposure, and then once
again after the counter message exposure.
Inprevious studies of attitude resistance, the counter message has only had one
version, i.e., it has not been varied in counter attack strength (see e.g., Haugtvedt and Petty,
1992; Haugtvedt, et al. 1994). Additionally, the counter attack messages have been developed
to be rather weak (Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992). However, we wanted to vary the strength of
the attack to examine if participants were sensitive to the nature of the attack, or in other
17 Additionally, we chose to only use the strong argument conditions because we wanted the initial attitudes to be
positive prior to attack.
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words, if they were processing the attack. A manipulation of the strength of the counter attack
message could allow us to better understand if an attack merely serves as a cue. Thus, it
strengthens our opportunity to check if an attack's ability to change attitudes is dependent on
its strength (an argument based explanation), or if the attack affects brand attitudes regardless
of strength. Thereby, we put the strength properties of contextually primed attitudes to a more
severe test. Ifbrand attitudes formed under different priming conditions differ in resistance,
this should be identified through differences in attitude decay from pre- to post-attack attitude
measurement.
The second study was a 2 (counter argument: strong vs. weak) x 2 (prime congruence:
congruent, incongruent) x 2(time of attitude measurement: post advertisement, post
counterattack) mixed factorial design with the first two treatments as between subjects factors,
and the last a repeated measurement factor within subjects, displayed in table 7.
Table 7:
Design for study 2
Prime congruence
Congruent Incongruent
Pre attack Post attack Pre attack Post attack
Attack Strong
strength Weak
5.3.2 Participants and procedure
Participants were 181 undergraduate marketing students at Ohio State University who
participated for extra course credit. Participants entered the lab in groups ranging from 2 to 8
students, and were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions. Each of
the participants was seated in front of a computer separated from other participants. Then the
experimenter entered the condition of the subject in the MediaLab software (Jarvis 2(02) used
in the experiment, and the participant was told to read instructions carefully, and complete the
study at their own pace. The experimenter remained quietly in the lab during the session.
Study 2 followed the same sequence as study 1 to the point where attitude toward the
brand in the advertisement was assessed. In contrast to study 1, they did not proceed to
thought listings at this point. The reason was that the thought-listing task it self could serve as
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a trigger to elaborate, and we did not want dilute the elaborative capacity of prime congruence
or incongruence prior to attack byenforcing elaboration. They were however asked how
confident they felt about the attitudinal responses given. The counter message part of the
study commenced next. Participants read one of two versions (strong or weak) of a message
questioning the quality of the shampoo brand previously advertised. No warning in the sense
of a cover story was given prior to attack. Following the attack, the participants again rated
their attitudes toward the brand and advertisement. Then they answered questions assessing
confidence in attitudinal responses given after having read the attack message. One item also
asked the participants to assess the strength of the attack message, serving as a manipulation
check of the attack manipulation. Next, they answered items pertaining to their level of
involvement in the product category of shampoo, and the same priming manipulations items
used in study 1.Prior to the debrief, participants completed the thought-listings procedure as
in study 1, and brand attribute and name recall tests. Then, the participants read a debrief,
were thanked and dismissed. The experimental session took approximately 10 minutes for
each participant to conclude.
5.3.3 Manipulations and measurement
Study 2 entailed two between subject factors requiring manipulations (prime
congruence, and counter message), whereas the third factor, time of measurement pre attack
vs. post attack was measured as a repeated factor within subjects.
5.3.3.1 Prime congruence
Prime congruence was manipulated to obtain two levels, congruence and incongruence
with the same stimuli combinations developed for study 1. To build on the findings from
study 1, no alterations were made to the prime story or the advertisement. Furthermore, study
1 showed that mean brand attitudes did not differ significantly across the argument quality
manipulation, indicating a very good opportunity to assess a key assumption in the ELM; that
attitudes of equal extremity may differ in strength. Logically then, we aimed to replicate this
equality of attitude extremity as a starting point before exposing participants to the attack
message. Hence, in study 2, only the strong argument version of the advertisement was used.
When combined with the functionally oriented prime vs. the experientially oriented prime, we
obtained two levels of prime congruence due to the functional brand profile of the
advertisement. For all other details, please refer to section 4.2.3.1.
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5.3.3.2 Counter message
The message containing arguments attacking the claims in the advertisement
represented the crucial manipulation to obtain assessment of attitude resistance in study 2.
Although not necessary to test H5, we wanted to test two different versions of the counter
message to see if attitudes in congruent prime conditions where more resistant to both strong
and weaker counter messages. Other studies (e.g., Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992) only tested the
effect of one version of a counter message (a rather weak attack). If congruently primed
attitudes were more resistant to both stronger and weaker attacks, it would increase our
confidence that contextual prime - advertisement content congruence facilitated stronger
attitudes.
One challenge was to make the counter messages logically tied into the preceding line
of stimuli and questions, otherwise we could expect that the counter messages were simply
deemed as irrelevant. Accordingly, the introduction to the counter message said the following
in both versions of the counter message: "Because of concern for their readers, the online
newspaper wants to make sure that they are promoting high-quality products. Therefore,
newspaper staffpre-tested the shampoo for a few weeks before the launch". Then the strong
and weak versions diverged. The strong and weak messages are shown in figure 5 and 6.
Figure 5. Strong counter message arguments
A summary of their judgments shows the following:
• On a ten-point scale (ten being the best), the average rating of the
shampoo was only 3.
• More than half the staff said it made the hair feel more coarse
• 15% said they experienced increased dandruff problems
• 75% said they would rather stick to the shampoo they used before
Figure 6. Weak counter message arguments
A summary of their judgments shows the following:
• On a ten-point scale (ten being the best), the average rating of the
shampoo was 6.
• Many reported that the shampoo-bottle was a bit slippery when wet
• Some did not like the color of the shampoo, and
• Some people did not like the scent of the shampoo
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The two versions contained the same number of counter arguments. However, in the
strong version, these arguments were more severe, questioning more directly at the functional
benefits of the shampoo (i.e., the dandruff and coarse arguments). Hence, they were assumed
to be more detrimental to the functional format of the previous shampoo advertisement. In the
weak version, a slippery shampoo bottle, and the use of "some" instead of numbers in
percentages relating to color and scent, attempted to make the counter message a bit specious.
The two versions of the attack message were pretested on a sample of 48 students'",
First they read the advertisement, and then one of the two versions of the attack message (Le.
a between subjects design). Then they were asked to rate the strength of the arguments on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 - weak to 7 - strong. Table 8 below shows the results for the weak
version of the message.
Table 8:
Strength ofweak counter message arguments (n = 24)
Weak-strong
(t-values)
1. On a ten point satisfaction scale (ten being best) the average rating of the shampoo was 6
2.38"
(5.92t
2. Many reported that the shampoo bottle was a bit slippery when wet
2.33
(6.78)
3. Some did not like the color of the shampoo
2.83
(5.06)
4. Some people did not like the scent of the shampoo
2.71
(5.29)
Note: a: Means on 7 point scale, values lower than 4 mean weaker
b: t-values
Even though the counter messages contained the same number of arguments, the
strength of each argument could only be evaluated based on whether or not they were
significantly different from a scale midpoint (4). Put differently, it did not make sense to
compare counter argument number 1 from the strong condition directly with counter
argument number 1 from the weak condition, to assess if they were significally different. The
18 We acknowledge that the attack strength manipulation is a relative rather than absolute. Comparing strength
perceptions against a scale midpoint is consequently a bit arbitrary. However, we wanted some indications of
strength differences prior to running study 2, consequently, we conducted the following analyses on an item-by-
item basis. Admittedly, the differences in scores on the collapsed indexes of strength perceptions are more
comparable. Finally, we chose to assess strength in a between subjects design because the participants in the
main experiment only would be exposed to one version of the counter attack message.
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results in the table above suggest that the four counter arguments were all rated to be below
the scale midpoint of 4, and indicated that the counter message was rather weak.
When collapsed to an index, the four counter arguments yielded M = 2.52, which is
significantly lower than 4, t(1,23) = 6.87,p < .001.
The same analysis for the counter arguments in the strong version gave the results
presented in table 9.
Table 9:
Strength of strong counter message arguments (n = 24)
Weak-strong
(t-values)
1. On a ten point satisfaction scale (ten being best) the average rating of the shampoo was 3
5.00·
(4·03t
2. More than half the staff said it made their hair feel more coarse
5.04
(4.71)
3. 15% said they experienced increased dandruff problems
5.42
(6.18)
4. 75% said they would rather stick to the shampoo they used before
5.42
(6.55)
Note: .: Means on 7 point scale, values higher than 4 mean stronger
b: t-values
All counter message arguments were rated to be significantly stronger than the scale
mid point of 4. The results indicate that the counter message arguments developed to be
stronger than those in the weak counter message indeed were perceived to be stronger.
When collapsed to an index, the four counter arguments yielded M = 5.22, which is
significantly higher than 4, t(1,23) = 7.93,p < .001. This index was more comparable with
that of the weak counter message index, and consequently, tested in one-way ANOVA with
counter message strength as grouping variable. The results showed that the strong counter
message arguments on average (Mstrong = 5.22) were stronger than the weak counter message
arguments on average (Mweak = 2.56), F(1,47) = 104.71,p < .001. Based on these pretests, the
conclusion was drawn that the strong counter message version was perceived as significantly
stronger than the weak counter message version.
5.3.3.3 Brand attitude and attitude confidence
Basically, the participants' brand attitude was measured with items similar to those in
study 1 (cf. section 4.2.4.1). However, in study 2, measures were taken before and after
attack, as described in the procedure section. The measurement procedure of study 2 was
equal to study 1 up to the point of the attack message. After having read the counter message
80
in either weak or strong version, they answered these items once again, but with an additional
instruction: "Now that you have read the test results, we would like to know how you feel
about the product. Your feelings might be more positive, less positive, or unchanged. To what
extent did you now find the brand to be bad - good, negative - positive, unfavorable -
favorable?" The scale labels indicated 1 as bad, negative, and favorable, and 7 as the opposite.
Only numbers were assigned to the scale points between the bipolar anchors. None of the
items had a "don't know" option.
Attitude confidence was measured with three semantic differential 7-point scales
anchored ''very unconfident - very confident", ''very uncertain - very certain", and ''very
insecure - very secure". The intro to these questions prior to attack was: "Please click the
number that best characterizes how certain you are about the judgment you made about the
shampoo". The participants also answered the same three items after the counter message.
5.3.3.4 Ancillary measures
Based on the ELM, it can be assumed that individuals might be more prone to
elaborate on messages concerning product categories in which they are highly involved. Even
though study 1 found no differences on time spent on reading the prime or the advertisement
between participants in the high vs. low congruence condition, we aimed to obtain a more
direct control of this in study 2. Accordingly, three Likert type items measured participants'
involvement in the product category (see e.g., Laurent and Kapferer, 1985; Mittal and Lee,
1988): "I tend to care a lot about what shampoo 1use", "I think you run a big risk if you
choose a shampoo that is inappropriate for your hair", and "The choice of shampoo is
important to me". The scales were anchored 1: Strongly disagree, 7: Strongly agree, and no
option for "don't know".
Protocols of cognitive responses to the advertisement, and recall of counter message
claims were also collected following the same procedure as in study 1, please refer to section
4.2.4.2.
5.4 Results
This section first presents results from manipulation checks and initial analyses, before
turning to results from tests of hypothesis 5.
5.4.1 Manipulation checks
In addition to testing whether the manipulations were successful, it was also important
to assess if the brand attitudes of participants before counter message were equal across
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priming conditions (as in study 1). A one-way ANOVA on brand attitudes before counter
message showed no significant difference across priming condition (Mcongruent= 5.35,vs.
Mjncongruent= 5.23, F(1,180) = .81, n.s.). Hence, the congruently primed participants did not
start out with more extreme attitudes than the incongruently primed participants.
For assessment of priming manipulation, study 2 followed the procedure of study 1.
The first asked the extent to which the featured girl in the priming story was primarily
concerned with quality and functionality when she bought products. One-way ANOVA with
prime congruence as between subjects factor indicated that participants in the congruent
prime condition agreed significantly more with this question (Mcongruent= 5.07), than
participants in the incongruent prime condition (Mjncongruent= 4.37, F(1,180) = 10.25, P =.002).
Similarly, participants in the incongruent prime condition agreed significantly more to the
statement "Sara just goes for the stuff that pleases her, and lives for the joy of the moment"
(Mcongruent= 2.95, Mjncongruent= 5.47, F(1,180) = 167.69,p < .001). At least these results
indicated that participants had a clear recall of the profile of the prime editorial.
Attack strength represented the second manipulation of study 2, and participants were
asked to rate the strength of the claims in the counter message. A 2(attack strength) x 2(prime
congruence) ANOV A on this item gave only the expected significant main effect of attack
strength. Participants who received the strong counter message rated this significantly
stronger regardless ofpriming conditions (Mstrong= 5.03 vs. Mweak= 4.23, F(1,180) = 19.89,p
<.001). These results indicated that the counter message manipulation was successful. More
importantly, the prime congruence condition did not affect the participants' perception of
counter message strength.
Based on the manipulation checks and the additional initial analyses we felt more
confident that any systematic difference in resistance of brand attitudes pre vs. post counter
attack message, could be attributed to the prime congruence manipulation.
5.4.2 Test of hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 basically predicted that brand attitudes established in the congruent
prime condition would resist a message attacking the advertised brand more than brand
attitudes established in the incongruent prime condition. Empirically, brand attitudes should
decay less from attitude measurement pre attack to post attack in the congruent prime
condition compared to the incongruent prime condition.
The three pre-attack brand attitude measures were highly interrelated (a = .917), and a
factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation yielded a one-factor
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solution accounting for 78.95 % of the variance. Hence, a brand attitude index was established
by adding the three items, and dividing the sum by three, thereby establishing an averaged
summated rating scale (Hair, et al. 1998:129) with M = 5.29, std.deviation = .91. The same
was done for the three brand attitude measures post attack, with a = .968. Similar factor
analysis yielded a one-factor solution accounting for 90.87 % of the variance. The averaged
summated rating scale for attitudes post attack had M = 3.04, and std.deviation 1.35.
To test hypothesis 5, a 2 (strong attack vs. weak attack) x 2 (congruent prime
condition vs. incongruent prime condition) x 2 (pre attack message vs. post attack message)
repeated measures ANOV A was run with the first two factors between subjects, and the third
as a repeated within subjects factor'". Table 10 reports the results.
Table 10: ANOVA results
Effects of prime congruence and attack strength
on brand attitudes study 2
Prime congruence
Congruent Incongruent
Pre attack Post attack Pre attack Post attack
5.44a 3.02 5.29 2.34
Attack
Strong (.85)b (1.19) (.86) (1.11)
50c 50 46 46
strength 5.24 4.51 5.16 3.9
Weak (.84) (.79) (1.09) (1.16)
41 41 44 44
5.34d 3.77d 5.22d 3.12d
a: means
b: std.deviation
c: number of participants
d: marginal means of prime congruence x time of measurement
There was a significant main effect of the pre - post message within subject factor,
with Mattitude pre attack = 5.28, vs. Mattitude post attack = 3.45, F(1,177) = 420.71, p <.000.
Participants' attitudes changed significantly from pre to post attack message. However, the
important prediction of H5 was that congruently primed participants would resist attack better
191t was not strictly necessary to enter the attack strength as a factor in order to test H5. More precisely, we
could also have analyzed the data for the two attack strength groups independently. By running the full model,
we were at the same time able to control whether attitude resistance was under combined influence of both prime
condition and attack strength, although not hypothesized.
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than the incongruently primed participants. The predicted interaction obtained empirical
support (F(1,177) = 8.73,p < .005). The brand attitude scores for the two groups pre vs. post
attack were Mattitude pre attack, congruent prime = 5.34, and. Mattitude post attack, congruent prime = 3.77, vs.
Mattitude pre attack, incongruent prime = 5.22, and. Mattitude post attack, incongruent prime = 3.12, as can be seen in
the bottom row of table 10. Accordingly, brand attitudes for the incongruently primed
participants resisted the counter message less than brand attitudes of the congruently primed
participants as predicted in HS. As the three-way interaction of prime congruence, attack
strength, and time of measurement failed to reach significance, the significant two-way
interaction indicates higher attitude resistance among the congruently primed participants,
even when attack strength is accounted for. This is shown in figure 7.
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Additional results showed a main effect of attack strength, with participants in the
strong attack condition reporting lower brand attitudes than participants in the weak attack
condition (F(1,177) = 31.81,p < .005)20. This main effect was logically qualified by a
significant interaction with time of measurement (F(1,177) = 89.18, p < .000). Apparently, it
was not only sufficient to be exposed to an attack for attitudes to change, the effect of attack
strength also suggests that the cogency of the attacking message was important. In
20 The conceptual meaning of main effects of the between subjects factors in this study is somewhat odd, as the
dependent variable is the average of the within-subject factor.
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methodological terms, this suggests that it might be appropriate to vary the strength of counter
messages in studies of attitude resistance. However, we cannot conclude that congruently
primed participants were more sensitive to attack strength than in congruently primed
participants, as attack strength failed to interact significantly with prime congruence.
Finally, a significant main effect of prime congruence (F(1,177) = 9.884, P < .005)
also showed that brand attitudes were on average lower for incongruently primed participants
than for congruently primed participants (Mcongruent prime condition = 4.55, vs. Mjncongruent prime
condition = 4.17). Prime congruence did not interact with attack strength (F = .081, n.s.).
No particular interactions between the attack strength manipulation and the other
factors were predicted. However, as other attitude resistance studies only had utilized one
version of attack message, it was potentially interesting to see if the two way interaction
between prime congruence and time of measurement (Le., attitude resistance) was found for
the weak and strong attack groups. Hence, a 2 (congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 (pre attack vs.
post attack) repeated measures ANOVA was run for each of the attack strength conditions. In
the strong attack group, significant main effects of time of measurement (F(1,94) = 348.48, P
< .000) and prime congruence (F(1,94) = 7.5,p = .007) were qualified by a significant
interaction between prime congruence and time of measurement (F(1,94) = 3.32, p = .072). In
the weak attack group, significant main effects of time of measurement (F(1,83) = 99.48, p <
.000) and prime congruence (F(1,83) = 3.25,p = .075) were qualified by a significant
interaction between prime congruence and time ofmeasurement (F(1,83) = 7.23,p = .009).
Accordingly, the resistance effect was slightly more prominent in the weak attack group. As
previous studies had no attack strength manipulation, the fact that the prime congruence x
time of measurement interaction obtained support in both attack strength groups ads further
support to the hypothesized attitude resistance consequences of contextual priming.
The initial manipulation checks indicated that our manipulations were successful.
However, additional analyses were run to account for some potential confounding factors.
Category involvement did not differ across priming conditions (Mcongruent = 4.86 vs. Mjncongruent
= 4.93, F(1,180) = .1, n.s.). Thus, potential difference in advertisement processing caused by
category involvement cannot account for the current resistance results. The participants also
spent equal amounts of time reading the prime story (Mcongruent = 64955.49 ms. vs. Mjncongruent
= 68312.68 ms., F(1,180) = .91, n.s.), and read the advertisement equally long (Mcongruent =
38532.31 ms. vs. Mjncongruent = 38822.29 ms., F(1,180) = .015, n.s.). Accordingly, there were
no significant differences between the priming conditions on these potential confounding
variables.
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5.4.3 Test of hypothesis 6
The results from tests of H5 indicated that attitudes of congruently primed participants
were more resistant than attitudes of incongruently primed participants, as shown through less
decay in attitude measures from pre to post attack. Another aspect of attitude strength was
related to the extent to which individuals felt more confident about their attitudes in the
congruent prime condition. Hence, this aspect is not so much related to the extremity of the
attitudinal judgment and its potential decay, but rather taps into the cognitive confidence one
attaches to the judgment being made (i.e., trust in their own judgments). Hypothesis 6
predicted that the attitude confidence of congruently primed participants would be less
affected, or resist counter attack better, than the attitude confidence of incongruently primed
participants.
The three pre-attack attitude confidence measures were highly interrelated (a = .904),
and a factor analysis with maximum likelihood extraction and varimax rotation yielded a one-
factor solution accounting for 76.4 % of the variance. Hence, a brand attitude confidence
index was established by adding the three items, and dividing the sum by three, thereby
establishing an averaged summated rating scale (Hair, et al. 1998:129) with M = 5.33,
std.deviation = .99. The same was done for the three brand attitude confidence measures post
attack, with a = .942. Similar factor analysis yielded a one-factor solution accounting for
85.59% of the variance. The averaged summated rating scale for attitude confidence post
attack had M = 4.63, and std.deviation = 1.52.
To test hypothesis 6, a 2 (strong attack vs. weak attack) x 2 (congruent prime
condition vs. incongruent prime condition) x 2 (pre attack message vs. post attack message)
repeated measures ANOVA was run with the first two factors between subjects, and the third
as a repeated within subjects factor, following the similar test logic of hypothesis 5. Table 11
reports the results.
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Table 11: ANOVA results
Effects of prime congruence and attack strength
on brand attitude confidence study 2
Prime congruence
Congruent Incongruent
Pre attack Post attack Pre attack Post attack
5.3a 4.83 5.31 4.17
Attack
Strong (.99)b (1.8) (1.02) (1.57)
SOc 50 46 46
strength 5.39 5.15 5.33 4.4
Weak (.98) (1.27) (1.01) (1.18)
41 41 44 44
5.35d 4.99d 5.32d 4.28d
a: means
b: std.deviation
c: number of participants
d: marginal means of prime congruence x time of measurement
As for attitude resistance, there was also for attitude confidence a significant main
effect of the pre - post message within subject factor, with Mattitude confidence pre attack = 5.33, vs.
Mattitudeconfidencepostattack = 4.64, F(1,177) = 38.85,p <.000. Participants' confidence in their
attitudes changed significantly from pre to post attack message. There was also a significant
main effect of prime with Mconfidence congruent condition = 5.17 vs. M.confidence incongruent condition = 4.8,
F(1,177) = 5.69,p = .018. There were no significant main effect of attack strength or
interaction effect between attack strength and the other two factors (Fs < 1).
However, the important prediction of H6 was that congruently primed participants'
attitude confidence would resist attack better than that of the incongruently primed
participants. The two significant main effects were qualified by a significant interaction
(F(1,177) = 9.26, p < .005), please refer to the bottom row of the table above for cell-means.
Hence, attitude confidence fell more for the incongruently primed participants than the
congruently primed participants. As the three-way interaction of prime congruence, attack
strength, and time of measurement failed to reach significance, the significant two-way
interaction indicates less decay in attitude confidence among the congruently primed
participants, even when attack strength is accounted for. This is shown in the figure 8:
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Figure 8:
The effect of prime congruence and time of
measurement on attitude confidence
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The pattern clearly shows that the attitude confidence is less resistant for
incongruently primed participants.
No particular interactions between the attack strength manipulation and the other
factors were predicted in hypothesis 6. As in the tests of hypothesis 5, it would however be of
interest to see if the two-way interaction between prime congruence and time of measurement
on change in attitude confidence was found in for the weak and strong attack groups. Hence, a
2 (congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 (pre attack vs. post attack) repeated measures ANOV A was
run for each of the attack strength conditions. In the strong attack group, there was a
significant main effect of time of measurement (F(1,94) = 22.41,p < .000), whereas the main
effect of prime congruence was insignificant (F(I,94) = 1.99, n.s.). The significant main effect
was qualified by a significant interaction between prime congruence and time of measurement
(F(1,94) = 3.81, P = .054). In the weak attack group, significant main effects of time of
measurement (F(1,83) = 17.83,p < .000) and prime congruence (F(1,83) = 4.21,p = .14) were
qualified by a significant interaction between prime congruence and time of measurement
(F(I,83) = 6.28,p = .014). As previous studies had no attack strength manipulation, the fact
that the prime congruence x time of measurement interaction obtained support in both attack
strength groups ads further support to the hypothesized attitude confidence consequences of
contextual priming.
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5.5 Summary and discussion of study 2 findings
The purpose of study 2 was to investigate whether brand attitudes of congruently
primed participants were stronger than attitudes of incongruently primed participants, and in
that manner, extend on the findings from study 1. Specifically, if level of congruence between
editorial context and advertisement content did affect attitude strength in an attitude resistance
perspective, at different levels of congruence we would expect:
a) that brand attitudes of congruently primed participants resisted a message with
counter attitudinal arguments better (i.e., changed less in brand attitudes pre vs.
post attack), than attitudes of incongruently primed participants, (H5) and
b) that the confidence attached to the attitudinal response made of congruently
primed participants would resist a message with counter attitudinal arguments
better than the confidence attached to attitudinal responses of incongruently
primed participants (H6).
The underlying rationale behind these two predictions was that even though initial
brand attitudes of participants in the strong argument condition in study 1 were equal across
priming conditions, they could nevertheless be held with different strength, as suggested by
the results from H3 and H4. However, to test this, the initial attitudes had to be challenged - a
situation frequently occurring for consumers in many product categories. Competitors will
tend to challenge the claims of each other's brands, trying to sway customers. Hence, the
resistance aspect of attitude strength was a logical focus of study 2.
The primary prediction of hypothesis 5 was an interaction between prime congruence
condition, and time of measurement pre vs. post attack. This interaction should show that
congruently primed attitudes resisted attack better than incongruently primed attitudes.
Overall, the significant interaction (F(1,177) = 8.73, P < .005), supported the prediction with
more resistant attitudes for congruently primed participants. This result could be confounded
by several factors; it could be the case that participants spent different amounts of time
reading primes and/or advertisements depending on priming condition, and it could be the
case that congruently primed participants felt more involved, and hence elaborated more than
incongruently primed participants. However, the analyses do not support these confounding
effects as one-way ANOVAs on brand attitudes before counter message showed no
significant differences across priming conditions (Mrongruent = 5.35,vs. Mjncongruent = 5.23,
F(1,180) = .81, n.s.). Neither did category involvement differ across priming conditions
(Mrongruent = 4.86 vs. Mjncongruent = 4.93, F(1,180) = .1, n.s.). The participants also spent equal
amounts of time reading the prime story (Mrongruent = 64955.49 ms. vs. Mjncongruent = 68312.68
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ms., F(1,180) = .91, n.s.), and read the advertisement equally long (Mcongruent = 38532.31 ms.
vs. Mjncongruent = 38822.29 ms., F(1,180) = .015, n.s.). These results should indicate that before
exposure to the attack, the situation in the two priming conditions was rather similar with
respect to some potential confounds, and also similar to the situation in study 1. So, despite
equally positive attitude across priming conditions, attitude resistance was significantly
different, as predicted by the ELM. This pattern of results also suggests that level of
congruence between editorial context and advertising content affects elaboration likelihood,
thus corroborating the results from study 1.
Study 2 employed a manipulation of attack message strength not introduced in
previous studies of attitude resistance. A significant main effect of attack strength showed as
expected that attitudes resisted weak attack better than strong attacks. However, attack
strength did not interact with prime condition - indicating that there was no systematic
difference in the ways congruently vs. incongruently primed participants processed weak vs.
strong attacks. Hence, it cannot be concluded that attack messages were differently elaborated
upon as a function of prime congruence condition. On the other hand, within each strength
condition, the interaction between time of measurement and prime congruence was
significant, which increases our confidence in the results.
Attitude resistance characterizes the shift in the attitude score it self, and is a rather
direct measure of attitude strength as addressed in hypothesis 5. In hypothesis 6, the focus
changed to the individuals' judgments of their attitude as it addressed the confidence attached
to the attitudinal judgment they had made. Attitude resistance and confidence in ones'
attitudes can operate independently, but it is more likely that attitudes that show more
resistance may be supported by higher confidence. Put the other way, if you are less confident
in your attitude, why work 'hard' defending against an attack? Hence, hypothesis 6 predicted
that attitude confidence of congruently primed participants would change less from pre to post
attack compared to incongruently primed participants. This interaction obtained empirical
support (F(1,177) = 9.26, P <.005). Interestingly, there was no difference in attitude
confidence pre attack (Mcongruent = 5.34, Mjncongruent = 5.32, F <1), so despite equal confidence
initially (and equal product category involvement), confidence fell more for incongruently
primed participants in response to the attack message. This interaction between prime
congruence and time of measurement appeared in both attack strength groups, but the effect
was slightly more pronounced in the weak attack group.
The failure of the attack strength manipulation to interact with prime congruence and
time of measurement for both attitude resistance and attitude confidence renders a situation
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where we cannot conclude that attack message arguments were processed differently across
priming conditions, only that attacks in general produced more decay for incongruently
primed participants. This was not particularly surprising, as the elaborative capacity of prime
congruence only has been hypothesized to hold for the advertising message, a prediction
obtaining predominant support. More precisely, congruence occurs between the editorial
context and the advertisement, not between the prime and the attack message.
Summing up, the results from study 2 confirm the predictions that increasing
congruence between editorial context and content of advertisement claims can produce
stronger brand attitudes in terms of attitude resistance and attitude confidence. Furthermore,
the occurrence of congruence produces these two effects in both strong and weak attack
message groups.
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6. DISCUSSION
In this chapter, the findings of study 1 and 2 are reviewed and discussed in relation to
the two overall research questions for this dissertation, and the related hypotheses. In addition,
we will address some limitations and provide suggestions for future research. Finally,
theoretical and managerial are accentuated.
6.1 Questions, predictions, and results
In the opening scenario of this dissertation, you were asked to picture yourself reading
a business magazine, e.g., Forbes. You had just read how successful executives organized
themselves to become more efficient. Turning the page, a full-page, color advertisement for
the new, enhanced PDA from Casio hit you right in the eye, describing important features of
the new product. Alternatively, you could have read about the same executives' culinary
interests, before turning the page to the same advertisement. The bottom line, practical
question then was: do you think you processed the advertisement differently depending on the
story you read? The two experiments reported in this dissertation would suggest that you
would.
The practical question turned into research questions inspired by two theoretical
approaches: priming and persuasion. Priming is a label used for procedures that increases the
accessibility of some category or construct in memory (Sherman, et al. 1990) - in this
research conceptualized as contextual priming represented by the editorial material (i.e., the
context) preceding the advertisement. Previous priming research stopped short of detailing
how persuasion (and elaboration) can be affected, whereas previous persuasion research
stopped short of accounting for contextual priming. What could be the link between
contextual priming and persuasion - or: could priming facilitate elaboration?
Prime congruence occurs as an instance where the prime (the editorial story preceding
the advertisement) activates memory concepts that are applicable (Higgins, 1996) to the
content of the prime target, in this case the advertisement. Logically, prime congruence will
vary, and level of prime congruence represented the cruciallink between priming and
persuasion in the current research. Hence, we could have high prime congruence when the
Forbes reader read about executives' efficient organizing, and low congruence if the story
dealt with executives' culinary interests.
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Study 1, purpose and findings
Study 1 addressed the basic question: can contextual priming, through congruence
between editorial context and advertisement content affect elaboration likelihood? As a
central methodological tool, the quality of the arguments in the target advertisement was
varied, a technique frequently utilized in the ELM to investigate extent of message
elaboration. Basically, sensitivity to the argument quality manipulation should increase at
higher levels of elaboration. Consequently, if prime congruence was to facilitate elaboration,
the first prediction of study 1 was that sensitivity to argument quality should increase at
higher levels of prime congruence, because primed memory content was applicable to the
advertisement content. Conceptually, the assumption that congruence might affect attitudes
has been tested with congruence between message content and factors like attitude functions
(e.g., Lavine and Snyder, 1996; Snyder and DeBono, 1985; 1989), attitude object functions
(e.g., Shavitt, 1990), cognitive and affective bases of attitudes (e.g., Edwards, 1990; Edwards
and von Hippel, 1995), and mood-profile of preceding stories (Howard and Barry, 1994).
These studies have primarily shown that matching or congruent messages tend to produce
more positive attitudes than mismatching (incongruent) messages. In the functional attitude
domain the attitude function - advertisement content congruence has established itself to such
extent that it has obtained the label "the functional matching hypothesis of persuasion" (see
e.g., Lavine and Snyder 1996; Petty, et al. 2000). However, the explanations and results are
mixed, as illustrated by Millar and Millar (1990) who found mismatching to be more
effective. Few of these previous studies employed an argument strength manipulation in order
to assess degree of elaboration. Petty and Wegener (1998) suggested that matching effects on
persuasion could be explained through at least three different mechanisms (see also Fabrigar
and Petty, 1999; Petty, et al. 2000) based on the multiple roles of persuasion variables
postulate (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). Petty and his colleagues (petty and Wegener, 1998b;
Petty, et al. 2000) obtained congruence by matching message content, and personality traits or
schemas self-monitoring and need for cognition. Wheeler (2001) also found that self-schema
matching could serve to increase elaboration likelihood, so the assumption that congruence
might facilitate elaboration is documented. However, it should be noted that the strategy to
establish congruence in the current research by means of editorial context aiming at temporal
activation is quite different from previous congruence manipulations.
The results for brand attitude extremity showed that incongruently primed participants
failed to notice the argument quality manipulation - thus indicating low level of elaboration.
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On the other hand, the congruently primed participants did notice this manipulation, with
weak arguments yielding lower brand attitudes. The fact that this predicted interaction
between argument strength and prime congruence on brand attitude was significant, lends
initial support to the assumption that prime congruence can facilitate elaboration, in line with
the multiple roles of persuasion variables postulate of the ELM. The elaborative capacity of
prime congruence was predicted to give additional results to corroborate the attitude extremity
results.
In studies of persuasion, verbal protocol analyses are common to investigate the
content of elaboration. Specifically, in high elaboration likelihood conditions, if arguments
are perceived as strong, the ratio of positive to negative cognitive responses should be
predominantly positive, and the opposite if the arguments are perceives as weak. This
sensitivity to argument quality should be significantly less at lower levels of elaboration.
Transferred to the current studies of prime congruence, we predicted the similar pattern.
However, this prediction failed to obtain empirical support, the profile of cognitive responses
to strong and weak arguments did not vary as expected with prime congruence.
Considering the notion of applicability of primed content to the prime target from the
priming literature (e.g., Higgins, 1996), cognitive responses of congruently vs. incongruently
primed participants could be utilized differently. Specifically, it could be that congruently
primed participants relied more on their cognitive responses when forming their brand
attitudes compared to incongruently primed participants. In other words, it could be the case
that congruently primed participants were able to tie closer links between their cognitive
responses and brand attitude due to applicability - i.e., that the content of elaboration of
congruent advertisement claims was more easily accommodated into accessible and
applicable memory content. Results showed that the correlations between brand attitude and
the cognitive response index were significantly higher among congruently primed
participants, compared to incongruently primed participants.
If attitudes of congruently primed participants resulted from more elaboration and
their attitudes were more strongly intertwined with their cognitive responses as the previous
results suggest, we would also expect that the correlation between brand attitudes and
purchase intentions were higher for congruently primed participants. The results of study 1
confirmed this prediction.
Of the four predictions of study 1, only the predicted interaction between prime
congruence and argument quality on the ratio of positive to negative cognitive responses
failed to reach significance - even though the pattern of results indicated that the cognitive
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response index of the congruently primed participants were more sensitive to the argument
quality manipulation. In conjunction, the results of study 1 do suggest that level of
congruence between the editorial context in which an advertisement appear, and the content
of that advertisement plays significant roles in the formation of brand attitudes. In other
words, study Loffered initial evidence that prime congruence can facilitate elaboration - even
when congruence is temporarily established as in the present research.
Study 2, purpose and findings
Competitors frequently challenge a brand's unique position - implying that brand
attitudes will often face attacks in the nature of claims from competing brands, word of mouth
from customers or other third-party sources, etc. So, one thing is knowing how prime
congruence might enhance elaboration through sensitivity to argument quality - another thing
is the extent to which brand attitudes of congruently primed customers yield less in face of
attack than the brand attitudes of incongruently primed customers.
Study 2 extended study l' results by introducing a counter attack message after the
initial advertisement exposure then followed by a post attack brand attitude measure. Would
brand attitudes of congruently primed participants resist better than those the incongruently
primed? Would the confidence attached to brand attitudes of congruently primed participants
resist better as well? The ELM predicts that brand attitudes are stronger when based on more
extensive elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty, et al. 1995), and if the results of study
1 can be ascribed to enhanced elaboration, prime congruence should also affect attitude
resistance and confidence.
In study 2, the attitudes of all participants on average fell after the attack, and more so
after stronger attacks as illustrated by the significant main effect of the attack strength
manipulation. However, study 2 also produced a significant interaction between prime
congruence and time of measurement pre vs. post attack - meaning that the attitudes of
incongruently primed participants resisted attack less than congruently primed participants.
The attack strength manipulation failed to interact with prime congruence condition, implying
no systematic difference in the way strong vs. weak attacks were processed between priming
conditions, but no predictions were made for the attack strength manipulation. Previous
attitude resistance studies did not manipulate the attacking message, and the results obtained
here, that the interaction between prime congruence and time of measurement was significant
overall, and separately within each attack strength group, corroborate the elaborative capacity
of prime congruence signaled in study 1.
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The confidence attached to one's attitudinal judgment might also be dependent on
elaboration, as attitudes backed by more extensive elaboration might be held with more
confidence than attitudes backed by less elaboration. As we saw in study 1, the cognitive
responses of congruently primed participants were more closely related with their attitudes,
which might lead them to be held with more confidence. Attitude confidence is rarely
reported as a pre vs. post attack repeated measure as done here in study 2, but rather used as
an attempt to measure attitude strength when no attacks are introduced. As the predicted
interaction of prime congruence and time of measurement was significant, this showed that
the confidence congruently primed participants had attached to their attitudinal judgments
resisted attacks better than that of the incongruently primed participants. The attack strength
manipulation showed similar effects for resistance in attitude confidence as it showed for
resistance in attitude extremity.
In conjunction, the results from study 2 corroborated the results of study 1.Whereas
study 1 established evidence that prime congruence facilitated elaboration, study 2 showed
that attitudes of congruently primed participants were significantly stronger as they resisted
attacks better than attitudes of incongruently primed participants. Study 1 introduced an
argument strength manipulation not previously employed in studies of contextual priming
effects. At the same time, it showed that contextual priming enhanced message scrutiny,
thereby introducing an additional variable capable of affecting elaboration likelihood.
Previous contextual priming studies have not tested attitude strength consequences of prime
congruence. Furthermore, the current studies show that high congruence between editorial
context and content of brand advertisements penalizes consumer judgments when
advertisement content is perceived as weak and specious. These results are obtained with a
manipulation creating temporary congruence, in difference from most of the previous studies
of congruence or matching between advertisement content and attitude functions, attitude
object functions, and some self-schemas.
The hypotheses of the present studies, and level of empirical support are summarized
in table 12.
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Table 12:
Summary of hypotheses and empirical results, study 1 and study 2
# Prediction Empirical result Conclusion
Hl Prime congruence x Argument quality F(1,133) = 9.8, P = .002 Supportedinteraction on brand attitude
Prime congruence x Argument quality
H2 interaction on pos.-neg. cognitive F(1,133) = 1.4, n.s. Not supported
response index
H3 rcog.responses, brand attitude in congruent condition > Fisher z = 2.48, P < .01 Supportedrcoz.reeonses brand attitude in incongruent condition
H4 rbrand attitude, purchase intention in congruent condition > Fisher z = 1.8l,p < .04 Supported
'brand attitude purchase intention in incongruent condition
Prime congruence x time of
HS measurement interaction on attitude F(1,177) = 8.73,p < .005 Supported
resistance
Prime congruence x time of
H6 measurement interaction on attitude F(1,177) = 9.26,p < .005 Supported
confidence resistance
6.2 Limitations and future research
Although the results from the two studies were primarily supportive of the main
theoretical predictions, some other factors deserve discussion in relation to the obtained
results.
6.2.1 The prime and prime target
Prime target ambiguity. The current studies chose to apply a rather concrete,
functionally oriented advertisement as a prime target. This choice is somewhat different from
previous practice and reasoning in the priming literature. Following the priming literature,
prime-driven perceptions are most likely to appear when the target stimulus is ambiguous.
However, exactly how ambiguous a target stimulus would have to be is not clear. The
impression left from Yi's (1990a,b, 1993) studies of contextual priming in advertising, is that
the advertisement following a prime need to be ambiguous for priming effects to occur, but
ambiguity is not manipulated in Yi's work. Ambiguity is apparently conceived of as a
characteristic of the target that opens up for multiple interpretations of the target (see e.g.,
Empson 1930, Hoch 2003). In other words, when there are multiple possible interpretations of
a target stimulus, participants are more likely to make an interpretation in direction of the
prime. It is likely that advertisements will vary in ambiguity; some are very descriptive and
factual, while other may portray pictures and textual elements encouraging multiple
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interpretations. Does this rule out the effects obtained in the current studies as priming
effects?
One might expect (at least) two effects to operate based on target stimulus' level of
ambiguity. First, for highly ambiguous target stimuli, a main-effect of primed representation
is likely to occur. For example, consider two primes used in the current studies, one priming
functional consumption behavior, and the other priming experiential consumption behavior. ff
the target advertisement was high in ambiguity, participants primed with functional
consumption could interpret the advertisement in that manner, whereas the other subject
group would use the experiential consumption prime as a reference. Thus, both primes would
be equally effective in biasing advertisement processing in direction of the prime. Put
differently, if the prime target had this level of ambiguity, the notion of prime congruence
would be nonsensical, as both primes would produce congruence.
Admittedly, advertisements with few verbal elements, or slogans or visual elements
made deliberatively to open up for many interpretations, could experience this effect. In those
cases, both primes might be said to be equally effective in biasing perceptions of the
advertisement, but it could also be the case that only one of these biases was the one sought
for by the advertiser.
Second, what if the advertisement was less ambiguous as in the current studies? Then
we might expect that of two primes, only one might appear relevant to the advertisement.
More precisely, both primes activate memory content, but only one type of memory content
has clear relevance for the advertisement. An irrelevant prime could show less effect, or
actually work directly against the message of that advertisement, because activated memory
content is incongruent with the advertisement. A relevant prime could on the other hand
strengthen the interpretation and perception of the advertisement. Returning to the functional
vs. experiential prime manipulation adopted in the current studies, if the advertisement was
clearly communicating functional product attributes, the functional prime would be the more
relevant one if it activates the functional consumption associations of the customer. ff it
through its occurrence in the immediate context surrounding the advertisement leads to more
elaboration and a more favorable attitude than the other prime would have done, we would
still have a priming effect, despite the target's low level of ambiguity. This is what we
observed in study 1 and study 2.
Hence, it seems to be limited reason to argue that a stimulus following a prime should
be ambiguous for priming effects to occur. The less ambiguous, the more the relevance vs.
irrelevance of the preceding prime would have to say for different effects. The more
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ambiguous target, the more we might experience biasing effects in direction of the primed
representations, simply because different memory contents are equally applicable. Future
research would benefit from manipulating prime target ambiguity to test the potential
different priming effects associated with target ambiguity.
Examining other types of congruence between prime and prime target: The potential
bases for congruence could be close to indefinite, and much remains to be investigated with
respect to the concept of congruence itself, what is creating perceptions of congruence, and
what are the potential effects of congruence between advertisements and their contexts. The
current studies established congruence between prime and advertisement content for
functionally oriented primes and prime target (i.e., an explicit congruence vs. incongruence
manipulation). However, incongruence is given with respect to either prime content or prime
target content - and is ultimately defined through the eyes of the beholder. Future research
could introduce manipulations of both functional and experiential brand advertisements in
response to the functional and experiential editorial context (c.f., Lavine and Snyder, 1996).
That could enable a test of the elaborative capacity of different bases of congruence
frequently appearing in newspapers, magazines, etc.
One could also envision editorial context priming either happy or sad moods (e.g.,
Howard and Barry, 1994) - however, few advertisements would aim to be sad in content, but
they might nevertheless in themselves trigger sad moods like feelings of guilt, negative body
image, etc. Another dimension could be to manipulate congruence by means of layout, Le.,
visual congruence vs. verbal congruence. Both the prime and the prime target could vary on
this visual - verbal dimension, however it poses a challenge to control for argument strength.
In everyday life, companies will be likely to apply a mix of visual and verbal elements in their
advertisements, and future research could manipulate congruence both visually and verbally.
In the advertisements in the current studies, the pictorial element was held constant across
conditions, and high verbal content was logical for a functionally oriented congruence
approach. However, in attempts to manipulate congruence between editorial context and
advertisements with a symbolic concept (c.f., Park, et al. 1986), one might have to downplay
the verbal elements, and give more attention to the visual or pictorial elements of the prime
target.
In addition, occurrences with partial congruence are likely. With partial congruence
we mean that an advertisement might combine functional and/or experiential and/or symbolic
positioning messages. The verbal element might be highly functional, whereas the pictorial
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elements might be highly symbolic, or verbal arguments might be both functional and/or
symbolic etc. Attempts have been made to investigate this without clear results (e.g., Agres,
1990; Lavine and Snyder, 1996). The construction of pure (uni-directed) vs. combined
advertisements will be difficult, at least when it comes to keeping the pure vs. combined
advertisements comparable. Given pure advertisements with 6 bullet-points with product
attributes in each of the functional vs. experiential oriented advertisements, it would be hard
to decide which arguments to select for the combined version, given a goal of keeping the
amount of information equal in pure vs. combined advertisements, additionally one would
also have to counterbalance the sequence of functional vs. experiential ad claims.
Finally, both study 1 and 2 were framed as occurring in an Internet context. However,
a quick glance at the stimuli would suggest that they (at least the editorial stories) do not look
too much like Internet solutions. Future studies might attempt to enhance the web-layout to
correct for this, or might choose to conduct similar experiments in real paper versions of
magazines (c.f., Moorman, et al. 2002). New ways to present advertisements on the Internet
are invented rapidly, but more importantly, Internet gives the advertiser an opportunity to
more precisely place their advertisements along with content of their desire. This is possible
due to the frequent updates of internet-magazines and -newspapers. The same opportunity
could enable field experiments to be conducted regarding the effect of editorial context (and
vice versa) on elaboration of advertisements, and could be pursued in future research.
The effect of the context surrounding advertisements was the primary focus in both
studies, and accordingly, participants in all conditions read a story in one or the other version
prior to the advertisement. Thus, the designs of study 1 and 2 contained no control-group. The
relative difference in effects based on level of congruence was our primary concern, but it
might also be of interest to add a third level to the priming factor, turning it into a no prime
vs. congruent prime vs. incongruent prime manipulation. Itwould not add in understanding
the difference between prime congruence and incongruence explicitly. However, depending
on the effect in a potential control group of study 1, it could give some indications as to what
one learn from considering the effectiveness of advertisements seen in isolation, compared to
effectiveness of advertisements occurring in a context (as they naturally most often will do).
If the purpose of these future studies is to continue to investigate and delineate the
elaborative consequences of congruence between advertising content and advertising context,
caution should be taken to ensure that argument quality is perceived to be equally strong or
weak across advertisement content.
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6.2.2. Multiple roles of elaboration variables and the current studies.
Motivation to elaborate: Personal relevance is acknowledged as a key facilitator of
elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and Wegener, 1999, se also chapter 3). To what
extent might the elaborative consequences of prime congruence be accounted for by personal
relevance? Personal relevance was not manipulated in the current studies. This does not mean
that personal relevance has to be situationally manipulated in order to address the effect, as
evident from e.g., Haugtvedt and Petty (1994), Petty and Wegener (1998b), Petty, et al.
(2000), and Wheeler (2001) and their practice of using personality traits or self-schemas as
measures of personal relevance or elaboration likelihood.
Ifwe assume that individuals will spend more time on message scrutiny when they are
more involved in message processing, we should expect that congruently primed participants
spent more time reading the advertisement compared to the incongruently primed participants.
The results from study 1 showed no significant difference in time spent on reading either the
prime or the advertisement between the two prime conditions, nor did time spent on reading
the advertisement alter the predicted interaction between prime congruence and argument
strength in study 1 when entered as a covariate. Although these measures are only proxies of
involvement at best, they do not indicate clear differences in involvement or personal
relevance between the two prime congruence conditions in study 1. In study 2, participants'
level of involvement in the product category was statistically controlled through
measurement. The results showed no difference in involvement in the product category
between the two prime congruence conditions. Nor did we find any significant difference in
time spent on reading the advertisement in study 2. As the studies entailed no explicit
manipulation of personal relevance, we cannot conclude that this might not account for some
of the elaborative effect of prime congruence. On the other hand, the measures seem to
support our contention that personal relevance is too equal to account for the majority of the
results.
Other studies of matching or congruence have as outlined earlier, matched or
mismatched messages to characteristics of the attitude objects, the individual, the attitude
function or -functions, etc. These practices are perhaps better described as producing
matching or congruent conditions by priming more chronically accessible concepts, whereas
the priming manipulation applied in the current studies is oriented towards temporary
accessibility (c.f., Higgins, 1996). Future studies might repeat the studies reported here for
individuals high vs.low in need for cognition (c.f., Pettyand Wegener, 1998b; Wheeler,
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2000), high vs.Iow in self-monitoring (c.f., Lavine and Snyder, 1996), high vs.Iow in need to
evaluate (c.f., Jarvis and Petty, 1996), etc.
Ability to elaborate is the second key facilitator of elaboration (Petty and Cacioppo,
1986, Petty and Wegener, 1998a). Ability to elaborate has often been manipulated by
introducing distraction tasks for the participant (see Petty and Wegener, 1998a for a review).
One potential explanation of the elaborative capacity of prime congruence in current research
is that participants in congruent conditions are better enabled to process information in
embedded advertisements - as the content of these advertisements can be readily
accommodated by congruent primes. We introduced no manipulations of ability to elaborate
in the current studies. On the contrary, the pace of the experiments was completely under the
control of each participant, they were free to spend the time they felt necessary. Future studies
might consider introducing ability manipulations to better delineate this potential explanation.
Different roles for prime target advertisement congruence: The current studies focused
on investigating the extent to which congruence served as a variable capable of increasing
elaboration likelihood on its own, which is but one potential way a variable in the elaboration
situation might exert its effect. One way worth commenting is congruence's capacity to bias
processing.
This is most likely when elaboration likelihood is high, and would produce main-
effect of congruence. In other words, when there is a match between the prime and the target,
elaboration should go in favor of the prime, or impart a favorable bias to the ongoing
information processing activity. Biased processing is most likely to occur when elaboration
likelihood is high - i.e., when the recipient has motivation and or ability to reach a particular
conclusion, or elaborate in a particular direction (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty and
Wegener, 1999). Petty and Wegener (1998b), Lavine and Snyder (1996, footnote 2), and Petty
et al. (2000) argue that biased processing is one possible explanation for the functional
matching effect in persuasion. Inparticular, Lavine and Snyder (1996) suggested that when
they found functional matching to invoke positive bias in message processing, it was likely
that "processing motivation was relatively high" (p.600).
All else being equal, unless the prime itself initially increases ability to elaborate, it
seems less likely that elaboration likelihood was sufficiently high to induce bias in the
contextual prime situation. Seen in isolation, the prime itself could through the accessibility
mechanism in the encoding stage, increase the elaboration likelihood, that is, the likelihood
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that subsequent information will be interpreted in line with or assimilated in direction of the
prime. Assimilation could result as a consequence of increasing prime-target congruity (Herr,
1986; Higgins, 1996). If there is a high degree of congruence, we might experience that
elaboration of the information in the subsequent advertisement is assimilated into the
cognitive schema triggered by the prime. The results of study 1 with higher correlation
between cognitive responses and brand attitudes in congruent conditions might indicate an
assimilative tendency. If on the other hand congruence is low, the primed information is not
applicable, and the result should be neither assimilation nor contrast.
Could congruity also produce a biased contrast effect? It could be the case that if the
prime is too blatantly administered, the recipient could adjust for the potential influence of the
prime, and elaborate in opposite to the prime - thereby producing a counter-biasing effect
(Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). In this case, the unawareness of the prime's influence
assumption of priming effects would to some extent have been violated.
The current studies utilized a fake brand, so no particular reason to draw a specific
conclusion seem prominent - at least it is not likely that motivation to reach a particular
conclusion should be especially higher for congruently primed participants compared to
incongruently primed participants. As the participants in the two prime conditions spent equal
amount of time reading the advertisement in both studies, and involvement was equal across
prime conditions in study 2, we do not find strong evidence of prime congruence serving to
bias elaboration.
However, could prime congruence have served as a peripheral cue in the current
studies? The cue explanation is viable in low-elaboration conditions. It presupposes that when
the recipient neither has the motivation, nor the ability to elaborate, the persuasion variable
will affect elaborative outcome through a low-elaborative process like e.g., simple inference,
heuristics etc (Petty and Cacioppo 1986; Petty and Wegener 1999).
Under the cue-explanation we could encounter assimilation and contrast effects. If the
prime itself has no effect on elaboration likelihood, higher levels of congruence should make
assimilation increasingly likely, and easy. However, the subsequent judgment would not be a
result of elaboration, meaning that under the cue explanation, we would expect no differences
in indicators of attitude strength between the two prime conditions. The correlational results
in study 1, and the attitude resistance and attitude confidence resistance results of study 2 do
show differences in attitude strength between the two prime conditions. Consequently, the
cue-based explanation of congruence seems less likely compared with the enhanced message
scrutiny explanation. Future research might pursue a more explicit test of the biased and cue-
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based explanations of prime congruence. For example, customers are frequently bombarded
with advertisements for both new and existing brands, brands they know from own
experience, or not. Based on level of experience with a particular brand, effects to prime
congruence might be different (c.f., Yi, 1993). Evidently, there are many research
opportunities left to investigate in order to gain a better understanding of the effect of
advertising context on advertising effectiveness.
6.3 Theoretical and managerial contributions
The purpose of any dissertation is to make contributions to existing knowledge. In the
following two paragraphs, some of the theoretical and managerial contributions of the current
studies are emphasized.
6.3.1 Theoretical contributions
Priming and persuasion are heavily researched, with rich traditions both with respect
to theory and methodology. This research contributes to both priming and persuasion theory
through the following.
First, the priming literature has frequently shown that primed concepts are likely to
influence subsequent perception (e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Higgins 1996). Until now,
the assumption has mainly been one of main-effects, i.e., that the higher the congruence
between context and advertisement, the better (e.g., Yi 1990a,b). However, because no
priming studies have manipulated the target advertisement's argument quality and/or gathered
process measures, we did not know how primed concepts might interact with properties of the
target advertisement in producing effects. In other words, we actually did not know if
congruence in some circumstances prompts a level of scrutiny that might backfire on brand
attitudes due to enhanced elaboration.
By manipulating the level of congruence between the editorial context, and the content
of the advertisement, we gained the first insights into the process of elaboration that takes
place when participants are being primed prior to the persuasive advertisement. The argument
strength manipulation was crucial in detecting differences in elaboration across levels of
prime congruence, a manipulation not previously employed in priming studies. The studies
also showed that prime targets didn't need to be highly ambiguous for priming effects to
occur.
Furthermore, the strength of primed brand attitudes has not been addressed in previous
priming research. Through our second experiment, we demonstrated the extent to which
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primed brand attitudes were differentially resistant to counter arguments both with respect to
decay in attitude extremity, and confidence of the attitudinal response, were different across
levels of prime congruence, thus adding to existing knowledge about priming effects and
persuasion. Additionally, the strength of attack manipulation showed that level of congruence
had attitude strength effects for both weak and strong attacks.
The persuasion literature has devoted less explicit attention to priming (c.f., Petty and
Wegener, 1998a; Eagly and Chaiken, 1998). Hence, priming has not been integrated with
persuasion theory. Through this dissertation project, an effort has been made to start filling
this gap. The assumed critical qualifier in the priming literature was the extent to which the
consumer was aware of the influence a priming attempt has on his or her subsequent attitude
(Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). By showing that the priming process indeed affected
elaboration of persuasive messages and attitude strength, this represents a significant
contribution to existing knowledge of how context affects persuasion.
6.3.2 Managerial contribution
Advertising plays an important role in most brand building efforts. The current studies
show that advertisements' effectiveness in producing strong brand attitudes cannot be fully
assessed without considering the context in which the advertisements appear. A brand
manager would typically have to consider where to place advertisements in order to obtain
maximum effect in a target market. Compared to costs of developing advertisements, their
placement costs can be substantial. Placed in the wrong context both with respect to which
media, and where within that medium, advertising dollars would be wasted. The main
contribution of managerial relevance from this dissertation pertains to the advertisement
placing strategy applied to a brand-building frame of reference.
Brand managers will benefit from being advised on how they might use context to
increase likelihood that their ads are processed as extensively as intended and therefore be
more successful in helping the brand achieve and maintain its intended position. They should
also be aware that as advertising context affects extent of scrutiny given to arguments
presented in the advertisement, they might benefit from testing the perceived strength of
arguments explicitly. In early stage of ad-copy development, it should be a manageable task
to conduct such tests.
To be effective, the advertisement has to be noticed, attended to, and hopefully
elaborated upon to obtain a strong, favorable and unique position in consumers' minds (Keller
1993; 2003). The results of study 1 and 2 clearly points out that even if an advertised brand is
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equally well evaluated at initial ad-exposure, the strength of the attitudes can be different
depending on the elaboration prompted by the level of congruence between ad-context and
ad-content. This project provides insights into how advertising context can be utilized as a
means to facilitate stronger brand attitudes.
Additionally, advertising testing procedures might become more accurate when
context is also considered. At present, test panels (e.g., focus-groups) are normally exposed to
the advertisements isolated from the media in which they occur, and from the specific content
preceding the advertisements (be that feature stories or other advertisements). This may lead
to inefficient decisions about the content of the advertisement itself, and the proper placing.
Furthermore, media brokers will also benefit from enhanced knowledge of context
effects. They may provide better advice to the advertisers, and thereby increase the
advertisement's value for the advertiser.
Finally, the owners of the media themselves might obtain a competitive edge if they
are able to match context and advertisements. Particularly, a content-based placement strategy
will require more collaboration between the advertiser, the media broker, and the media
owner to obtain an optimal fit between context and advertisements. Where you previously
paid for the space of the advertisement itself, we might experience a shift where pages facing
and following the advertisement are bought and filled with appropriate editorial content in
order to obtain the best control for context effects. In the most flexible current medium, the
Internet, you may today experience that advertisers place their advertisements as banners on
the most appropriate web pages.If technology allows this flexibility, this could also be the
future for off-line (i.e., print) media.
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ApPENDIX 2: STIMULI USED IN STUDY 1 AND 2
Many newspapers and magazines now have online versions of
their publications. While free of charge, the online versions typically have
many different formats and contain advertisements on the same pages as
the stories.
Some newspapers and magazines are considering the
development of online versions that do not contain advertisements, or only a
very limited amount of advertisements. These versions could be available by
subscription. Because little is known about consumer reactions to different
online formats (e.g., should the ad-free version look the same as the print
versions?), we are conducting this study.
On the following page you will read an example of a possible
format. After viewing the page, you will be asked to provide your opinions
about the layout.
Please read t he story carefully and take your time.
Press «spacebar' when you are ready to continue
Prime cover story
•••••• !Il
•• l»1If
.!!Il»
#t!ll
Many companies are uncertain about how information abouttheir
brands should be presented. To day, information about brands seems to
drown in other types of information, e.g., banner-ads etc.
We will ask you to evaluate one brand for a company who considers to
present their brand in full-screen format. The presentation you are about to
see is not completely readymade copy, so you should not attend too much
to ad execution. The picture is only illustrative.
Your task will be to provide overall assessment of the brand, and the
way it is presented. You should consider the informative value of the
presentation. You will also be asked to provide some judgments aboutthe
product categories this brand compete in.
As you will observe, there is no information about price in the
presentation. This is due to the fact thatthe brand is not yetlaunched.
However, you should assume that the price would be reasonable compared
to competing brands of same quality in the category.
Hit Nspacebar' when you are ready to continue!
Cover story before advertisement exposure
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VALUE
QUALITY
USEFULNESS
FUNCTIONALITY
PRACTICAL
EFFECTIVE
EFFICIENT
DURABILITY
Businesses realize that to please young customers.
these qualities are required oftheir brands
Cl In a recent survey of 2 000
undergraduates at three major
universities, respondents
claimed that they were getting
more concerned with
functional qualitie s of
products, and that they look
for "value for money" in their
purchases. The Internet IS
supporting this trend, with
search engines making price
comparisons easier. Says
Sara, 22 years old: "l am
paying more auenuon to the
benefits or value I get for the
money l spend. l guess it 's
because l have a tight student
budget" The study shows
that there are many others like
her.
o Businesses are recognizing
these trends by putting more
effort into advertising where
they try to convince
consumers that their brands
are "the best buy" , a "value-
deal", or "more for less."
Quality and value-seeking
consumers mean intensified
competition In many
categories. In the end, the
consumer benefits. The new
generation has shown
busine sses that they will not
be fooled by ads that tell them
that happiness lies in the
brands they wear or use.
Press spacebar to move ahead!
Congruent prime story study 1 and 2
PLEASANT
INTERESTING
AMUSING
VARIETY
ENJOYABLE
SUITABLE
PLEASURABLE
FUN
Businesses realize that to please young customers.
these qualities are required oftheir brands
o In a recent survey of 2000
undergraduates at three major
universities, respondents clai-
med that they would pay more
attention to other things than
work and career after gradu-
ation. Says Sara, 22 years: "l
do not want to spend my life
worlting 60 hours a week. I'll
work to live, not live to wont'~
When out shopping, she looks
for products that may provide
pleasure, and she shows little
brand loyalty. This is a new
challenge for marketers. Most
brands will have to provide a
variety of things, because pre-
ferences will change rapidly.
Cl Businesses have tried to
put labels on these young
people, but they don't seem to
apply very well. Some argue
that Internet has changed the
way young people think. feel.
and behave as consumers.
They want the easy way out,
and they want to be pleased.
When you lose the touch and
feel of things on the internet,
other things gain importance.
The key-words in the left
column shows this. Before
they where secondary
priorities. Today, they are top
priorities.
Press spacebar to move ahead!
Incongruent prime story study 1 and 2
123
Th€ N€w Vital Ess€nc€ Shampoo
-A new brand othab shempoc has just been developed.ln tests. over
halt of the people vAlo tried Vnal Essence thoughl lhat it cleaned
their hair b,,!ler thanlh .. shampoo tl19Y used at norne.
-Vital Essene,,'. all-nahMal ingredients provide your hair v.ith optimal
protection against sun and pOIklIion damage. while preventing
dandruff and hair toss.
- Provides essential vitamins for healthy hail and skin.
e The Vhl Essence Shampoo is avaUabt. in a ,,.ariely of sizes. and
unique formulas for dilferent hair Iypes.
eWdh contalners made of en·;ironmenlaJ.friendly and recyclable
material and natural ingrediems. you vJiIl nol halm Iha environment.
.Vital Essence shampoo \\111be-avaUable-at your hairdresser. lo mate
slire you gellhe right one for you and your hail.
The New Vital Essence
Shampoo - healthy haif Ih"
heanhyway
Press spacebar to move ahead!
Advertisement strong argument condition study 1 and 2
Th€ N€w Vital £ss€nc€ Shampoo
• A new brand of hail shampoo has just been developed. Inlhe pretests,
half the peop!& who tried Vhal Essen1:e fen it ct.aned their hair as good
as Ihe shampoo they used al home . as long as Ihey stayed out of rain
and wind
• This is due lo the ne-,I/ scientific formula with synthetic silicona. Il will
leduce some types of dandruff. and will Mt harm your scalp ifyou don'l
use II more than IhrH times a week
• The synthetic silicone formuta provides il shell around hair. making Ihe
haif easity manageabt..
• This shampoo is clearly il good substitute for all the shampoos you
hava previously used.
• h comes inlh,ee ditterenl siZes, and the fOffill.lla works \lAth most types
ofhair.The New V~at Essence
Shampoo - Hai, care fOI
everyone - every time - Vital Essence Shampoo will soon arrive at a supermækst neal you
Press spacebar to move ahead!
Advertisement weak argument condition study 1
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J
Because of concern for their readers, the online newspaper wants to
make sure they are promoting high-quality products. Therefore,
newspaper staff pre-tested the shampoo for a few weeks before
launch.
A summary of their judgments shows the following:
·On a ten point satisfaction scale (ten being best), the average
rating of the shampoo was only 3
·More than half of the staff said it made their hair feel more coarse
·15 % said they experienced increased dandruff problems
·75 % said they would rather stick to the shampoo they used
before
Press "spacebar" to move ahead
Strong counterargument message used in study 2
Because of concern for their readers, the online newspaper wants to
make sure they are promoting high-quality products. Therefore,
newspaper staff pre-tested the shampoo for a few weeks before
launch.
A summary of their judgments shows the following:
-On a ten point satisfaction scale (ten being best), the average rating
of the shampoo was 6
·Many reported that the shampoo bottle was a bit slippery when wet
·Some did not like the color of the shampoo, and
·Some people did not like the scent of the shampoo
Press "spacebar" to move ahead
Weak counterargument message used in study 2
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ApPENDIX 3: MEASUREMENT ITEMS USED IN THE STUDIES
Need for evaluation (Jarvis and Petty, 1996)
nevall I form opinions about everything
neva12 I prefer to avoid taking extreme positions
neavl3 It is very important for me to hold strong opinions
neval4 I know exactly what is good and bad about everything
neval5 I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues
neval6 If something goes not affect me, I do not usually determine whether it is good or bad
neval7 I enjoy strongly liking and disliking new things
neval8 There are many things for which I do not have a preference
neval9 It bothers me to remain neutral
nevaIlO I like to have strong opinions even when I am not personally involved
nevaIll I have more opinions than the average person
nevall2 I would rather have a strong opinion, than no opinion at all
nevall3 I pay a lot of attention to whether things are good or bad
nevall4 I only form strong opinions when I have to
nevall5 I like to decide that new things are really good or really bad
nevall6 I am pretty much indifferent to many important issues
7 point scale, 1 = extremely uncharacteristic of me, 4 = uncertain, 7 = extremely characteristic of me
Need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao, 1984)
ncogl
ncog2
ncog3
ncog4
I prefer complex to simple problems
I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking
Thinking is not my idea of fun
I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge
my thinking abilities
I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth
about something
I find satisfaction in deliberating hard for long hours
I only think as hard as I have to
I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones
I like tasks that require little thought once I have learned them
The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me
I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems
ncog5
ncog6
ncog7
ncog8
ncog9
ncoglO
ncogll
ncogl2 Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much
ncogl3 I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve
ncogl4 The notion ofthinking abstractly is appealing to me
Iwould prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and more important to that is somewhatncogl5 important but does not require much thought
ncogl6 Ifeel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort
ncogl7 It's enough for me that something gets the job done; Idon't care how it works
ncogl8 Iusually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally
7-point scale, 1= extremely uncharacteristic ofme, 4 = uncertain, 7 = extremely characteristic ofme
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sm6
sm7
Self-monitoring (Lennox and Wolfe, 1984)
sml In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel something else is called for
I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish
to give them
When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change to something that
does
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people in different situations
I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself
in
Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front
Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly
sm2
sm3
sm4
smS
sm8 I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly from their eyes
In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the person I
sm9 am conversing with
smlO My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and
motives
I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh
smll convincingly
sml2 I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes
sml3 If someone is lying to me, I usually know at once from a person's manner of expression
7-point scale, 1 = never true, 4 = neutral, 7 = always true
Propensity to self-reference (Haugtvedt, 1994, Shakarchi and Haugtvedt, 2004)
I find that thinking back to my own experiences always helps me understand things better in new
nsrl and unfamiliar situations
nsr2
nsr3
nsr4
nsrS
nsr6
nsr7
I think it is easier to learn anything if only we can relate it to ourselves and our experiences
When Iread stories, I am often reminded of my own experiences in similar circumstances
I often find myself use past experiences to help me remember new information
I think it is easier to evaluate anything if only we can relate it to ourselves and our experiences
I always think about how things around me affect me
In casual conversations, I find that I frequently think about my own experience as other people
describe theirs
When explaining ideas or concepts to other people, I find that I always use my own experiences as
nsr8 examples
7-point scale, 1 = extremely uncharacteristic ofme, 4 = uncertain, 7 = extremely characteristic ofme
Attitude toward the brand study 1, pre attack study 2 (Haugtvedt and Petty, 1992; Vi, 1990)
Instruction: To what extent did you find the shampoo brand
1 2 3 4
bratl
brat2
brat3
S 6 7
Bad
Negative
Unfavorable
Good
Positive
Favorable
Attitude toward the brand post attack study 2
Instruction: Now that you have read the test results, we would like to know how you feel about the
product. Your feelings might be more positive, less positive, or unchanged.
bratl 2
brat2 2
brat3 2
To what extent did you find the shampoo brand
1 2 3 4
Bad
Negative
Unfavorable
S 6 7
Good
Positive
Favorable
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Attitude toward the advertisement study 1, pre attack study 2 (Aylesworth and MacKenzie,
1998; MacKenzie and Spreng, 1992)
Instruction Now we want you to consider the advertisement itself, not the brand. Please click the
number that best describes your judgment of the advertisement.
1234567
atadl
atad2
atad3
Bad
Dislike
Unfavorable
Good
Like
Favorable
Attitude toward the advertisement post attack study 2
Instruction Now we want you to consider the advertisement itself, not the brand. After having read
about the experiences reported by the brand users, we want you to click the number that
best describes your judgment of the advertisement.
1234567
atad1_2
atad2_2
atad3_2
Bad
Dislike
Unfavorable
Good
Like
Favorable
Category Involvement (laurent and Kapferer, 1985; Mittal and Lee, 1988)
involv1 I tend to care a lot about what shampoo I use
involv2 I think you run a big risk if you choose a shampoo that is inappropriate for your hair
involv3 The choice of shampoo is important to me
7-point scales, 1= Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree
Purchase intention study 1, pre attack study 2
What is the likelihood that you would purchase the advertised shampoo when it becomes
available in the market?
pintl
1
Not very likely
3 4 52 6 7
Very likely
Purchase intention post attack study 2
After having read the about the experiences reported by brand users, we want you to click
the number that best describes the likelihood that you would purchase the advertised
shampoo when it becomes available in the market?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
pintl_2 Not very likely Very likely
atcon1
Attitude confidence pre attack study 2
atcon2
atcon3
Please click the number that best characterizes how certain you are about the judgments
you made about the shampoo.
7 point scale, 1 = Very uncertain, 7 =Very certain
Please click the number that best characterizes how certain you are about the judgments
you made about the shampoo.
7 point scale, 1 = Very unsecure, 7 =Very secure
Please click the number that best characterizes how confident you feel about the judgments
you made about the shampoo.
7 point scale, 1 = Very unconfident, 7 = Very confident
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Attitude confidence post attack study 2
atcon1_2 Please click the number that best characterizes how certain you are about the judgments
you expressed after having read the test results.
7 point scale, 1 = Very uncertain, 7 = Very certain
atcon2_2 Please click the number that best characterizes how certain you are about the judgments
you expressed after having read the test results.
7 point scale, 1 = Very unsecure, 7 = Very secure
atcon3_2 Please click the number that best characterizes how confident you feel about the judgments
you expressed after having read the test results.
7 point scale, 1 = Very unconfident, 7 = Very confident
Manipulation checks
congruent Sara is very concerned about the functionality and quality of the things she buys
prime
7 point scale, 1= Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree
incongruent
prime
Sara just goes for the stuff that pleases her, and lives for the joy of the moment
7 point scale, 1= Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree
argument
strength
Please click the number that best describes your judgment of the strength of the
information in the advertisement
7 point scale, 1= very weak, 7 = Very strong
attack To what extent did you find the test results to believable?
believability
7 point scale, 1= Not at all believable, 7 = Very believable
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